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 According to Greek mythology, Zeus, king of the gods had intended for 
Man to live without consciousness, believing that knowledge would only bring 
misery upon them. Driven by pity, the Titan Prometheus stole divine fire from 
Zeus, and unleashed a flood of inventiveness, creativity and culture on the Earth. 
Realising Prometheus’ treachery, Zeus had him shackled to the side of a crag. 
Each day, Zeus would send an eagle to tear at the Titan’s flesh and devour his 
liver. Each night, the wounds would heal so that Prometheus could be tormented 
once more.1  
 
  Like Prometheus, large corporations who own copyright content are 
responsible for much of the technological innovation that occurs in digital 
markets. Yet the recent cases in North America and Europe suggest that they are 
also attractive targets for allegations of anticompetitive abuses of their market 
power. Whenever a copyright owner is alleged to have refused to license its 
content, two regimes are primed for collision. On one hand, copyright law 
requires the integrity of a state-granted monopoly to be protected by giving 
owners the prerogative to deal as they please. On the other, competition law 
demands derogation through compulsory access to further its goals that may not 
be consistent with copyright policy. The principal challenge lies in developing a 
coherent framework to determine when and how intervention should occur.  
 
                                                 
1 Aeschylus, et al, Prometheus Bound: Greek Tragedy in New Translations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989) 
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 Recent developments at the Faculty of Law at the National University of 
Singapore have provided a timely reminder that the law coexists in an ecosystem 
with other disciplines. Two double-degrees with the economics and business 
administration departments now complement the traditional four-year LLB 
program. This may well reflect the multidisciplinary competence those 
researching and practicing law here will eventually be expected to possess if they 
are to remain competitive. In this spirit, while the focus of this dissertation rests 
firmly upon the laws of Singapore, North America and the European Union, it 
incorporates microeconomic analysis integral to understanding digital copyright 
markets.  
 
 With the needs of the busy reader in mind, I aim to make this complex 
debate as comprehensive as possible, whilst scattering suggestions throughout. 
Like allegorical seeds, some will doubtlessly fall on stony ground, but others may 
be expected, if nurtured, to flourish. The reader may find the discussion 
demanding at various points. If so, explanations for unfamiliar economic or 
technological concepts may be found either in the footnotes accompanying the 
discussion, or Appendices at the end of this work. Indeed, more than half of the 
81, 702 words that fill these covers are found in there - only the barest, most 
essential ideas are included in the main text. The implications of economic models 
have been stated in words and diagrams, rather than mathematical equations, as is 
normally the case. Finally, graphical representations are meant only to be 
illustrative and are not a necessary condition to follow the discussion.   
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Fig.1: An allegorical depiction of the evisceration of creativity by unjustifiably harsh 
competition  regulation in digital copyright markets.        
Source: Peter Paul Reubens, Prometheus Bound. 1611-2, completed by 1618.  Oil on canvas, 
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 Competition rules regulating access to digital copyright content in the US 
and EU have largely been misdirected or incomplete. This has resulted in 
complex, sometimes conflicting, rules governing refusals to license, and may stem 
from insufficient appreciation of the fundamental legal and economic issues 
involved. In a world where intellectual property serves as one of the sources of 
greatest value, a finely tuned competition policy is more important than ever 
before. This dissertation therefore aims to formulate salient guidelines for 
applying the Singapore Competition Act 2004 to digital markets.  
 
 Copyright as it presently exists in the digital realm has distorted the 
utilitarian balance. Overbroad copyright risks retarding innovation, particularly in 
digital markets where innovation is interdependent on interoperability and access 
to copyright content. No measure at present seems capable of addressing 
anticompetitive abuses by copyright owners endogenously within the copyright 
regime. This may have caused copyright abuses to fall within the purview of 
competition law.  
 
 Section 47 of the Competition Act prohibits the dominant copyright owner 
from abusing its rights. However, “dominance” and “abuse” are arbitrary concepts 
that have been made more uncertain by broad textured legislation. The flexibility 
offered to those interpreting key terms that determine liability has sometimes 
caused a divergence in approaches based on the particular economic goals and 
legal analytical framework chosen.  
 
 xi
 From a legal perspective, the law sometimes fails to appreciate the nature 
of the grant under copyright law and tends to over or under-compensate the owner 
at the expense of encouraging further creative works. Analogies to real property 
rights are inappropriate. Digital copyright is susceptible to free riding, and owners 
should be more justified in refusing access. The extent of this justification turns on 
the scope of the copyright grant. By explicitly taking into account the owner’s 
statutory rights, analysis will be more principled and conceptually certain. 
Analysis should also include an express weighing of the socio-economic costs and 
benefits in the refusal in order for proper calibration of copyright immutability.  
 
 From an economic perspective, the law sometimes gives insufficient 
attention to gains from dynamic efficiency. Concerns about preserving SMEs 
reflect pious socio-political aspirations based on inconclusive evidence, rather 
than more readily identifiable economic targets. Similarly, focusing on price and 
output gains of static efficiency neglects the greater benefits which technological 
progress brings. Any failure of market discipline on prices and output is only 
temporary. Even on a long-run view of markets that acknowledges the need for 
appropriation by IP owners and continual control over access to their content is 
taken, the law may still fail to appreciate the economics of network effects.  
 
 Ultimately, rivals should be encouraged to independently innovate and 
develop new and better copyright content where possible, rather than relying on 
compulsory access as a crutch to compete. How the law develops in Singapore 
will have a substantial bearing on her national economy. Countries with legal 
 xii
systems able to deliver quick, sound and binding answers to tough questions like 
these will likely take the baton in world trade.  
 xiii
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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION: THE REASON FOR, AND SCOPE OF,  
THIS WORK 
 
The sower may mistake and sow his peas 
crookedly; 
The peas make no mistake, but come up and show his line. 
 
       Ralph Waldo Emerson2 
 
 
 The theory that the law can identify and prohibit harmful business 
practices is probably the single most important, yet underdeveloped, idea in 
competition policy today.3 As a tool of competition policy, competition law 
regulates a myriad of sectors in the economy. Of these sectors, those involving 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) 4, particularly in digital markets, 5 have recently 
galvanised considerable public interest.6 The development of competition policy 
                                                 
2 Quoted in P C McGraw, Life Strategies: Doing What Works, Doing What Matters (New York: 
Hyperion, 1999), at p.56.  
3 Competition policy as understood here encompasses all government policies that preserve and 
protect competition among independent buyers and sellers in relatively unregulated markets. This 
includes market opening policies that promote competition in national markets and laws that 
regulate commercial trade and conduct. Of these, two notable ones are competition law and 
intellectual property law. See A. Borner and R. Krueger, The Basics of Antitrust Policy: A Review 
of Ten Nations and the European Community’ World Bank Technical Paper No. 160, 
(Washington: The World Bank,1991) See also S. Urata, ‘Competition Policy and Economic 
Development in East Asia’ 1 Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Winter/Summer 
(2002) (“The term ‘competition policy’ is defined broadly to include not only competition law but 
other measures such as regulation, trade and foreign direct investment that influence 
competition.”).  
4 Article 2.8 of the WIPO Convention states that ‘intellectual property’ includes ‘the rights relating 
to literary, artistic and scientific works- performances and performing artists, photographs and 
broadcasts, inventions in all fields of human endeavour, scientific discoveries, industrial designs, 
trademarks, service marks, and commercial names and designations, protection against unfair 
competition and all other rights resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, 
literary or artistic fields.’ http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/convention/index.html See also W R 
Cornish and D Llewellyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Edition, 2003) at p.6. 
5 Digital markets refer to three distinct, but related industries: computer programs; e-commerce 
and info-communications. The principal output of digital markets is IP- copyright, patents and 
trade secrets over computer code. See R A Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001), at p.245. 
6 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Cutris V. Trinko, [2004] LLP 540 US 682; 
United States v. Microsoft [2000] 253 F.3d 34; EC Commission v. Microsoft [2004] Case T-
201/04. See P Thorott, ‘EU’s Microsoft Verdict Raises Questions’, Windows IT Pro, 25 March 
2005, at http://www.windowsitpro.com/Article/ArticleID/42133/42133.html. (Describing the US 
Microsoft case as ‘high-profile’), EU Business, ‘EU Court to Announce Microsoft Verdict’, 21 
 2
when applied to IPRs depends on the appreciation courts have of their underlying 
legal and economic nuances. In particular, theories crafted to allow or prohibit 
refusals to license will be central in shaping competition rules in digital markets, 
which become more increasingly important in this technological age.7 For this 
reason, it is imperative to develop an appreciation of this issue.    
 
 Amongst the species of IPRs, copyright has seen the greatest development 
over the last decade.8 Copyright protects expression of ideas and information that 
are of commercial value. Any resulting market power it enjoys is often justified- 
to reward the owner, as well as to encourage further creativity. 9 Owners are not 
required to exploit their creations for the benefit of others,10 and copyright law 
                                                                                                                                      
December 2004, (A European Union court is to issue its initial verdict Wednesday in a high-profile 
anti-trust case pitting US software giant Microsoft against the EU's executive commission.) 
http://www.eubusiness.com/Competition/041222012144.gw02yo17. 
7 C Shapiro, ‘Competition Policy’ in E Hope, Information Economy in Foundations of Competition 
Policy Analysis (London: Routlege, 2000).  
8 As a Member of Parliament noted: “Under the IP umbrella, copyright protection deserves special 
focus, as core copyright activities are one of the fastest growing industries in Singapore, outpacing 
Singapore's economy over a 15-year period from 1986 to 2001.” Z Nordin, Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates, 16 November 2004 at : 
http://www.parliament.gov.sg:80/reports/public/hansard/title/20041116/20041116_S0004_T0003.
html#1  
9 The phrase ‘market power’ will be used throughout this dissertation. It is important to stress that 
this refers to substantial market power over a significant amount of time. See Competition 
Commission of Singapore (CCS) Draft Guidelines on the Section 47 Prohibition (Draft 
Guidelines), para. 3, available at: 
 http://www.ccs.gov.sg/Doc/GuidelinesConsultation/Abuse_of_Dominant_Position29032005.pdf..  
(“An undertaking will not be dominant unless it has substantial market power”) See D W Carlton 
and J M Perloff, Modern Industrial Organisation, 4th edn,  (Boston: Pearson, 2005) at 642. (“This 
ability to set price above marginal cost implicitly uses the model of perfect competition as a 
benchmark against which to measure the behaviour of firm. If this definition is applied literally, 
probably every firm in the United States has at least a tiny bit of market power. The model of 
perfect competition is an extreme one that describes few, if any, actual industries. Therefore, 
presumably, when courts find that a firm has market power, they must mean the firm has a 
substantial amount of market power for some significant time.”) (Emphasis mine.) Richard Posner 
has preferred to term this “monopoly power” since market power as such may inaccurately be 
understood as the power to affect the price of the goods sold. Non-fungible goods are inherently 
differentiated according to consumer taste, thus any of these goods possess differing degrees of 
market power. See R A Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1976) at p. 11. 
10 Para. 3.1 Antitrust Guidelines for Intellectual Property, issued by the Department of Justice, 
April 6, 1995.   
 3
allows owners to procure injunctions and damages against unlicensed users. They 
may also refuse to license their content if they so choose.11   
 
 Copyright has expanded rapidly to cover traditionally unprotected subject 
matter such as computer programs and electronic data – principal outputs of 
digital markets.12 Copyright also covers functional interfaces in digital standards. 
This data is needed for DVDs to play across regions. It is also needed for portable 
music players to play across different codices and software to work over different 
operating systems (OS). As the Guidelines recognise, copyright owners may use 
their copyright as entry barriers.13 Owners may therefore use their control to 
access to key components to eliminate industry rivals and stifle the future 
development of the industry.14  
 
 As a matter of policy, this is undesirable. Overprotection makes it difficult 
for subsequent authors to borrow from their predecessors. This violates 
copyright’s mandate to promote creativity, since almost all creative work is 
derivative.15 Overprotection also allows owners to distort the competitive 
                                                 
11 Continental Paper Bag. v. Eastern Paper Bag  [1908] 210 US 405. (“The right can only retain 
its attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention of its violation.”). Genentech v. Eli Lilly Co. [1993] 
998 F.2d 931, at 949 (Fed. Cir.) (Patentees must have the power to select exclusive licenses as they 
see fit). Congress has since codified the patent’s right to refuse to use the patent. Section 271(d)(4) 
provides that a patent owner cannot be deemed guilty of misuse by virtue of its refusal to use or 
license the patent. 35 USC §271(d)(4). While this is a patent case, the principle applies equally to 
copyright. See also H Hovenkamp et al, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles 
Applied to Intellectual Property (New York: Aspen Law, 2003) at §18.8 (“While the statute refers 
to patent misuse, and does not directly cover antitrust violations, the policy it expresses is still 
relevant.”). 
12 R A Posner, supra, n. 4.  
13 Ibid, at 10.15. (Noting that “intellectual property rights can be entry barriers”.) 
14 See discussion in Chapter I, Part II.D.2 
15 W M Landes and R A Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’, (1989) 18 Journal of 
Legal Studies 325.  
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process.16 In today’s digital marketplace, an unprecedented number of essential 
products are tightly bound up in standards-dependent interfaces.17 Competition 
authorities are concerned with two possible abuses of digital copyright. First, 
owners have the incentive to adopt competitive strategies to prevent rival product 
compatibility, making it difficult for firms developing alternative standards to 
compete effectively.18 Second, there is concern that the number of ‘locked in’ 
customers reduces the incentive for the market to adopt a more effective 
network.19  
 
 William Cornish and David Llewelyn observed that the growing 
importance of IPRs make them increasingly susceptible to “critical” scrutiny. 20 
Aided by little more than parsimoniously worded legislation and the cautious 
dicta of their peers, judges have attempted a complicated balance of interests 
underlying two seemingly incompatible regimes: one conferring the right to 
exclude others, and the other condemning the exercise of this exclusionary right in 
                                                 
16 R Pitofsky, ‘Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New 
Economy’, (2001) 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 535 (Stating that the “essential feature that is new about 
the 'New Economy' is its increased dependence on products and services that are the embodiments 
of ideas”). 
17 See discussion in Chapter I, Part II.D.1.  
18 D Rubinfield, ‘Competition, Innovation and Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network 
Industries’, Speech before Software Publishers Association Meeting (1998),  at 5-6.  
19 Y M Wang, ‘Opening the ‘Black Box’ of Network Externalities in Network Adoption’ (2000) 
11 Information Systems Research 61. The recent technological fracas involving Apple’s 
revolutionary iPods music players provide an example of both. Apple has sold over 2 million iPods 
and owns 90% of the market for hard-drive music players. Its Music Store website provides 70% 
of all paid-music downloads worldwide. It possesses market power in the clearest sense. 
Competitors and consumers have complained that songs purchased from the iTunes music store 
can only be played on an iPod because Apple has thus far refused to license interface information 
to rival music services or device makers in order to protect its market share.19 In doing so, Apple 
potentially restricts competition in the first sense, by refusing access to rivals, as well as locking in 
consumers, thus abusing its copyright in the second sense. A Salkever, ‘A Bitter Apple Replay?’, 
(14 October 2004) BusinessWeek Online at: 
 http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2004/tc20041014_9962_tc056.htm.  
See also Chapter III, Part IV for a detailed discussion of this issue.   
20 W R Cornish and D Llewellyn, supra, n. 3 at iv. (Noting that since the industrialised world 
operates as a set of knowledge based societies, intellectual property rights have become the 
foreground features of economies. The way they are exploited will therefore be the subject of 
greater scrutiny than before, “much of it highly critical.”) 
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certain circumstances. In so doing, they have a responsibility to ensure that the 
rules governing access do not eviscerate statutory monopoly rights due to owners  
under copyright law. 
 
 Casual observers looking at the vast amount of academic literature on 
decisions applying competition law to refusals to license IPRs (‘the Interface’) 
might assume that such a significant issue has been comprehensively discussed 
and resolved. If so, then they would be deceived. The debate has largely generated 
more heat than light. Indeed, it is surprising how unclear the boundaries of the law 
in refusals to license remain, given the constant rhetoric of how important 
commercial certainty is. 21   
 
 The call for scholarship to develop competition rules applicable to digital 
markets has largely gone unanswered. 22 Scholars such as David Teece have noted 
that regulation of digital markets appear to “be moving in uncharted territory, 
unassisted by scholarly research on innovation and competition”.23 Unless and 
until the central issues are clarified, new cases will not have a firm foundation 
upon which to develop sound precedents. Uncertainty over what constitutes 
competition law violations is undesirable. Conduct having desirable competitive 
                                                 
21I Rahnasto, Intellectual Property Rights, External Effects and Anti-trust Law, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) at pp.13-6. (Criticising the judicial approach of some cases which that base 
their conclusions on doctrines without proper explication of their goals or analytical framework, 
and noting that while case law has expanded and new problem areas identified, case law remains 
vague in terms of theory and practice.) 
22 G Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe, (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2000) (“Given the lack 
of clarity of what is meant by a truly competitive economy, it is not surprising that there is a lack 
of clarity about the aims of competition law… There is a firm need for the concept of abuse in the 
context of IPRs to be properly clarified.”) at p.846. (Emphasis mine) 
23 D J Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Organizational, Strategic and Policy 
Dimensions,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at p.159 
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effects may be deterred,24and uncertain competition rules repel foreign direct 
investment.25 Economies as large and resilient as those in Europe and the US may 
survive false condemnations of efficient market conduct with little more than a 
bad hangover. Singapore, with its umbilical dependence on international trade and 
investment from dominant, high technology multinationals, will feel its 
repercussion much more keenly. The success achieved by courts and regulators 
here in prudently intervening where appropriate will be crucial for Singapore’s 
economic future. 
 
 It is therefore timely to understand the challenges courts and regulators in 
Singapore may encounter at the Interface to cultivate a principled growth of local 
jurisprudence. Following EU and US cases may provide some initial relief against 
commercial uncertainty. However, the relief is at best, only temporary. Singapore 
will soon be required to develop autochthonous rules to suit a vastly different 
socio-economic climate from these jurisdictions. Each chapter in this dissertation 
therefore attempts to carefully formulate guidelines for implementing competition 
                                                 
24 As Baxter put it:  “If our antitrust laws were to impede technological development to any 
substantial degree, the net effect of those laws on our well-being would surely be negative.” W.F. 
Baxter, ‘Antitrust Law and Technological Innovation’, (1985) Issues in Science and Technology 
80 
25 US firms in particular are loath to pursue investment opportunities in the face of insecure IPRs, 
especially in light of the traditional antipathy inherent in US antirust law toward compulsory 
licensing. A review of the cases cited in that article reveals that few of the US courts that have 
considered the issue have actually held that an intellectual property owner's refusal to license 
violated antitrust law. The rare instances of compulsory licensing described in the article involve 
judicial approval of a compulsory licensing order imposed by US federal antitrust enforcement 
authorities as a condition of settlement of an antitrust dispute  R  Pitofsky et al., ‘The Essential 
Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law’, (2002) 70 Antitrust L.J. 443, at pp.458-61.  See also 
D M Gitter, ‘International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States 
and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption’, 
(2001) 76 NYU. L. Rev. 1623, at p. 1681 (noting, with respect to patent cases, the traditional 
rejection under U.S. law of compulsory licensing) R G Badal and H E Ware, ‘EU's Differing 
Approach’, (2002) Nat'l L.J A15 www.nlj.com, at A15 (explaining that U.S. firms are watching 
closely EC competition judgments, including the IMS case, in making investment decisions);  T A 
Piraino, Jr., ‘A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology Competition’ (2002) William 
and Mary Law Review 67  
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rules in digital markets. Done properly, these guidelines can approach the clarity 
of bright line rules without sacrificing the ability for the law to be flexible and 
responsive to factual peculiarities. These guidelines may then be revised and 
rebutted in the light of experience. 
 
 Chapter I examines the basis for competition law interfering with 
copyright in Singapore. By understanding the rationale for copyright protection, it 
will be shown that a desire to boost trade revenues and curb digital piracy have 
strengthened copyright at the expense of distorting the access-incentive balance 
underlying copyright policy. This distortion has lead to copyright owners 
exercising market power traditionally possessed by patent owners. Overbroad 
copyright risks retarding innovation, particularly in digital markets where 
innovation often depends on interoperability and access to copyright content.26 
While endogenous checks exist within copyright law, they are unlikely to address 
the distortion satisfactorily. The trend has instead been to rely on competition law 
as a panacea to counterbalance the effects of burgeoning copyright.  
 
 Chapter II develops the inquiry by examining the law at the Interface. It 
observes that the relevant rules, while simple to state, are difficult to apply. It 
begins by looking at the Singapore Competition Act 2004 27 (‘Competition Act’), 
and studies the relationship between generic competition and sector specific 
regulation, which copyright resembles. The study turns to how courts have 
determined key concepts such as ‘dominance’ and ‘abuse’ in IP and digital 
markets. It observes that judicial decisions are inconsistent and at times, 
                                                 
26 ‘Content’ here refers to subject matter protected under copyright laws, and not ‘content’ in the 
sense of  knowledge or unprotectable information.   
27 (Cap 46, 2004)    
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unprincipled. Courts may proceed on the assumption that the ends of competition 
policy are clear, and the analytics to resolving digital copyright cases simple. 
These are most likely get it wrong. Like the allegorical iceberg, issues appear 
straightforward, but to resolve them meaningfully, courts must be prepared to 
delve much deeper.  
 
 Chapter III proposes the first of two pillars for developing sound 
competition theory in digital copyright markets: clear economic goals. Cases have 
generally been driven by three schools of economic theory. The first is the 
Harvard School, which vigorously opposes market power and high market 
concentration. Harvard regulators believe dominance is intrinsically bad because it 
reduces product diversity and technological development. Where copyright 
confers such market power it should be scrutinised and where appropriate, 
cauterised. The second view, adopted by Chicago School regulators, use 
competition law to promote social welfare through the free working of markets. 
The goal of competition law is then to support market created efficiencies by 
eliminating practices that corrupt market efficiency through trade restraints. The 
third view comes from the Schumpeterian School, which proposes that a retooling 
of competition analytics is required to recognize the new competitive landscape. It 
takes into account characteristics of digital markets such as network effects, 
tipping, path dependency and lock-ins. The Chapter concludes with an observation 
that while each successive economic theory may increase the rigour of 




 Chapter IV completes the analysis in discussing the second pillar for 
developing competition theory at the Interface: sound legal analytics. The 
discussion starts from a rudimentary property rights approach. Under this 
approach, the proprietary nature of digital copyright determines the threshold for 
‘abuse’. A second approach pivots upon the scope of the copyright grant, where 
conduct deemed to be within the scope is inviolable, whereas conduct outside of it 
will be subject to scrutiny. In the final approach, courts attempt to weigh the 
perceived costs of allowing owners to refuse to license against a set of perceived 
benefits. The Chapter concludes with the suggestion that courts in Singapore may 
find elements of each approach that may be relevant in developing an 
autochthonous approach.   
 




 Jurisprudence from courts in the US and EU are likely to be the most 
influential in Singapore. The US Sherman Act permeates competition laws in 
jurisdictions as diverse as the EU, Japan and Australia. 28 In 2003, the Economic 
Review Committee recommended that Singapore enact a generic competition 
                                                 
28 Section 2 (15 USC § 2) declares that it is unlawful for undertakings to monopolize or attempt to 
monopolise trade or commerce within the US or with foreign nations It thus limits the means by 
which undertakings may lawfully either acquire or perpetuate market power, or as well as attempts 
to do so. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Services, Inc.,[1992] 504 U.S. 451, 480, 112 S.Ct. 
2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265. (Kodak), citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., [1966] 384 U.S. 563, 570-
71, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (“The offense of monopoly power under § 2 of the Sherman Act 
has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful 
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”) Neither necessitates a 
rule of reason inquiry. The Court added a third limb: (3) that as a result, the plaintiff suffered 
antitrust injury. See also K Middleton et al, Cases and Materials on UK and EC Competition Law, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 14. (“The influence of US antitrust scholars on the 
development of competition laws throughout the world has been profound.”)  
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law.29 However, it was not until the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, that 
generic competition law found its way into Singapore’s domestic markets.30 Like 
competition laws in the US and EU, the Competition Act prohibits 
anticompetitive mergers, collusive agreements and abuse of dominance. The 
means by which the Act was introduced, as well as the significant influence the 
US continues to have on the local economy, compel the conclusion that 
developments in US antitrust jurisprudence will remain a closely followed point 
of reference. If more reasons are needed, it need only be remembered that the US 
is also the largest exporter of technology in the world.31  
 
 Jurisprudence from EU and UK will also be relevant. Structurally, the 
Competition Act more closely resembles the UK Competition Act 1998, 32 which 
                                                 
29The ERC suggested that to encourage the growth of enterprising startups, a generic competition 
law should be enacted “to institutionalise a regime where no company enjoys unfair privileges, and 
must compete on equal footing in the market with others. See Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
Singapore, http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/ERC/frm_ERC_default.asp?sid=99  at p.118.  
30 On 1 January 2004, the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) came into force. The 
full text version of the USSFTA can be found at  
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Section_Index.html. The 
relevant chapters for discussion on its relevance to the interface between competition policy and 
IPRs are Chapters 12 and 16. Article 12.2, Footnote 12-1 provides “Singapore shall enact general 
competition legislation by January 2005, and shall not exclude enterprises from that legislation on 
the basis of their status as government enterprises.” The Competition Policy Chapter in the 
USSFTA fulfils two broad functions. First, it was designed to ensure that having obtained mutual 
market access, this access is not nullified or impeded by an unfair business environment. In this 
sense, it is “enabling”, and provides the necessary structure for optimal exploitation of FTA 
concessions. Secondly, the Competition Policy Chapter was designed to provide the assurance that 
the Singapore government would continue in its policy of allowing Government Linked 
Companies (GLCs) to act independently. Chapter 12 is entitled “Anticompetitive Business 
Conduct, Designated Monopolies, and Government Enterprises” Chapter 16 is entitled 
“Intellectual Property Rights”. The IPR Chapter was to provide US and Singapore based 
companies with increased IP protection. These are significantly stronger than those contained in 
the TRIPS agreement. See T Koh and Chang L L, The United States Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement: Highlights and Insights (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies and World Scientific 
Publishing, 2004) 
31 144 Cong. Rec. S12,377 (Daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“America exports 
more copyrighted intellectual property than any country in the world....[I]n 1996, the core U.S. 
copyright industries achieved foreign sales and exports exceeding $60 billion, surpassing, for the 
first time, every other export sector....”). 
32 Senior Minister of State for Trade and Industry, V Balakrishnan, Singapore Parliamentary 
Debates, 19 October 2004   
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takes its form from the EC Treaty.33 Early development of copyright law in 
England set the framework that was largely adopted throughout the 
Commonwealth. These principles were selectively welded together with some 
Continental influences such as moral rights in copyrighted works, and later 
diffused internationally through treaties and conventions, which embodied a 
multilateral aspiration for international harmonisation of IP law.34 Thus, while the 
Singapore Copyright Act 1999 (Copyright Act)35 was derived from the Australian 
Copyright Act 1968, cases from the US, the UK and to a lesser extent, the EU 
have contributed to its development. In considering issues concerning Singapore 
copyright law, statute and case law from these jurisdictions are therefore 
relevant.36  
 
 Taken together, the laws and accompanying academic discourse from the 
EU and US therefore form the bulwark for this dissertation. Despite some 
differences in procedure and substance, IP and competition laws, by virtue of their 
nature of being commercial rules, are broadly bound by common denominators.37 
Singapore is unlikely to generate enough cases to establish a clear set of 
precedents from which to develop an autochthonous competition law system in 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/reports/public/hansard/title/20041019/20041019_S0004_T0006.htm
l (“The Bill before the House is largely modelled on the UK's Competition Act 1998.”)  
33 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Article 230, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1.  
34 D I Bainbridge, Intellectual Property, 5th edn. (Essex: Longman, 2002), at p.199. (“[T]here are 
many similarities and most of the basic principles are common”) 
35 Cap 63, 1999 Rev Ed. For an cogent account of the Copyright Act’s history, see G Wei, The 
Law of Copyright in Singapore, (SNP Editions: Singapore, 2000) at pp. 31-6.   
36 As S Jayakumar, Minister of Law noted: “We have taken into account legislation in other 
countries including that of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada.” 
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 16 November 2004 at supra, n.7.  
37 D Geradin, ‘Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the EC Treaty: What can the EU learn from the 
US Supreme Court’s Judgement in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, IMS and Deustche Telekom?’ 
(2005) Common Law Market Review at p. 29.  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=617263 at p. 29. (Noting that despite the 
contextual differences between US antitrust law and EC competition law, EC competition laws 
could learn from the US Trinko decision.) 
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the near future. It is therefore likely to adopt a ‘best practices’ approach from the 
US and EU, as it has with its selective adoption of its competition legislation, and 
then tweaking it to suit its own ends.38 This makes perfect commercial sense. 
Firms caught by the Competition Act will include foreign multinationals with 
sufficient individual or collective market power to distort the competition process 
in Singapore.  
 
B. Refusals to License 
 
 The debate on the desirability of applying competition law to IPRs in 
Singapore is largely academic, since the Competition Commission of Singapore’s 
Draft Guidelines (‘CCS Guidelines’) made clear that it does.39 The author 
therefore proceeds  on the belief that the aims of his dissertation would be best 
served by highlighting areas of concern for future study, or else directly making 
concrete suggestions to refine the law at the Interface.  
 
 Refusals to license may include refusals simpliciter,40 charging high prices 
for access such that it would not be economically feasible for potential licensees 
to seek access. 41 It may also take the form of a refusal to license unless the 
potential licensee agrees to a tying agreement. In any case, it should be said that 
there is much commercial sense in licensing. Few copyright owners have the 
                                                 
38 As Vivian Balakrishnan noted, “The Bill adopts international best practices, and yet takes into 
account our specific economic characteristics and requirements, in particular, the fact that we are a 
small open economy.” V Balakrishnan, supra, n.31.  
39 Competition Commission of Singapore (CCS) Draft Guidelines on the Section 47 Prohibition 
(‘Guidelines’), available at:   
http://www.ccs.gov.sg/Doc/GuidelinesConsultation/Abuse_of_Dominant_Position29032005.pdf  
40 Volvo v. Veng (UK) Ltd  Case 238/87 [1988] ECR 6211. 
41 Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig. CSU [2000] 203 F.3d 1322, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 
(Fed. Cir.) (Xerox) Xerox had set the prices for parts so high that ISOs would be effectively 
eliminated as competitors in the relevant service markets. 
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resources to manufacture, distribute and sell their works themselves. The vast 
majority of owners license their rights to maximise their financial potential. 
Rarely does a copyright owner capriciously refuse to license. Failure to do so may 
mean that potential licensee will simply make their technology compatible with 
other rival systems. However, it is nonetheless entirely conceivable that owners 
may take a calculated move to refuse to license. Apart from allowing the 
discussion to centre on the conceptual core at the Interface mentioned earlier, 
refusals to license are also frequently used in conjunction with other forms of 
prohibited conduct such as tying and exclusive dealing. As such, jurisprudence 
here forms a common denominator for assessing abuse of dominance cases 
involving IPRs.  
 
C. Digital Copyright Covering Industrial Standards  
 
 Digital markets permeate global and national economies. Universal 
programmable computing machines have existed for over 50 years.42 A vast 
majority of new technical developments involve computer technology, even if the 
developments themselves do not appear at first sight to be so connected. Modern 
photocopiers, electronic mail, digital music and DVD standards all owe 
something to computer science.43 Software, protected primarily by copyright, 
fuels the spectacular advances in technologies underlying computers and info-
communications.44 Two key sectors in digital markets are personal computers 
                                                 
42 D I Bainbridge, supra, n.33 at p.190. 
43 Ibid. 
44 These have led to reductions by orders of magnitude in the costs of storing and transmitting 
information Indeed, one commentator recently opined that "[t]he extraordinary innovations of our 
modern world are increasingly the result of networks ...."G.L. Priest, ‘A Ruling for 'Predators'-and 
Consumers’, Wall St. J., May 3, 2001, at A18. 
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(PCs) and Internet access. As of 2005, 35.2% of EU residents own a PC, and 45% 
have access to the Internet.45 In the US, the figure for PC ownership is 58%,46 and 
Internet access rate of 42%.47 In Singapore 74% of households own a PC, 65% 
have Internet access, and 83% of all businesses use IT appliances.48 The 
immediate and ‘spill-over’ effects Interface cases create will likely therefore be 
significant. 
 
 Digital copyright industries differ from traditional ones in two main 
respects. First, digital markets tend to have high fixed costs and low marginal 
production costs. Their products require massive investments in R&D or physical 
or virtual networks; once this initial investment is made, it is relatively costless to 
create additional units. These industries are said to exhibit increasing returns to 
scale, and tend to be highly concentrated.49 Second, digital copyright markets 
often exhibit network effects.50 This means products become more valuable as the 
number of users increase.51 In digital industries, network effects are significant. 
                                                 
45 http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-CD-04-001-5/EN/KS-CD-04-001-5-
EN.PDF  
46 Forbes Magazine, (1999) in Fischer and Lorenz, Internet and the Future Policy Framework for 
Telecommunications, A Report of the European Commission, (2000), at p. 30.  
47 http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/n_america.html  
48 S Ng and Cui H M, Asia Pacific Information & Communication Technology Technical Meeting, 
Singapore Country Report 2004. Available at: 
  http://www.unescap.org/stat/ict/ict2004/6.Country_report-Singapore.pdf  
49 For an industrial economic approach to this, see J Sutton, Sunk Costs and Market Structure 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991). Sutton distinguishes between traditional exogenous sunk cost 
industries, and R&D intensive endogenous sunk cost industries. Importantly, he argues that the 
latter will often be highly concentrated, with firms wielding substantial market power and 
therefore prime targets for competition regulation for anticompetitive abuses.  
50 Essentially, network effects are a market phenomenon where the value of the network increases 
in the number of users. P Lewin, ‘Introduction: The Market Process and the Economics of 
QWERTY’, in P Lewin, (ed.), The Economics of QWERTY (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002) 
(“Liebowitz and Margolis introduced the term “network effects” to substitute for the term network 
externalities, to account for the possibility, indeed, the likelihood, these effects are often 
internalized.”) See Annex C for a detailed explanation of network effects. See also discussion in 
Chapter III, Part IV. 
51 For example, if more people use the Yahoo!’s chat service, the more people each user can 
message to. Traditional industries such as the F&B industry do not have this effect. No one enjoys 
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Digital economics explain that because of network effects, the market ‘tips’ 
towards single firm domination. 52  This is because network industries tend to 
gravitate towards products with the highest number of compatible co-users. 
Copyright owners with a large installed base of customers have a distinct 
advantage: customers are likely to buy enhancements or replacements, since 
products are both backward and laterally compatible; it is worth remaining with 
the same product brand. This creates a constant flow of demand for incrementally 
improved products from the same company, rather than radically new products 
from others.  Copyright therefore plays an important role in the ability of firms to 
achieve and maintain their dominance through direct or indirect control of the 
industry standard. 
 
III. OMITTED PERSPECTIVES 
 
 The Interface is a dimension of enormous depth and scope, encompassing 
many disciplines,53 giving rise to multifarious issues flowing from strategic 
market interactions in digital industries. While every effort has been made to 
discuss the key issues that may be important to the development of competition 
law in Singapore, a dissertation like this cannot cover everything, and should 
never pretend to. A number of notable areas and perspectives are missing in whole 
or part.  
                                                                                                                                      
Coke more because another drinks it. For a definite work on this area, see M A Lemley and D 
McGowan ‘Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects’ (1998) 86 Cal. L. Rev. 479.  
52 M A Lemley and D McGowan, ‘Legal implications of Network Economic Effects’ (1998) 86 
California Law Review 469 at p.523.  See discussion in Chapter III, Part IV.  
53 Within this dissertation there is relevant discussion of intellectual property law, competition law, 
company law, land law, tort law, contract law, criminal law, administrative law, industrial 
economics, the economics of innovation, technology economics and digital economics. In 
addition, there are elements of organisational theory in the structure and dynamics involved when 
one considers the strategies high tech firms take such as ecology and transaction cost theories.  
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 First, the focus is primarily on digital copyright. Copyright issues are 
growing in significance and frequency as the full impact of the digital revolution 
is increasingly felt by economies across the globe. In contrast, patent cases tend to 
raise fewer problems in digital markets, largely because unlike copyright, the 
balance between stakeholders has been largely consistent across various industries 
and over time. However, because much of antitrust jurisprudence was developed 
from patent cases, they provide an important backdrop for discussion. Trademarks 
and geographical indications do not give owners economic monopolies in their 
products. Reported cases involving abuses of trademarks and geographical 
indications are rare.54  This rarity suggests that the problem, unlike in copyright 
law, has largely been internalised. Further, their justification rests less on 
appropriability and innovation as in the case copyrights, than on avoidance of 
confusion about the origin of the goods or location.  
 
 Second, while anti-competitive agreements and mergers are important 
features when considering IPRs,55 the focus is on unilateral, rather than collusive 
aspects of competition. This dissertation is also unconcerned with the 
anticompetitive effect of copyright licensing. Rather, the focus is on the 
competitive effects of copyright per se, which examines the effects of the 
copyright monopolies have on competition.  
 
                                                 
54 G Tritton, supra, n.21, at p. 572.  
55 This includes exclusive dealing agreements, resale price maintenance agreements, R&D joint 
venture agreements, mergers and patent pools.  Vertical and Horizontal agreements on restraints of 
trade are governed by Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Section 34 of 
the Competition Act. Mergers are governed by Section 7 of the US Clayton Act, the EU Merger 
Regulation and Section 54 of the Competition Act. For a comprehensive discussion of 
anticompetitive licensing agreements and mergers, see G Tritton, ibid.  
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 Third, justifications for intervention by competition law often include 
concerns about the increasing encroachment of IP rights into cultural commons 
and constitutional liberties such as free speech.56 The Open Source movement and 
similar models are also relevant.57 However, these have no place in the present 
discussion.  
 
   
 
 
                                                 
56 R J  Commbe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Property: Authorship, Appropriation and the 
Law (Florida: Duke University Press, 1998); P Drahos, ‘Decentring Communication: The Dark 
Side of Intellectual Property’ in T Campbell and W Sadurski (eds.), Freedom of Communication 
(England: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1994). 
57 M Maher, ‘Open Source Software: The Success of an Alternative Intellectual Property Incentive 
Paradigm’, (2000) 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 619 (Showing how the science of 
complexity theory is able to explain the open source movement's ability to translate non-economic 
incentive mechanisms into a process for technological development and innovation); S M McJohn, 
‘The Paradoxes of Free Software’, (2000) 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 25  (Concluding that open source 
software may have a greater effect on the law of developing technologies than the law will have on 
software practices); D. McGowan, ‘Legal Implications of Open-Source Software’, (2001) U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 1; D Bollier, ‘The Power of Openness: Why Citizens, Education, Government and Business 
Should Care About the Coming Revolution in Open Source Code Software’, available at http:// 
eon.law.harvard.edu/opencode/h2o/#intro (illustrating the broad effect of changes in open code 


































Intuition will tell the thinking mind where to look next.  
 
        Dr. Johnas Salk58 
 
 A useful point to start the discussion is to reflect on how it developed to its 
present state. Just because competition law regulates access to copyright does not 
make it self-evident why it should. Copyright is a state sanctioned exclusionary 
right conferred on owners precisely so they may control access to, and 
exploitation of, their work. It should follow that copyright owners may refuse to 
license their copyright content if they so please. It has therefore been argued that 
there must be a strong presumption against any attempt to illegalise refusals to 
license. 59   
 
 Yet, the Singapore Competition Act 2004 undeniably includes copyright as 
one of the sectors under its purview.60 Chapter I posits that this may be because 
copyright law has somehow proven inadequate in regulating its own 
anticompetitive excesses. Part II introduces the nature and importance of 
copyright, arguing that digital copyright are an aberration in the traditional 
balance of access between right-holders and the public. In Part III, the discussion 
turns to the primary ways public access is preserved under copyright law should 
an owner refuse to license its content. In each case, significant limitations in each 
case prevent satisfactory resolution of the utilitarian imbalance within copyright 
                                                 
58 Discoverer of the Polio Vaccine. Quoted in S R Covey, The 8th Habit, (London: Simon & 
Schuster, 2004) at p. 52.  
59 F K Beier, ‘Industrial Property and Internal Market’ (1990) 2 IIC 131 at p.147.    
60 The Third Schedule exempting the application of competition law only excludes firms 
“entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a 
revenue-producing monopoly.” See Section 1, Third Schedule, Singapore Competition Act 2004, 
(Cap 46).  
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law alone. For this reason, competition law may have been introduced to 
counterbalance a seeming deference to private interests at the expense of access 
by rivals and the public. Part IV concludes by examining a key issue at the 
threshold of the Interface: whether the two regimes are inherently incompatible. It 
suggests that as tools of competition policy, competition law and copyright law 
share complementary goals, despite their apparent incompatible means of 
achieving those goals. However, because insufficient attention has been paid to 
understanding how they interact, courts have found it difficult to tap this synergy.  
 
II. THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF COPYRIGHT 
   
 Copyright has evolved from an initial author-centred right to a quid pro 
quo system. Owners enjoy copyright on a utilitarian basis, which rests on a 
balance. On one hand lies the owner’s right to appropriate its investment. On the 
other lies the right of the public to access the work whether for direct consumption 
or to use its contents to create complementary or competing works. Copyright 
plays a crucial role in setting up a market for the transaction of information goods 
between owners and the public. In recent years, the growing importance of 
copyright in national trade balances and concerns over digital piracy have spurred 
developed countries to push for stronger multilateral and bilateral commitment for 
stronger copyright. These developments have threatened to upset the copyright 
system as well as the innovation process. 61   
                                                 
61 The use of ‘innovation’ rather than ‘creativity’ here is an indication that the line between patent 
rights and copyrights are blurred, an observation that will be made clear later in the chapter.  
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A. Theoretical Justifications for Copyright 
 
 Understanding the basis for copyright is central to determining the extent 
that it should be regulated by competition law. Society has exercised its discretion 
to protect some categories of information rather than others. The interests 
underlying these decisions will inevitably drive inquiries as to the immutability of 
copyright to competition law interference. There are two main explanations for 
copyright protection. First, the labour justification recognises the intrinsic value of 
human creation that justifies reward for labour exerted. Copyright therefore 
recognises individual intellectual labour. The second justification is more 
contemporary, and has a utilitarian basis. Authors are given economic 
inducements to share the creation with society in return for a reward so that 
creative activity may be encouraged.62  
 
 John Locke offers perhaps the best-known labour theory justification of 
private ownership. Lockean theory is based on the idea that those who enhance 
previously unowned objects should own what they produce. 63 If what they 
produce can be taken from them without reason or compensation, they may be no 
better than slaves. Indeed, copyright is the most basic form of property because 
the literary, artistic, or musical works that it protects are essentially the products 
                                                 
62 See generally, D Chisum and M Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual Property Law (Matthew 
Bender: New York, 1992).   
63 In Locke’s words: “Though the earth, and all inferior creates be common to all men, yet every 
man has property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his 
body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.” see J Locke, ‘The Second 
Treatise’ in P. Laslett (ed.), The Two Treatises of Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970) at 305. Just as ‘body’ includes the mind, ‘labour’ extends to intellectual labour, since 
no labour is purely physical.   
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of his mind.64 In addition, these rights extend to protecting the personal interests 
of the author, including the acknowledgement and non-adulteration of his work, 
forming the foundation for moral rights.65  
 
 At the same time, Lockean theory recognises that were creators given 
control both over their work and every element used in their creation, there would 
be little raw material left for later authors.66 To promote continual innovation and 
public consumption, copyright law divided the possible rights in uses of a work 
between their creators on one hand and the public on the other. This is the familiar 
‘idea-expression dichotomy’, where expression is protected while the underlying 
ideas are not.67  
                                                 
64 On this view, it is positive law’s realisation of a self-evident ethical precept. See L Bently and B 
Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at p.32. 
65 Moral rights are personal rights belonging to authors or creators of copyright material and exist 
quite independently from economic rights, and continue to exist even after the economic rights 
have been transferred. The principal moral rights are: (1) the right of attribution, that is the right of 
the creator of a work to be publicly identified as such and to prevent others from claiming 
authorship of the work, to prevent others from wrongfully attributing to an author’s works that are 
not his or hers or that are unauthorised altered versions of his or her work; and (2) the right of 
integrity, that is the right to object to distortions or derogatory distortions of a work. The obligation 
to afford moral rights to creators of copyright materials arises from Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention. They are based on the Kantian belief that the author’s right of communication to the 
public should be insulated from the risk of adulteration that accompanied unauthorised access. I 
Kant, ‘Of the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books’, in, W Richardson, ed., Essays and Treaties on 
Moral, Political and Various Philosophical Subjects (1798) at pp.229-30. The right of 
appropriation and moral rights represent Lockean theory’s lasting contribution, gaining 
prominence in diverse copyright systems internationally, even securing a place as a fundamental 
human right. See RTE v. Commission (Magill) [1995] ECR I-743, (explaining "The Court of First 
Instance is right ... in stating that the essential function of copyright is to protect the moral rights in 
the work and ensure a reward for creative effort"); G Dworkin, ‘Moral Rights and the Common 
Law Countries’, (1994) 5 Austl. Intell. Prop. L.J. 5; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union Article 17, at para. 2; W Fisher, ‘Theories of Intellectual Property’, in New Essays 
in the Legal and Political Theory of Property’, in S R Munzer (ed.) (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001) at 169-73 at pp.169-73; D Fewer, ‘Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom 
of Expression and the Limits of Copyright in Canada’, (1997) 55 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 175  at pp. 
187-89, pp. 191-93 (discussing the application of this theory to Canadian intellectual property 
law). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 27(2) reads: “Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author.” http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html 
66 J Locke, supra, n.6. 
67 Expression provision for this may be found in the US: 17 USC § 102(b) (1994). While 
Singapore does not statutorily codify this, it clearly is fundamental to the sanction of reverse 
engineering in Section 39B of the Singapore Copyright Act, Cap 63, 1999 Rev. Ed.. See also 
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 While Lockean theory provides a basis for individual enrichment and 
allocation of rights, it does not capture the multifarious relationships between the 
interests of the public and the author.68  Information goods are social products, 
rather than the effort of the author’s labour alone. The copyrighted work builds on 
earlier works, and in today’s integrated digital marketplace, is often the outcome 
of concerted efforts of diverse workgroups comprising developers, programmers, 
and project directors. Further, most intellectual creation today is carried on at the 
behest of employers or pursuant to some form of sponsorship or commission.69 
Copyright therefore does not favour the creators as much as the employers who 
acquire the rights through contract or employment law.70 Accordingly, the natural 
rights justification for copyright is a weak one, and has generally been rejected by 
Commonwealth and US courts. 71   
 
 The contemporary view is that if copyright is to be the vehicle for the 
claim to own the value of adding one's labour to the common stock of 
information, then the labour must produce a useful product.72 This utilitarian 
                                                                                                                                      
Robert John Powers School Inc v Tessensohn [1993] 3 SLR 724, where the dichotomy was 
recognised and accepted by the Singapore Court of Appeal.   
68 H M Spector, ‘An Outline of a Theory Justifying Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights’ 
(1989) 8 EIPR. 270 at p.273. 
69 This argument was used to good effect in IMS Health, where the plaintiff argued that it was the 
group of pharmacies, rather than the defendant alone that should be given the right to grant access 
to its database. See IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH  & Co. KG, [2004] ECR 
0000. 
70 M Perelman, Steal This Idea: Intellectual Property Rights and the Corporate Confiscation of 
Creativity (New York: Palgrave, 2002) at 21. (Observing that individuals, lacking the power of 
corporations, soon found their intellectual property being appropriated by them.)   
71 This is the law in Singapore, the US and the  EU. H Hovenkamp et al, IP and Antitrust: An 
Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property (New York: Aspen Law, 2003) at 
§1.1 (“The principal basis for intellectual property protection in the United States is the utilitarian 
or economic incentive framework.”) D Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyrights, Patents and 
Trademarks  (Ontario: Irwin Law, 1997)  at pp.6-13; D Fewer, supra, n.8. G Wei, The Law of 
Copyright in Singapore, (SNP Editions: Singapore, 2000).   
72 Otherwise mere ‘sweat of the brow’ claims will need to be asserted under sui generis law like 
the emerging European database laws, unfair competition law or unjust enrichment law. See H 
Hovenkamp et al, supra, n. 14 at §1.1 
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justification shifts the focus from reward-based exploitation rights to a quid pro 
quo. As the US Supreme Court explained in the landmark case of Mazer v. Stein:  
 
“The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner 
a secondary consideration… the economic philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the 
conviction that it is the best way to advance public welfare through the 
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts’.”73   
  
 This view has been expressly adopted in Singapore.74 Thus, modern 
copyright grants the owner legal monopoly as a payment for its contribution to 
cultural, scientific or artistic progress. While expressly recognising the public 
interest is to be welcomed, it begs the question of how the balance might, in 
practice, be made. As William Landes and Richard Posner famously declared, the 
central challenge in copyright law is to strike the correct balance between public 
access and private incentives.75 It is submitted that a key point to the resolution of 
this challenge lies in understanding the mechanism for appropriating copyright 
rents.  
 
                                                 
73 [1954] 347 US 201. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution empowers 
the Congress to legislate: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.” 
74 S Jayakumar Minister of Law noted that in developing copyright law, it was important to “strike 
a good balance between the interests of copyright owners and those of the copyright users.” 
Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 16 November 2004 at: 
http://www.parliament.gov.sg:80/reports/public/hansard/title/20041116/20041116_S0004_T0003.
html#1   
75 W Landes and R A Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’ (1989) Journal of Legal 
Studies XVIII at 326. (Noting that finding and maintaining the access-incentive balance is the 
central problem in the law of copyright.) 
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B. Appropriating Copyright 
  
 Creation of copyright content requires investment of resources. This will 
be suboptimal if owners did not expect to make a profit from it. To do so, a 
market mechanism is needed. The key difficulty in devising a mechanism lies in 
the dichotomous ‘public good’ nature of information, which is at once non-
excludable, and non-rivalrous.76 The sale of copyright content requires disclosure 
of information. However, once information has been disclosed to buyers, it is 
extremely difficult to prevent these buyers from disclosing en masse to non-
paying users. Unlike land and chattels that occupy only one place at any given 
time, a copyright owner who sells its content cannot, except by physically 
restricting the recipient, exclude the rest of the world from possessing it because 
multiple users multiply, rather than consume the content. 77 Asymmetric 
information may make it difficult for owners to prevent free riders and imitators 
from misappropriating its work. This is made worse in digital works. Digital 
works may be copied quickly costlessly and numerously, and suffer from no loss 
in quality from multiple reproductions.78 
 
                                                 
76 Essentially, ‘non-excludable’ refers to the fact that the copyright owner cannot control access to 
its content once it has been disclosed; ‘non-rivalrous’ refers to the fact that a person consuming the 
copyrighted content will not reduce the amount available to others. For a detailed discussion of 
these characteristics on the immutability of copyright, see Chapter IV, Part II.  
77 Thomas Jefferson analogised public goods to one individual lighting his candle from the flame 
of another, since latter suffered no loss in heat or light as a result. See T Jefferson, The Portable 
Thomas Jefferson (New York: Penguin Books, 1985).  
78 Knowledge today is nearly costless to reproduce, communicate and distribute because of the 
Internet and mobile communications technology. Reproducing binary information also allows 
perfect replicas, in contrast to physical reproductions of literary, artistic or musical works that 
suffer the inability to replicate human skill. 
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 Economic theory teaches that unregulated access would drive the price of 
the product to its negligible marginal cost of reproduction.79 If all consumers free 
ride, then the public good would surely not be provided in the first place, at least 
not at a socially optimal level, since the owner receives no revenue.80 This leads to 
underproduction by the owner, underinvestment by existing and potential entrants, 
and therefore consequent market failure.81  
 
 It follows therefore that central to the ability to exploit copyright content 
effectively is its owner’s control over access. Rather than providing the incentive 
themselves, governments design copyright law with a market-based reward 
system of compensation for the effort expanded and expense incurred because of 
creating a work for public use.82 Copyright alleviates ‘free rider’ problems 
through granting authors power to control the quantity and quality of the 
information product available on the market by controlling its access and 
dissemination through private and state enforcement.83 This raises the challenge 
of devising a mechanism to transfer copyright content to society while ensuring 
that content providers are not discouraged from investing.  
 
                                                 
79 See generally, D W Carlton and J M Perloff, Modern Industrial Organisation, 4th ed., (Pearson: 
Boston, 2005) at pp. 526-36.  
80 S Bensen, ‘New Technologies and Intellectual Property: An Economic Analysis’ (1987) RAND 
Report N-2601-NSF.  
81 F M Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance,  2nd edn, (Rand McNally 
Co: Chicago, 1980) at p. 444 (Arguing that perfect competition would eradicate incentives for 
innovation without a system if intellectual property rights.) 
82 While prizes, grants and subsidies are given in limited cases, they do not form the general basis 
for copyright appropriation. In contrast to prize systems, where the winner is unilaterally picked, 
IPR allows the public to determine who should be rewarded as well as the size of that reward. The 
more copies of a book that is purchased, the greater the financial reward that accrues to the IPR 
owner Jeremy Bentham argued that ‘an exclusive privilege is of all rewards the best proportioned, 
the most natural, and the least bothersome. J Bentham, ‘A Manual of Political Economy’, in J 
Bowring (ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham (Edinburgh: Tait, 1843) at 31.  
83 See Sections 31-34 of the Singapore Copyright Act, supra, n.10, for civil action, and Section 
136 for criminal penalties regarding copyright infringement.  
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 Copyright law operates at two levels in an attempt to do this. First, it 
operates pre-grant by incorporating natural rights theory’s contribution in 
protecting expression and not ideas. The seminal US Supreme Court case of Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. built on the Lockean idea-expression 
dichotomy and held that utilitarianism also requires fair access by the public and 
future authors.84 Second, if content qualifies for copyright protection, the legal 
monopoly conferred is limited in its scope and duration. The owner enjoys 
exclusive rights over access to, and monopolisation of, his works for a limited 
time. During this time, the public’s interests of access are preserved through 
exceptions and limitations instituted in copyright legislation and supplemented by 
case law.85 This forms the basis of the utilitarian balance.   
 
C. The Rise and Rise of Copyright 
 
 The last century has seen increased political and legal activities designed 
to strengthen the various types of protection for ideas. As new forms of creativity 
bring new products to the market, owners seek new proprietary rights under the 
quid pro quo of utilitarianism. This may be due to two related reasons. First, a 
country offering stronger rights will encourage content owners, assured of 
financial returns, to exploit its content there compared to another with a high 
likelihood of free riders. 86 An upward strengthening of copyright thus seems 
inevitable as each country attempts to outdo the others. Second, new technology 
                                                 
84 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. [1991] 499 U.S. 340, 349, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1290, 
113 L.Ed.2d 358 (“The primary objective of a copyright is not to reward the labour of authors, but 
'[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. To this end, copyright assures authors the 
right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and 
information conveyed by a work.”) 
85 For a survey of Singapore copyright law in this area, see G Wei, supra, n. 14.  
86 J Gurnsey, Copyright Theft (Hampshire: AslibGower, 1995) at p.155. 
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has made it easier to reproduce copyrighted content. Copyright owners, fearing 
the commercially disastrous potential of perfected piracy allowed by digital 
technology, have successfully lobbied for stronger, longer, and broader control 
over access, use, and dissemination of their content.  
 
1. Trade  
 
 Advanced industrial countries have found copyright to be an area of 
growing importance. Exploitable ideas have become intellectual capital, and a 
successful economic future increasingly depends on a superior corpus of new 
knowledge. Worldwide, there are an estimated 70,000 to 125,000 companies 
engaged in software and IT services.87 The international software market value 
was $370 billion in 2000 with the US holding the dominant market share.88 
Annual US exports in the form of royalties and licensing revenue alone exceeded 
$37 billion89 The European market grew by 10.8% in 2000 to €141bn and is 
estimated that it will be worth €236bn in 2004.90 Already occupying 24% of the 
world market, it is growing faster than the markets US and Japan.91  
  
 Singapore’s own copyright-based industries generated $30.5 billion in 
output and $8.7 billion of value-added services to her economy in 2001.92 This 
amounted to 5.7% of her GDP, and is significant as it is close to that of 
                                                 
87 http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/  
88 National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators, 2000 (Washington DC, National 
Science Foundation, 2000) 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/  
92N Fang, “Intellectual property's asset potential remains 
untapped”, The Straits Times, 22 January 2005.   
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mainstream sectors which produced $9.3 billion in value added, amounting to 6% 
of GDP.93 The Singapore government has reiterated its commitment to developing 
Singapore’s strong reputation for IP laws,94 and for promoting high-tech 
innovation “to ensure the manufacturing sector is supported by strong foundations 
in technology, top-class infrastructure and science.”95 In turn, corporate 
juggernauts such as IBM and Microsoft invest heavily in local IT infrastructure.96 
Employees of copyright related industries also make up a significant component 
of Singapore’s workforce, equivalent to 5.7% of the national employment.97 As a 
Member of Parliament noted: 
 
 “Singapore's continued economic growth hinges on encouraging and 
protecting knowledge creation.  With globalisation and rapid 
technological advancement, a strong IP regime will be strategically more 
important than the traditional strength of geographical location, large 
domestic market or natural resources in abundance.”98 
 
    While the strengthening of protection has sometimes been explained in 
terms of legislative convenience, it also suggests that there is at least an implicit 
                                                 
93 Ibid.  
94 N Aggarwal, ‘Focus on IP’, The Straits Times, 18 Jan 2005. Singapore’s 
“strong provisions for protection intellectual property rights” was a key for Lucasfilm to set 
up an animation studio here. This, according to Alan Keith, vice-president for 
administration, was “a very big deal … (since) George Lucas was free to choose any country 
in the world.” R Miltton, ‘Singapore Envoy Hosts Reception for George Lucas’ The Straits 
Times, 4 July 2005.    
95 N Aggarwal, ‘A Magnet for Firms and Entrepreneurs’, The 
Straits Times, 17 January 2005. An example of the government’s role as a prime 
mover in the digital market can be seen from its purchase of $2.2 billion worth of computer 
products and services in 2005, three times more than the $700 million put out in 2004. G Chng, 
‘Govt. ups IT purchases by tender to $2.2b’, The Straits Times, April 29 2005. 
96 Economic Development Board (Singapore), ‘IBM strengthens its commitment to Singapore with 
multi-million dollar investments’ (on file with author). For example, IBM has committed to 
investing $39 million to set up IT infrastructure facilities and offer companies e-business services 
and IT outsourcing solutions.  
97 Intellectual Property Office of Singapore, ‘Copyright Based Industries Boost Singapore's 
Economy’, 27 July 2004. Available at http://www.ipos.gov.sg/main/index.html.  




agenda between owners and lawmakers to maximise returns from copyright 
protection.99 The US has been the primary mover of the trend toward stronger 
rights, and it has acted at two levels. The first level is multilateral. The Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is a direct 
consequence of technological development and the desire of technologically 
advanced nations to protect their IPRs abroad, particularly in digital works. 100  
Concerns over huge losses sustained by digital industries in the US led it to bring 
IPRs into its international trade negotiations.101  
 
 TRIPS represents the high watermark of international consensus on 
copyright evolution. It extends copyright to computer programs, in source or 
object code,102 as well as compilations of data that constitute intellectual creations 
because of selection or arrangement independently of pre-existing copyright in the 
material itself.103  However, further attempts to expand TRIPS level protection 
                                                 
99 L Bently and B Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 
p. 42. 
100 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Annex 1C. 33 ILM 81 40 
(1994). The TRIPS Agreement contains seven parts.  Parts I and II contain the substantive law 
provisions. Parts III and IV set forth the procedural standards for acquisition and enforcement of IP 
rights under national law. Part V deals with dispute resolution using World Trade Organisation 
dispute resolution mechanisms. Part VI provides transitional provisions providing selected groups 
of nations with additional time to comply with TRIPS. Part VII establishes institutional 
arrangements at the international level for TRIPS compliance, notably the TRIPS Council.    
101 The fact that existing conventions such as the Paris and Berne did not have effective sanctions 
and penalties no doubt was an important consideration. See S Ricketson, ‘New Wine into Old 
Bottle: Technological Change and Intellectual Property Rights’, (1992) Prometheus Vol. 10 No. 1, 
at 68. As Jessica Litman explains: “The content industries, copyright owners argued, were among 
the few in which the United States had a favourable balance of trade. Instead of focusing on 
American citizens who engaged in unlicensed uses of copyrighted works (many of them legal 
under US law), they drew Congress’s attention to people and businesses in other countries who 
engaged in similar uses. The United States should make it a top priority, they argued, to beef up 
domestic copyright law at home, and thus ensure that people in other countries paid for any use of 
copyrighted works abroad.” J Litman, Digital Copyright, (New York: Prometheus Books, 2001), at 
pp.80-1. 
102 Art. 10.1, TRIPS, supra, n.43. 
103 Art. 10.2, ibid. TRIPS lays down the minimum level of protection expected from member 
states, which member states have raised through domestic legislation. Singapore has faithfully 
incorporated each development in its Copyright Act, supra, n.10 conferring exclusive rights to the 
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were rejected amidst concerns of socio-political disagreements between 
developed countries and developing ones.104 This multilateral gridlock did little to 
deter the US from moving at the second level - that of bilateral free-trade 
agreements (FTAs). The US-Singapore FTA requires one of the highest levels of 
IP protection in the world.105 In addition to obligations to promote anti-
circumvention measures and transmission rights,106 the USSFTA requires 
Singapore to extend copyright to TRIPS-plus levels of life plus 70 years.107 While 
at first glance these measures are certain to increase market optimism, there are 
doubts that the benefits will last beyond the short run.108 
 
2. Copyright Piracy  
 
 The need to curb piracy is closely related to trade issues.109 In the UK, 
some ₤20 million a year are allegedly lost to copyright theft.110 Software 
                                                                                                                                      
author to the reproduction and making available of literary, artistic and musical works (Section 
26), and expanding copyright to computer programs and factual compilations (Section 7). 
104 J Litman, supra, n. 44. 
105 For a comprehensive discussion on the specific effects of the US-Singapore FTA on Singapore 
IP law, see Ng-Loy W L, ‘The IP Chapter in the US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement’ (2004) 16 
SAcLJ 42.  
106Chapter 12, US-Singapore FTA, available at: 
 http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Section_Index.html  In the EU, 
the Directive on the Harmonisation of certain aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society (the “InfoSoc Directive”) even the reproduction by private individuals of a 
Web page for non-commercial purposes, will trigger a compulsory levy. In this respect, the 
Directive would appear to be providing right holders with an exclusive right to control access to 
information, the right to read, a sphere copyright has never previously attempted to regulate. 
107 Article 4, USSFTA, codified in Section 28 Copyright Act, supra, n.10. At its inception in 1710, 
the English Statute of Anne conferred copyright protection to the author for 14 years from first 
publication; but if the author was still living at the end, another 14 was given. (UK Copyright Act 
1710, ss. 1 and 2) In 1814, the term of statutory right was extended to 28 years or the author’s life, 
whichever was longer. (UK Copyright Act 1814, s. 4) The Berne requirement of life and 50 years 
was mirrored the requirements in TRIPS. (TRIPS, Article 12) 
108 H C Jehoram, ‘Critical reflections on the Economic Importance of Copyright’, (1989) Rights 
3[1] at pp. 4-7. See also J Gurnsey, supra, n.29 at p.161. (Arguing that the US’s bilateral approach 
is selfish and ill-considered, will only be short term, and there should instead be a push for a 
multilateral approach to intellectual property agreements.) 
109 Piracy is understood broadly to include any situation where the owner is not able to appropriate 
returns from an expected sale of its work. W R Cornish and D Llewellyn, Intellectual Property: 
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developer Lotus claims to have lost around 160 million US dollars a year.111 
Pirated sales in Singapore reportedly totalled $7 million in 2002.112 As a Member 
of Parliament noted: 
 
“Foreign companies feel comfortable about being able to protect their IP 
in Singapore and the system offers a tightly policed and regulated 
environment which discourages piracy and a legal system that offers 
good support to victims of IP abusers.”113 
 
 Often, it is not the initial technology that stimulates the greatest demand 
for stronger copyright, but rather the technology of imitation.114 The greater the 
difference between initial development costs and those of easy and accurate 
imitation, the more exigent the case of legal protection needed to preserve 
domestic export figures. Digital goods require considerable investment to be 
made, but are often taken over by others quickly, effectively and cheaply. The 
                                                                                                                                      
Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Edition, 2003) 
at p.358 . 
110 ‘Apple, Claris and Microsoft research highlights’ (1993) FAST News issue 3, p.10 
111 A W Brancomb, ‘Who owns Creativity? Property Rights in the Information Age’ (1988) 91 
Technology Review, pp. 38-45. This correlation is however, highly controversial. As G Hoffman 
argues. “Perhaps the greatest single misconception that is so frequently observed throughout the 
literature on the costs of copyright piracy is the idea that a pirated unit of a delivery good implies 
the loss of the sale of an original unit of the delivery good, and so the cost of copyright piracy can 
be reliably calculated by an estimate of the number of pirated copies that are circulated. G 
Hoffman, ‘Piracy of Intellectual Property’ (1990)  16 Bulletin of the American Society for 
Information Science, at pp. 9-11. See also F Mannering, “The fact that a consumer purchases a 
pirate copy at a reduced price does not imply that he would have purchased an original at a higher 
price had the pirate copy not been available. It is perfectly feasible that the consumer would have 
simply gone without the good in question than purchasing the original. In fact, it has been 
observed that only 38% of all pirated copies are in fact lost sales of the original.” F. Mannering, 
‘Assessing the Impacts of Audio Home Copying Restrictions’ (1994) Quarterly Journal of 
Business and Economics 33, at pp.30-41. 
112 S Woo, ‘Stop at Three’, The Straits Times 10 July 2005 
113 Z Nordin, supra, n.41. NB: ‘IP abuses’ here refer to digital pirates, rather than to owners who 
abuse their IPRs, whose ‘victims’ would be rivals and consumers in the competition law context.  
114 The invention of the printing press in the 16th century led copyright owners to claim protection 
of their copies by book publishers. Over the following centuries, protection was exploded to cover 
analogous subject matter (engravings, paintings, sculptures, plays and musical compositions) and 
more recently the products of technological development (sound recordings, cinematograph films, 
TV and sound broadcasts, live performances, and integrated circuits).  
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early computer industry was content with contract and secrecy.115 However, the 
astonishing ability of digital technology to copy programs and mass consumer 
markets for pirated content rapidly reversed this perception. Millions of computer 
users recognised the ease with which software could be copied and exchanged 
and, inevitably, dubious entrepreneurs who hover at the margins of any successful 
industry recognised there was a market for illegally copied material that they 
could all too easily exploit.116 This makes the case for stronger IPRs hard to resist.  
 
 Every roll out of a new technology forces players in the copyright system 
to find a new point of equilibrium between access to protected works and 
incentives to create new works. The pressure for increased protection is 
commonly directed toward the expansion of existing regimes.117 This is generally 
easier, from a legislative point of view, than creating a new system. The main 
attraction of copyright protection is the immediacy and lack of formality in its 
application. For a product that is invariably dynamic and relatively short lived, the 
long lead-in time to granting a patent - to say nothing of the disclosure 
requirements – is clearly unacceptable. Patent protection creates problems for an 
industry that has developed a great deal of its products by building unashamedly 
on the work of those who have gone before.118 Most programs will be ‘original’, 
                                                 
115 J Gurnsey, supra, n. 29. 
116 Ibid, at p.112. (Noting that copyright piracy that exists is complex and costly, comprising a mix 
of casual theft and large scale piracy.) 
117 Z Nordin, supra, n.41. (“(C)opyright protection has to keep up with the fast paced 
developments of the IT sector … The proposed amendments are intended to keep our Copyright 
Act relevant in the digital age.”)   
118 J Gurnsey, supra, n.29 at p. 111. (“The reason for this can be readily appreciated. If computer 
programs and associated technology, such as semi-conductor chip design, could be protected under 
existing regimes, this would greatly lessen the immediate need for a new international convention 
on protecting the technology… the problem is that whilst copyright … may have been a ‘ready 
made system’ in the 1970s, it was not a ‘tailor made system’ for computer programs.”) That is not 
to say that patents are irrelevant. Computer programs may well be patentable as an invention. 
Other legal vehicles may also have a role to play in safeguarding computer programs. These 
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but few will be ‘novel’ and ‘inventive’.119 It also explains why there is a trend 
toward database protection, multimedia works, and new forms of electronic 
distribution, often reacting without having time to contemplate suitable conditions 
and qualifications.120 
 
 Given the ease of copying, digital copyright gives software owners 
exclusive rights over reproduction not found in traditional works, subject to 
extremely narrow exceptions.121 This was justified on the basis that the author’s 
reproduction right was fundamental, and the utilitarian basis of copyright law 
required that the extent of that right not be diminished to ensure that future 
incentives to create are not stifled.122 In recent years, copyright law therefore 
tailored any limitations narrowly while at the same time expanding the scope of 
protected subject matter.123  
                                                                                                                                      
include the law of confidential information and the law of contract. However, the focus is on the 
role played by copyright. Source codes, object codes in ROM chips and documentation are 
protected as literary works under Section 7(1) of the Copyright Act, supra, n.10. 
119 As required for patent protection. See Sections 14-16 of the Singapore Patent Act (Cap 221, 
2002 Rev. Edn. ).  
120 W R Cornish and D Llewellyn, supra, n. 52, at p. 34. Perhaps the best specimen of growth is 
the EU Database Directive. The EU has moved towards extending protection toward the unoriginal 
data in databases through broadening its criteria to include those that are protected based on the 
sufficiency of the investment of labour and resources expended in their creation: the sui generis 
database right. Under this right, database owners can prevent extraction and re-utilisation of the 
whole or substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the content of that 
database. In certain cases they may also prevent the systematic extraction and/or re-utilisation of 
insubstantial parts. Commentators have noted that this in effect extends protection over the realm 
of factual information traditionally denied protection by copyright law. Further, the term of 
protection of the database right is 15 years from the date of completion or from the date it was 
made available to the public, and renewable if there are sufficient alterations to the database for 
another term. The provision for a new 15 year term of protection based on any substantial 
qualitative or quantitative change the contents of the database creates the potential for a database 
right to last forever. See for a comprehensive summary of the issues, see H A Deveci, ‘Databases: 
Is Sui Generis A Stronger Bet than Copyright?’ (2004) 12 Int'l J.L. & Info. Tech. 178. 
121 For example, computers work by reproducing data in its volatile Random Access Memory 
(RAM), which could technically be saved to disk. Copyright lobbyists used this as a premise to 
argue that each appearance of any portion of software code in a computer program’s RAM is an 
infringement of copyright. This means that owners have the legal right to control access to every 
appearance of the work in the memory of any computer anywhere. 
122 J Litman, supra, n. 44 at p.27. 
123 Right owners have been conferred greater control over the right of communication to include 
access on demand, and the right of electronic reproduction. This makes all reproductions, however 
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 Today, digital copyright covers functional works such as software, and 
seems out of character with the traditional categories of literary and artistic works 
which copyright traditionally protects.124  Some judges and academics have been 
critical of expansion of control over technological development through copyright, 
and are concerned about its anticompetitive threat. Judge Boudin remarked, 
applying copyright law to computer programs “is like assembling a jigsaw puzzle 
whose pieces do not quite fit.” 125 Gerald Dworkin agreed, arguing, that “the 
application of copyright to industrial articles is conceptually inappropriate.”126 As 
will be seen below, given the content attracting contrived copyright protection, 
this is undoubtedly true, though until something better comes along, legislators 
will continue adapting copyright to a range of situations for which it was never 
intended. This convenience, however, has come with a price. 
   
                                                                                                                                      
transient, liable for infringement. In Europe, these are found in the InfoSoc, Directive  supra, n.49 
and EC Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, Council Directive 91/250, 1991 
O.J. (L 122) 42 (‘Software Directive’). In Singapore, Section 15(1A) of the Copyright Act, 
provides that “For the purposes of this Act, reproduction, in relation to any work, includes the 
making of a copy which is transient or is incidental to some other use of the work.” It has not 
included the equivalent of Article 9(1) into the Copyright Act, supra, n.10.   
124 S Ricketson, ‘New Wine into Old Bottle: Technological Change and Intellectual Property 
Rights’, (1992) Prometheus Vol. 10 No. 1, at p. 73. (Arguing that sui generis protection offers 
protective regimes more closely tailored to the needs of the claimant and also take closer account 
of third party interests.) 
125 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., [1995] 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.) at p. 820, (Rejecting 
Lotus's claim that the emulation interface of Borland's Quattro Pro spreadsheet program infringed 
Lotus 1-2-3), aff'd by an equally divided Court, [1996] 516 U.S. 233; Autodesk Inc v. Dyason 
(No.2) [1992] 22 IPR 163  (“Functionality is not the proper object of copyright protection.”, per 
Mason C.J.) p. 36 
126 G Dworkin, ‘The Nature of Computer Programs’, in Lahore J., et al, Information Technology: 
The Challenge of Copyright (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1984) at p.109 (Arguing that while 
copyright law has “evolved gradually to embrace new forms of unfair competition and to create 
new kinds of copyright interests”, extensions have “been mechanical and scientific methods of 
enhancing the underlying cultural, literary, dramatic, musical and artistic interests which people 
traditionally associate with copyright.” Computer programs, “which for example, make washing 
machines work, are far removed from these interests.”) 
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D. The Price of Copyright 
 
 Digital copyright exists primarily for the functions they perform and not 
because of any elegance in expression. The consumer is not concerned with the 
computer coding that make up his program, only whether it works efficiently, 
effectively and in a user friendly manner.127 Two important consequences follow 
the mutation of copyright in functional works. The first is a blurring of the line 
between copyright and patent rights. A second related outcome is that as 
technological innovation becomes more dependent on prior work, as well as 
current developments, strong copyright in digital works may retard the innovation 
process.   
 
1. A Copyright Threshold for Patent Rights  
 
 While patents and copyright both give their owners the right to exclude 
free riders, there are significant differences in the way each is obtained and 
exercised. It is trite that the difficulty involved in obtaining an IPR is directly 
proportionate to the strength of that right. Copyright protects original expressions 
resulting from the creator’s myriad choices in the course of constructing the work. 
It is does not cover “ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical 
concepts as such”.128 Copyright is intended to stimulate creativity and facilitates 
                                                 
127 Computer Edge v. Apple Computer [1986] FSR 537.  
128 Article 9.2 Berne. Or more familiarly known as the ‘idea-expression’ dichotomy: see Chapter I, 
Part II.  
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dissemination through the royalty mechanism of appropriation.129 Finally, 
copyright is readily obtainable once low threshold requirements are met.130  
 
 In contrast, patent rights provide a complete exclusionary right par 
excellence, granting protection over the idea contained in the invention.131 These 
rights will be infringed whether or not there was any direct copying. In part, the 
considerable breadth of patent monopoly is offset by the fact that patents are 
granted only if an applicant complies with a relatively onerous registration 
process. Unlike copyright that arises automatically on creation of the work, 
patents are only granted after the applicant satisfies the requirements for 
registration.132 Although the granting process may not be as onerous as some 
would like, it imposes a significant threshold on the types of inventions that may 
be patented, 133 the scope of the monopoly granted,134 and the nature of 
information disclosed in the patent.135 Patents are often produced with the 
intention of being maintained by the inventing party to obtain some market 
advantage over competitors, in the form of cost savings, or to offset huge 
                                                 
129 R Watt, Copyright and Economic Theory: Friends or Foes, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000) 
at p. 9. 
130 As long as a work (1) has not been copied or parasitically derived, (2) displays a minimal 
amount of effort, (3) is reduced to material form and imbued (4) has connecting factors of personal 
status and/or place of first publication, it will be conferred copyright.  See G Wei, supra, n.14. 
131 For a recent commentary on Singapore patent law, see generally, A Kang, et al, A Guide to 
Patent Law in Singapore, (Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2005). 
132 Section 44, Singapore Patent Act, supra, n.62.  
133 In the case of patents, protection is expressly conferred on inventions, only if they are inventive, 
new and industrially useful. See TRIPS Article 27 and Sections 14-16 Singapore Patent Act, ibid. 
Thus while one cannot patent scientific principles, a patent may be obtained for a useful machine 
that uses those principles for a non-obvious, specific way.  
134 Besides the substantive requirements for patentability, the subject matter should not be contrary 
to public policy. See Section 13(2) Singapore Patent Act, ibid.  However, even though third parties 
may not use the invention without the patentee’s permission, they are free to invent around and 
beyond the field of monopoly conferred on the patentee. 
135 The applicant must publish the invention to the world so that others may exploit them in non-
infringing ways. Thus in Genelabs Diagnostics Pte Ltd v. Institut Pasteur [2001] 1 SLR 121, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal held that the disclosure “must not only identify the subject matter of 
the claim …, it must do so in a way that enables the skilled man to make or obtain it, a kind of 
enabling disclosure.” at p.129.   
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investment outlays. In contrast, copyright is said to be concerned primarily with 
encouraging the production of new works.136  
 
 The corollary of low thresholds for protection in copyright is a narrow 
delineation of subject matter, generous exceptions, and limitations to facilitate 
public access to the content. With the extension of copyright into digital works, 
the broad interpretation of access rights, and enactment of anticircumvention laws, 
the line between copyrights and patents has been blurred.137 As George Wei 
observed:  
 
“(G)reater overlap of subject matter can arise, and this can result in 
uncomfortable tensions between the rights. Much of the overlap that 
does exist in intellectual and industrial property law can be traced to 
the relentless expansion of copyright in this century resulting in the 
shadow of copyright being cast over a number of intellectual and 
industrial property rights.” 138 
  
  
 Copyright today seems more about control than it is about 
compensation.139 An arguably unintended result of legislative extension of 
copyright into functional works to counter digital piracy and promote national 
trade figures, is that the copyright owner can obtain patent-like right through the 
back door of a copyright.  
                                                 
136 For a classic statement, see A Sterling, World Copyright Law ( USA: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), 
para. 16.06.  
137 For an excellent discussion of this in the US context, see J Litman, supra, n. 44 at p. 80.  
137 W Landes and R A Posner, supra, n. 18.  
138 G Wei, supra n. 14.  
139 N Elkin-Koren, ‘It’s All About Control: Copyright and Market Power in the Information 
Society’ (7/00 draft) cited in J Litman, supra, n.44, at p. 80.  
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2. Retarding Innovation  
 
 Traditionally, the innovation process occurs in linear, sequential stages, 
from research to development, design production and finally marketing, sales and 
service.140  This is illustrated in Fig. 2 below. In this serial model of innovation, 
little incremental innovation follows the initial breakthrough. There is no feedback 
or overlap between and among stages.141 In the copyright context, the owner of 
copyright on a book may be able to control whether it should be adapted into a 
movie. However, once the movie is made, it may not control how its soundtrack 





 However, this model does not address the innovation processes at the heart 
of technological change in digital markets.142 In these markets, the innovation 
process is radical and involves significant vertical and horizontal 
interdependencies, with tight linkages and feedback among and between the 
various stages. 143 Innovation takes place simultaneously at each level, as seen in 
Fig. 3. For example, software products increasingly combine elements from 
previous solutions. Where copyright is granted to interdependent functional 
                                                 
140 J Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organisation, (Boston: MIT Press, 1988) at p. 389.  
141 Unlike the model of simultaneous innovation discussed below.  
142 For a detailed and insightful discussion of how costs affect market structure in ‘traditional’ and 
R&D intensive industries, see J Sutton, Sunk Costs and Market Structure (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1991).  
143 T M Jorde and D J Teece, ‘Innovation Co-operation and Antitrust’ in T M Jorde and D J Teece 
eds., Antitrust, Innovation and Competitiveness (XX: New York, 1992) at pp. 48-50.  B A Kemp, 
'The Follow-on Development Process v. the Conventional Patent Protection Concept', (1974) 16 
IDEA 31; R R Nelson, 'Intellectual Property Protection for Cumulative Systems Technology', 
(1994) 94 Colum.L. Rev. 2674. 
















interfaces, their owners will not merely be able to exert control on their 
independent production process, as was the case with the linear model of 
innovation. Instead, it will have control over the development of complements and 
substitutes that require access to interface with the standard. Further, with this 
model of simultaneous innovation, the quickest copyright owner will control the 
technological development dependent on its standard, even if its own initial 
contribution to the utilitarian balance was minimal.144 It thus extracts the 






                                                 
144 M A Heller and R S Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research’, Science, (1998) Vol. 280 No. 5364  at p. 698.  
Fig. 3: A Network Based Value Chain showing simultaneous innovation 
         Source: CONRINET http://www.echo2.lu/condrinet  
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 It is important to understand that the relationship between copyright 
protection and innovation is not monotonic.145 Whatever the merits of extending 
copyright protection to digital works, enhancing protection has diminishing 
marginal benefits, and at some point will cause a net negative impact on 
innovation, as the strengthening of existing rights stifles more new innovation 
which builds on those rights than that which further expansion encourages. Thus, 
the relationship between the two resembles an inverted ‘U’. In network 
economies, refusals to license may prevent consumers benefiting from network 
effects accruing to a new standard and impede the function of this ‘circular’ model 
of innovation.  
 
 
                                                 
145 A failure to acknowledge this limit is one of the flaws in Polk Wagner’s recent argument that 
there is no reason to worry about ever-increasing control over intellectual property. R P Wagner, 
Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, (2003)103 
Colum. L. Rev. 995. Wagner argues that since control over intellectual property is imperfect, 
increasing intellectual property rights will encourage new creation that will have spillover benefits 
to the public. While this is certainly true up to a point, beyond a certain level of control the costs of 
marginal increases in control outweigh any such benefits. Wagner simply assumes that point has 




Fig. 4: An inverted ‘U’ 
curve showing the 
relationship between the 
strength of copyright 
protection and the 
innovation it promotes.   
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 In essence, the digital copyright owner today not only has a state 
sanctioned right over the competitive process, but also the rate of innovation. 
After all, the corollary of the copyright owner receiving greater control over its 
content is the ability to restrict the access of third parties to it.146  If digital 
copyright has expanded beyond the utilitarian bargain,147 what is the solution? 
Compelling arguments have been made that any imbalance should be corrected by 
endogenous changes rather than shifting the balance through an application of 
competition law. As Michael Katz puts it: 
 
“Even if one concludes that someone should engage in fine turning IPRs 
to reflect competitive conditions or other market characteristics, that 
someone need not be a competition policy authority. Present antitrust 
laws and enforcement institutions have not been created with this role in 
mind. Moreover, co-ordination with the PTO148 is essential to 
implementation of a sound overall policy. Absent legislation, using 
antitrust policy to fine tune IP laws would very likely create more 
problems than it would solve.”149 
 
 The presumption is therefore against exogenous remedies. After all, it may 
be argued that hundreds of years have been spent developing a sophisticated 
endogenous machinery to ensure a ‘proper’ balance between the owner and the 
                                                 
146 W Landes and R A Posner, supra, n. 18 at p.326, See also A Thierer and W Crews eds., 
Copyfights: The Future of Intellectual Property in the Information Age (Washington: Cato 
Institute, 2002) (presenting various authors debating over, inter alia, how intellectual property law 
should be revised to meet the unique conditions of the ‘digital’ or ‘information’ age and the proper 
scope and subject matter of patent law). 
147 See Chapter I, Part II.   
148 This refers to the US Patent and Trademark Office.   
149 M L Katz, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust Policy: Four Principles for a Complex 
World’ (2002) Vol. 1 Issue 1 Jour. Tele. & High Tec. Law 325 at 328-9. As Richard Posner 
argued: “It is not a violation of (antitrust laws) to acquire a monopoly by lawful means, and those 
means include innovations protected by intellectual property laws. If copyright protection of 
software is too broad (either because too much intellectual property protection can reduce output 
or because… too much innovation can be inefficient), it is a matter to take up with Congress.” R A 
Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd Edn, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), at p. 250. See also, 
B Ong, ‘Anti Competitive Refusals to Grant Copyright Licences: Reflections on the IMS Saga’ 
(2004) EIPR. 26(11) 505 at p.508 (Arguing that copyright law can remedy anti-competitive refusal 
to license through (1) “tinkering with the rules on the eligibility of the subject-matter for copyright 
protection”, (2) “the nature and scope of the copyright owner's exclusive rights”, (3) “the 
availability of compulsory licences to would-be competitors of the copyright owner”.)   
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public.150 As the OECD broadly declared, “Any intrusion by competition law, 
particularly into the owner’s exclusive right in refusing to license its IPR after it 
has been legitimately obtained would discourage innovation.”151 
 
 These arguments are valid to the extent that copyright is capable of 
endogenously controlling anticompetitive abuse, if they are not, they should be 
capable of being fine-tuned to meet the challenge. This means not just the 
technical possibility of doing so, but the political will to do so as well – something 
that will not be easy, given the belligerent opposition copyright industries will 
likely marshal against any such attempts.   
 
III. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF INTERNAL REGULATION  
 
 Two categories of people commonly turn to three avenues for relief 
against abuses of copyright. The first are those who seek access to copyrighted 
content. The second are those who have successfully accessed that content but are 
sued for infringement. The avenues for relief are as follows. First, a court may 
make a find of non-infringement. This either may be because the infringer 
attempted to access unprotectable information through reverse engineering, or 
because the information was copyrighted, but the law found that technical 
                                                 
150 Copyright law protects only works of expression, excluding facts and ideas; the fair use 
doctrine, often referred to as a "safety valve," protects against cases in which the routine 
application of copyright law would unduly restrict public access to the work; and the Copyright 
Act contains compulsory licensing provisions. Trademark law provides no protection for generic 
marks or, with some qualification, descriptive marks. (stating that registered marks that become 
generic terms are subject to cancellation at any time); (stating that descriptive marks may only be 
registered provided they have acquired secondary meaning). Patent law provides no protection for 
fundamental principles or for laws of nature. See D I Bainbridge, Intellectual Property, (5th 
Edition) (Essex: Longman, 2002) at 13.  
151 Organisation for Economic Development Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise 
Affairs, Committee (OECD) on Competition Law and Policy, Competition Policy and Intellectual 
Property Rights Executive Summary (1998) at p.8.  
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necessity justified access. Second, a court may allow alleged infringers to raise an 
equitable shield of copyright misuse. This is a unique invention of US 
jurisprudence. The owner’s action is barred by its unjust conduct in attempting to 
enforce its rights beyond the bounds of its statutory grant. The court, while finding 
infringement, nonetheless holds that the owner deserves no remedy. As a third 
recourse, third parties unable to access content to begin with may plead that they 
fall within the recognised categories giving them recourse to compulsory 
licensing.       
 
A. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy 
 
  TRIPS unequivocally states “copyright protection shall extend to 
expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical 
concepts as such.”152 This principle is unanimously accepted in the US,153 EU 
154and Singapore.155 In this way, copyright distinguishes between proprietary 
information and ‘information commons’ in digital works. While access to the 
former may be controlled by the copyright owner, the latter requires the owner to 
grant access under certain conditions.156 Two practical manifestations of these 
                                                 
152 TRIPS, supra, n. 42, Article 9.2.  
153 USC 102(b): “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to 
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work .”; 
See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co, supra, n. 27. 
154 Software Directive, supra, n. 59, Recital 13.  
155 Robert John Powers School Inc v Tessensohn, supra, n.10.  
156 The test, according to the Court in Wheelan v. Jaslow, [1987] FSR 1 (C.Apps. 3d. Circ) was 
that “the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work’s idea and everything that is 
not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the idea.” This was 
elaborated on in Computer Associates v. Altai [1992] 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.) which held that 
elements taken from the public domain and elements dictated by efficacy and external factors, 
where expression must be regarded as confounded into ideas, as falling outside the core of 
protectable expression. For an approving view see A L Clapes, and J M Daniels, ‘Some 
Perspectives on the "Controversy" Over the Computer Associates Test for Copyright 
Infringement’, (1993) 9 Computer Law 11.  For a disapproving view, see Ibcos Computers v. 
 44
principles have emerged with regard to digital copyright. The first is that access to 
the work’s underlying ideas through reverse engineering should be 
unobjectionable. The second is where technical efficacy or market necessity 
dictates copying.157  
 
1. Reverse Engineering  
 
 The debate arising from reverse engineering deserves a dissertation of its 
own.158 Suffice to say that copyright owners have claimed it is necessary to object 
to reverse engineering as it involved straightforward copying.159 This was met 
with a riposte from their opponents who argued that other copyrighted works 
could be consulted and drawn upon to follow instructions to make other works, as 
                                                                                                                                      
Barclays Mercantile [1994] FSR 275, where Jacob J. held that British copyright law did not 
demand a search for a “core of protectable expression”, and rejected the concept of “merger” of 
expressions into ideas. See also B Abramson, ‘Promoting Innovation In The Software Industry: A 
First Principles Approach To Intellectual Property Reform’, (2002) 8 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 75.  
157 Altai, ibid, following the classic decision of Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp [1930] 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.) The Court took Judge Hand's analysis of a play and 
applied it to software. In Nichols, Judge Hand sought a way of describing how copyright would, 
and would not, be applied to the non-literal copying of a literary work: “Upon any work, and 
especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as 
more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general 
statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point 
in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright 
could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart from their expression, his property is never 
extended.” Judge Hand's point was that at some level of abstraction, copyright protection ceased as 
expression and was transformed into an unprotectable idea. Altai used this "abstraction" approach 
to craft an “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test. Under this test, a computer program is 
examined at each level of abstraction for unprotectable elements: The objective, at each level of 
abstraction, is deemed to be an unprotectable idea. Also at each level, unprotectable elements 
include: scenes a faire, i.e., stock modules and other programmatic elements used in the trade, 
techniques which are required by hardware or other external constraints, and patterns which are 
required by efficiency considerations. All of these unprotectable elements are then filtered out. 
What is left--after filtering at each level of abstraction--is protected. This residue is then compared 
with the suspect program to determine whether unlawful copying has occurred.  
158 See Annex D (Reverse Engineering) for a brief explanation of the technical and legal issues.  
159 A R Miller, ‘Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer Generated 
Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?’, (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 977  
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long as the results were themselves non-infringing.160 It was therefore only 
because of the peculiarity of computer technology that a single copy had to be 
made before the step of consultation could take place. Although legislation shows 
that this debate has largely been settled in favour of access over the use of 
copyright law to preclude competition, it is not without its critical failings. 
 
 In the US, reverse engineering has developed under its fair use exception. 
Access to copyrighted content is allowed to the extent that the amount copied was 
no more than was necessary to achieve interoperability.161 Under the doctrine of 
‘transformative use’, it is allowed even to design rival products that diverted 
revenue away from the copyright holders, as long as they were free of the owner’s 
copied code.162 This is because the owner’s interests in appropriating have been 
incorporated in fair use analysis. Thus, any adverse market impact did not 
preclude the application of reverse engineering.163  
 
                                                 
160 D Karjala, ‘Copyright Protection of Computer Software, Reverse Engineering and Professor 
Miller’ (1994) 19. U. Dayton LR 975; T Vinje, ‘Threat to Reverse Engineering Practices 
Overstated - Stac Electronics v. Microsoft Corporation’ (1994) 8 EIPR 364.  
161 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). In Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., [1992] 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir.) 
Although Accolade had copied the whole of Sega's programs in the course of its reverse 
engineering, the court discounted this conduct because it occurred in an intermediate stage of 
Accolade's software development process. Although the court recognized that Accolade's games 
affected the market for Sega games, they did not do so in a way about which copyright law is 
concerned. Significantly, it allowed decompilation to prevent Sega from having a de facto 
monopoly over the unprotected ideas and functional concepts in the program, and held that to get a 
monopoly on such ideas and functional concepts, a creator needs to seek patent protection. (at 
1523-7) 
162 Intermediate copying that occurred was legitimate, because it merely facilitated the copying of 
the unprotected function or idea of the software, and where it is used to facilitate the making of 
transformative (better or extended) products See Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix 
Corp [2000] 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir.). “[I]n the case of computer programs the idea/expression 
distinction poses distinct 'unique problems' because computer programs are in essence 'utilitarian 
articles - articles that accomplish tasks. As such they contain many logical, structural and visual 
display elements that are dictated by the function to be performed, by considerations of efficiency, 
or by external factors such as compatibility requirements and industry demands' ... the fair use 
doctrine preserves public access to the ideas and functional elements embedded in copyrighted 
computer software programs.” At 602-3 
163 D J Gifford, ‘Developing Models for a Coherent Treatment of Standard-Setting Issues Under 
the Patent, Copyright, and Antitrust Laws’ (2003) 43 IDEA 331 
 46
 In the EU, copyright protects a work against the competition of copies, but 
not against competition from works that are non-infringing copies. It is fair use so 
long as the defendant's final product does not contain a substantial amount of 
copied material. EU law allows reverse engineering a program to achieve 
interoperability, where:  
 
(i) The information must not be used for any other purpose, in 
 particular  
 in a program which infringes the original decompiled program, and 
 must not be supplied to another person for a different purpose  
(ii)  The lawful user must not have the necessary information “readily 
 available” to him  
(iii)  The lawful user must not decompile more than necessary to 
 achieve interoperability. 164     
 
 The law on reverse engineering in Singapore is in a state of flux. In the 
landmark case of Creative Technologies v. Aztech Systems Pte Ltd,165 the Court of 
Appeal effectively held that allowing reverse engineering for commercial 
purposes did not exist under Singapore copyright law.166 Under the fair dealing 
defence offered by Section 35, the fact that the defendant  was seeking to make a 
compatible or interoperable program was irrelevant even if the ultimate product 
                                                 
164 Article 6, EU Software Directive, supra, n.59, Article 6 of the Directive provides that copying 
and adaptation occurring in the decompilation of software code is permitted where it is 
"indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an 
independently created computer program with other programs”.  The problem is that (ii) occurs 
only where the details of technical interfaces have been published. This begs the question of who 
would wish to engage in the tedious process of decompilation if this were so, and therefore hints of 
redundancy. The problem with (iii) is that where interface structures are scrupulously hidden, the 
entire program may have to be decompiled. It is an open question whether the decompiler is 
fishing for other things using interoperability as a pretext. See Pro Sieben v. Carlton UK TV [1999] 
EMLR 109. 
165 [1997] 1 SLR 621. Specifically it held that fair dealing provisions did not cover private study 
for commercial purposes. It also held that the adjective “private” before “study” had the effect of 
confining the defence to individuals actually performing the study.  
166 For excellent articles on this landmark case, see Ng-Loy W L, ‘Legitimizing Reverse 
Engineering of Computer Programs in Copyright Law - How Far Have We Gone in Singapore?", 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology, (1996) Vol. 4 Issue 1: Spring 6,  pp. 48-
64; D Seng, ‘Reviewing the Defence of Fair Dealing for Research or Private Study’ (1996) SJLS 
136; S Lai, ‘Recent Developments in Copyright Protection and Software Reverse Engineering in 
Singapore: A Triumph for the Ultra Protectionists?’ (1997) 19 EIPR 525. 
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was itself non-infringing. However, developments in the EU and US led the 
Singapore Parliament to legislate away the statutory bar previously prohibiting 
commercial reverse engineering. 167 The intent was to allow the defence of fair 
dealing for commercial research, promoting reverse engineering for commercial 
purposes.168  
 
 More recently, Sections 39A-C were added, and provide for reverse 
engineering. The result is a two-tiered provision for reverse engineering: the first 
under the specific heads of Sections 39A-C, and the second tier of general fair 
dealing under Section 35 may still provide relief from an infringement action.169 
The introduction of Sections 39A-C into Singapore copyright law also allows the 
possibility of adopting the US concept of “transformative use”.170 This would be a 
welcome development for restoring the utilitarian balance. Transformative use 
sanctions access to copyright content only where it adds value to the original 
work. It does not reduce market competition.171  
 
                                                 
167 For a commentary, see L Lim, “The Aftermath of Creative v Aztech: Fait Accompli or Fiasco?” 
(1998) 10 SAcLJ 414. The Copyright (Amendment) Act 1998 deleted Section 35(5) on private 
study completely.  
168 Explanatory statement to the Copyright Amendment Bill 1998. See S222/98. Note however, 
that the copyist would still have to show that the dealing was “fair”. This rests upon the nature of 
the work, the amount taken and the effect of the dealing upon the potential market for or value of 
the work or adaptation.  
169 This is confirmed by Section 39A(4), which provides that “(f)or the avoidance of doubt, this 
section is without prejudice to the generality of section 35 and does not limit the operation of that 
section.” 
170 Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc, supra, n.105. 
171 As George Wei noted in the context of the Creative case: “The transformative use in the Aztech 
case did not reduce competition: it directly created it although the public could be said to have 
benefited from the competition.”  G Wei, supra, n.14, at p.1255.  It has been cogently argued that 
under the new reverse engineering provisions, the right of “decompilation” is strictured with too 
many preconditions. In addition, many of these pre-conditions are unclear or ambiguous, making it 
unlikely that a reverse engineer can fully comply with them in good faith. Further, where 
decompilation is not with a view to interoperability, or where the preconditions cannot be satisfied, 
reliance must be had to section 35 of the Copyright Act, as a form of fair dealing. This lack of 
clarity and utility in the new reverse engineering exceptions may in fact discourage reverse 
engineering. See D Seng, ‘Reverse Engineering The New Reverse Engineering Provisions in the 
Copyright (Amendment) Act 2004’, (2005) SJLS 234 
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 It is important to recognise that despite the inroads made by these 
developments, reverse engineering is difficult and costly, and its results uncertain. 
Simple or unpopular systems raise little issue with rivals - they are either easily 
accessed or not worth the trouble. Most access issues hover around commercially 
successful platforms such as Microsoft’s Windows OS, which for a variety of 
legal and technical reasons has proven impossible to reverse engineer.172  
 
 Even if access was possible, third party developers still face a second 
hurdle: anticircumvention legislation. Initiated in the US, copyright owners argued 
that in a digital age, anyone with access to their works could commit massive 
violations of their copyrights with a single keystroke by transmitting unauthorised 
copies all over the Internet. 173  To preserve the sanctity of their rights, owners 
insisted on being entitled to having some degree of control over access to their 
works. This meant not merely initial access, but continuing control over every 
subsequent act of gaining access to the content of the work. To protect their 
property rights, the law needed to be amended to prohibit individuals from 
unauthorised access to copyrighted works. A compliant US Congress thereby 
                                                 
172 United States v. Microsoft Corp., [1999] 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C.) (suggesting that process 
of reverse engineering Windows is so time consuming that it could not be done successfully); M A 
Lemley and  D McGowan, ‘Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects’, (1988) 86 Calif. L. 
Rev. 479, 527-530, discussing why no one has been able to reverse engineer the Windows 
operating system to produce a compatible version. For example, rivals seeking to examine the 
proprietary interface will have to use complicated clean room procedures to prevent anything but 
information about the ultimate function of the IPR to move between two groups of engineers in 
order to avoid infringement suits. However, the IPR owner may still challenge the claim, accusing 
the engineers of direct copying. This leads to wasteful duplication of efforts and litigation over the 
existence and effectiveness of these ‘Chinese walls’. The copier must be able to show a detailed 
paper trail. See A Johnson-Laird ‘Software Reverse Engineering In The Real World’, (1994) 19 U. 
Dayton L. Rev. 843 
173 J C Ginsburg, ‘Essay: From Having Copies to Experiencing works: the Development of an 
Access Right in US Copyright Law’, in H Hansen, ed. US Intellectual Property: Law and Policy 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2000).  
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passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 174 The EU175 and 
Singapore176 have followed suit with anticircumvention legislation of their own.  
 
 The DMCA’s chilling effect on reverse engineering may be best seen in 
the infamous DeCess case. 177 Copyright owners brought an action against a 
teenage hacker for circumventing a technological protection measure in the form 
of a software ‘lock’ employed to prevent the copying of DVDs. The Court held 
that while the DMCA recognised reverse engineering, the doctrine developed 
under common law178 did not apply where it was done to the lock itself in order to 
access the uncopyrightable ideas. In this way, while the uncopyrightable ideas 
were still in theory made available under reverse engineering doctrine, the act of 
circumventing the ‘lock’ preventing access brought the facts of the case outside 
the doctrine’s defensive perimeters. Accordingly, the hacker was found to have 
violated the relevant provision in the DMCA.179 The fact that reverse engineering 
of the software lock was both ancillary and necessary to achieving the same effect 
as legitimate reverse engineering doctrine was irrelevant.180 The effect of DeCess 
                                                 
174 17 USC 1201 
175 EU Copyright Directive, Directive 2001/29/EC of 21 May 2001.  
176 In accordance with the US-Singapore FTA, Singapore has similar provisions in her Copyright 
Act. See Sections 261B-G, supra, n.4. In particular, Section 261C of the Copyright Act prohibits 
the circumvention of technological measures designed to restrict access to a work, and make it 
illegal to make or distribute any tool or service designed to facilitate circumvention. This amounts 
to a criminal offence liable to a fine of up to $20,000 and imprisonment of up to 2 years.  See also 
similar provisions in the EU InfoSoc Directive. As S. Jayakumar, Minister for Law explained 
“Copyright owners should reasonably expect their efforts in employing such measures to protect 
their works from infringement not to be thwarted and not to have those technological 
measures circumvented.” Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 16 November 2004 at, supra, n.17 
Whether Sections 35 and 39A-C will be eroded by Section 261C remains an open question at the 
time of writing.  
177 Universal Studies v. Reimerdes, [2000] 82 F. Supp. 2d at 214 
178 Sega Enterprises Ltd., supra .n.107; Sony, supra, n.108. 
179 Section 1201 permitted reverse engineering of copyrighted computer programs only and did not 
authorize circumvention of technological systems that control access to other copyrighted works. 
180 In a deathblow to the ‘transformative use doctrine’ developed in Sony, the Court held that “Sony 
involved a construction of the Copyright Act that has been overruled by the later enactment of the 
DMCA to the extent of any inconsistency between Sony and the new statute. … By prohibiting the 
provision of circumvention technology, the DMCA fundamentally altered the landscape. A given 
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is graphically represented in Fig. 5.  
 
  
 The legal status of reverse engineering shapes the nature of competition 
and innovation in information platforms by providing a statutory license to 
copyright content. Legitimate access under reverse engineering creates an 
incentive for owners to license their content. They could charge an amount less 
than the cost of reverse engineering, and appropriate a profit in the process. 
However, cases like DeCess encourage copyright owners to use anti-
circumvention devices to complementarily regulate access and its use.  This 
makes perfect commercial sense for the owner, but none for the public. If 
copyright owners can impose conditions on the act of gaining access, and back 
those conditions up with either technological devices, or legal prohibitions, or 
both, then the promise of access via reverse engineering would be illusory. Cases 
like DeCess will doubtless encourage restricting access through digital rights 
management.  
                                                                                                                                      
device or piece of technology might have ‘a substantial non-infringing use’, and hence be immune 
from attack under Sony's construction of the Copyright Act … but nonetheless still be subject to 










Access blocked by anti-circumvention devices and laws 
prohibiting circumventing these devices
Fig. 5: Third party developers unable to access unprotectable ideas through reverse 
engineering following DeCess; thus unable to provide substitutes or complementary 
products which depend on interoperability with the industry standard. 
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 Even if the codes required for software interoperability were not blocked 
by anti-circumvention devices, by introducing frequent updates, the copyright 
owner may nonetheless render those codes obsolete.181 Alternatively, owners may 
also turn to trade secrets even where copyright or patent protection is 
unavailable.182 The initial decision to exclude software from patentability 
reflected a widespread view in the early computer industry and amongst 
researchers in the field that protection over digital ‘ideas’ was undesirable for 
competition and innovation.183 However, over the last decade, there has been 
growing trend where dominant undertakings in the computer industry underpin all 
their other IP in the field with patents. Globally, the movement has been powered 
particularly by the readiness of the US Patent Office to allow patents for computer 
programs and other functional works.  
 
 Not content to be left behind, Europe followed suit. The European 
Commission has taken steps toward the position that while copyright protected 
expression of programs in source and object code, patents could protect 
fundamental programming techniques.184 It justifies this expansion using the 
                                                 
181 Microsoft regularly changes its operating system. It has upgraded its operating system software 
on a regular basis over the last 15 years and on several occasions has introduced an entire new 
generation of operating system, despite the difficulty of migrating the installed base of users from 
an old program to a new (albeit compatible) one. A competitor would have to reverse engineer 
each new program and alter its own program to maintain compatibility with the new generation 
Microsoft product. M A Lemley and D McGowan supra, n.119 at p.529. Apple has also warned 
customers of Real using software which currently allows unauthorised interoperability with its 
iPod players that “it is highly likely that Real’s Harmony technology will cease to work with 
current and future iPods”. J Wrostad, Apple Accuses RealNetworks of Hacker Tactics in Tiff over 
iPod, Newsfactor Technology News www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_id=26086.  
182 Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1993] 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir.) 
183 K Beresford, Patenting Software under the EPC (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000). 
184 Draft Directive to Harmonise National Law on the Patentability of Computer Programs. 
2002/0047/COD 
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TRIPS requirement to extend patents to “all fields of technology”.185 The onus 
then seems to be on those who object to copyright extensions to prove their case. 
This was echoed when the Singapore Patent Act was amended to delete Section 
13(2), which contained a prohibition excluding from patentability certain types of 
subject matter, in particular, software.186  
 
 Today, 15% of all patents are software patents,187 a number of them are 
patents that govern APIs and similar interface technology.188 Coupled with 
refusals to license, software patents may create firewalls in a communal 
environment of technological innovation.189 While Singapore has not expressed a 
position with regard to software patents, it has been vigilant in allowing patents in 
other controversial areas such as biotechnology.190 There is therefore little doubt 
that the economic impetus that had driven it to mimic the West in extending 
copyright to digital works will encourage also local software patents in the near 
future.  
 
                                                 
185 Article 27. W R Cornish and D Llewelyn, supra, n.52 at p.780. (Noting the EPO amended its 
Guidelines o allow claims involving a program if overall the invention made a contribution to an 
art that was technical.) For example in Koch and Strezel EPO T26/86, a patent was granted for a 
program governing the operation of an X-ray apparatus controlled by a computer program so as to 
secure optimal exposure without overloading it. It was sufficient that “technical means” were 
involved as well as the mathematical method or algorithm, which was characterised as “non-
technical”. It was unnecessary to show that the invention lay exclusively or largely in the 
technical, rather than the non-technical domain. Another groundbreaking case was Viacom’s 
Application, [1987] OJ EPO 14  where a patent was granted for a computer operating program 
because the claim went to the general functioning of the computer, rather than to an application 
designed to execute particular tasks. Further inroads have even allowed software underpinning 
business methods to be patented as a convenient alternative. T 931/95 – Pension System 
186 See A Kang, et al, supra n.74, at p. 68. 
187 D W Carlton and J M Perloff, supra, n. 22 at p.565 
188 Examples include U.S. Patent No. 5,590,347, for a “[m]ethod and system for specifying 
alternate behavior of a software system using alternate behavior indicia”; U.S. Patent No. 
5,437,006, for a "[s] spreadsheet command/function capability from a dynamic-link library"; and 
U.S. Patent No. 5,430,878, for a “[m]ethod for revising a program to obtain compatibility with a 
computer configuration.” 
189 W R Cornish and D Llewelyn, supra, n.52 at p.780.  
190 G Wei, An Introduction to Genetic Engineering, Life Sciences and the Law, (Singapore 
University Press: Singapore, 2002)  
 53
2. Technical Necessity  
 
 Copyright law recognises that where there are very limited ways to express 
a writer's idea, copyrightable expression becomes unprotectable.191In Lotus 
Development Corp v. Borland International Inc,192 the Court held that the menu 
system of Lotus 1-2-3 was a method of operation not protected by copyright. It 
served as a method by which the underlying software was operated and 
controlled.193 The policy underlying this exclusion was drawn from the utilitarian 
mandate to encourage subsequent authors to build upon the efforts of their 
predecessors.194  
 
 The court was also influenced by the fact that the menu commands used in 
Lotus had become an “industry standard” in the market for computer spreadsheet 
programs. It would therefore have been undesirable if copyright could be 
acquired, and asserted, in a way that would compel the many software users who 
were familiar with the Lotus menu commands to learn different commands for 
                                                 
191 US copyright law explicitly denies copyright protection to any ‘idea, procedure, process, 
system method of operation, concept, principle or discovery…’ 17 U.S.C. §102(b), see Annex A 
for full text. Programmers may be constrained by functional and compatibility requirements to a 
limited number of ways of writing the program. Digital copyright law has accordingly recognised 
that interface code may also be unprotectable. The WCT states in Article 2 that copyright 
protection extends to expression and not ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical 
concepts as such. Article 1(2) Of the EU Software Directive, supra, n. 59,  states that ideas and 
principles which underline any element of a computer program are not protected under the 
Directive. Article 6 of the Software Directive, supra, n.59, excludes copyright protection for 
elements and acts necessary to achieve interoperability. Similarly, industrial designs protection 
elements technically necessary to make a compatible product are not protected. See also Art 7.1 
Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Oct 1998 on legal 
protection of designs: A design right shall not subsist in features of appearance of a product which 
are solely dictated by its technical function. No equivalent provisions are found in Singapore.  
192 [1995] 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.). 
193 Ibid, at p. 818. Even though expressive choices had been made by Lotus in choosing and 
arranging the menu commands, this expression was not copyrightable because the specific words 
chosen were necessarily part of a “method of operation” 
194 See Chapter I, Part II.  
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different spreadsheet programs.195 The court was concerned with customers being 
‘locked into’ the Lotus system, such that the cost for customers to change their 
practices may be so high that they are not likely to buy a competing product that 
even when it might be commercially superior.196  By allowing Borland to replicate 
the Lotus interface, customers could opt for the superior product, thus promoting 
competition via substitution. In essence, while the computer program may have 
deserved copyright protection, the owner had no basis to impede competition by 
imposing unnecessary learning costs upon consumers.  
  
 While it may be tempting to facilitate the development of compatible 
interfaces through the reasoning in Lotus, extending its ambit too widely could rob 
designers of any real protection from copying, since it effectively places user 
interfaces into the public domain. Customers may benefit in the short run by 
having an option between two similar software interfaces. However, this grossly 
discounts the projected investment returns that induce interface developers’ future 
entry or further improvements to the interface, since some users may opt for the 
alternative program instead.  
 
 Lotus may also be criticised as too blunt in its application by access 
without clear evidence of consumer harm. Under competition law, there is no 
general obligation to make compatible products or facilitate their creation.197 
                                                 
195 Boudin J observed: “If Lotus is granted a monopoly on this pattern users who have learned the 
command structure of Lotus 1-2-3 or devised their own macros are locked into Lotus, just as a 
typist who has learned the QWERTY keyboard would be the captive of anyone who had a 
monopoly on the production of such a keyboard.” Ibid, at 821 
196 W A Sheramata, ‘Barriers to Innovation: A Monopoly, Network Externalities and the Speed of 
Innovation’ (1997) Antitrust Bulletin 937, at 955.  See discussion in Chapter III, Part IV for further 
discussion of this issue.  
197 US v. Microsoft Corp, 253 F 3d 34 64, at 64 (DC Cir 2001) (‘A monopoly does not violate the 
antitrust laws simply by developing a product that is incompatible with those of its rivals.’) 
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Lotus shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, creating a presumption of harm 
unless the owner can show otherwise. This turns the presumption of innocence 
fundamental to natural justice on its head.198 In this regard, Lotus may have taken 
a step too far in favour of public access. Platform owners would often be glad to 
license or cross license interface information to strengthen network externalities 
amongst its users. In these cases, courts should be astute to defendants pleading 
‘technically necessary’ to provide substitutes, rather than complementary 
products.  
 
3. Evaluation  
 
 Digital works are essentially utilitarian rather than literary or artistic. As 
such they contain many logical, structural and visual display elements that are 
dictated by the function, efficiency, or external factors such as compatibility 
requirements and industry demands. This makes the boundary between idea and 
expression extremely difficult to draw under copyright law. 199 It is clear that 
competition law will intervene to mandate compulsory licensing where copyright 
covering functional content affects competition. In Magill,200 Magill TV Guides 
sought to publish a weekly guide to all television programming on the channels 
then broadcasting in Ireland. At that time, three companies were broadcasting in 
the Irish market, and each published its own weekly guide. The broadcasting 
                                                 
198See generally, W Wade and C Forsyth, Administrative Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004). 
199 In Nicols v. Universal Pictures Corporation [1930], 45 F. 2d 119, Learned Hand J. said of the 
expression/idea dichotomy: “Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever 
can”. At 121; Lord Hailsham LB (Plastics) Ltd v. Swish Products Ltd., after remarking that it is 
trite law that there is no copyright in ideas, observed “it all depends on what you mean by ‘ideas’” 
[1979] RPC 551 at 629.  
200 RTE v. Commission, supra, n.8.  
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companies claimed copyright in their respective weekly guides, and sued Magill 
for copyright infringement. However, Magill asserted that the broadcasting 
companies had violated Article 82 by refusing to grant it a licence under their 
copyright. As Cornish and Llewelyn explained, the case attracted the attention of 
competition authorities because “the right which underpinned the broadcaster’s 
position was an extension of copyright to subject matter (straightforward factual 
information) which many Member States would consider not to justify intellectual 
property protection in the first place.”201 
 
 The idea-expression dichotomy is consistent with competition law 
intervention when a protected work requires little or no initial R&D or investment 
such that it would have still arrived on the marketplace even without copyright 
protection. A copyrighted revolutionary software standard may be the result of a 
flash of inspiration without perspiration. Here, the copyright simply rewards the 
creator without really being an incentive for further innovation. However, it is 
controversial whether competition regulators should be arbiters of whether a 
product’s claim to copyright is suspect and therefore should be compulsorily 
licensed as a remedy.    
 
C. Copyright Misuse 
 
 Copyright misuse was invented by US courts to prevent owners from 
acting beyond the lawful scope of their copyright.202 Having been found liable for 
                                                 
201 W R Cornish and D Llewellyn, supra, n.52 at p. 755. 
202 In Lasercomb v. Reynolds, anticompetitive licensing agreements prohibited Lasercomb's 
customers from developing or assisting others to develop die-making software during the term of 
the standard licensing agreement for 99 years. The Court held that the monopoly power does not 
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infringement, defendants may raise this equitable shield to nullify the finding 
because the owner had acted inequitably, and should not be allowed to abuse the 
judicial process by benefiting from the damages that would otherwise be awarded.  
The misuse defence is particularly useful in the case of digital copyright where 
protection is less justified, but where the infringer cannot avail himself to either 
reverse engineering or technical necessity.203 While there is no direct equivalent in 
the EU or Singapore, the appeal of the US copyright misuse led local 
commentator Burton Ong to suggest that:  
 
“If copyright law were to take on the responsibility of tackling the 
problem of anti-competitive refusals to license internally, but without 
overhauling the copyright system with an unavoidably detailed statutory 
scheme of compulsory licensing provisions, it might be more feasible to 
develop on a doctrine of ‘copyright misuse’”204 
 
 The immediate benefit of relying on copyright misuse to regulate 
anticompetitive abuses is that there will not be a need to address the problems 
arising from grafting competition law onto copyright – a move that may cause 
further upset to the access-incentive balance. Like sector-specific regulation, rules 
and remedies can be better calibrated to the needs of the stakeholders rather than 
be subject to broad generic rule. However, two critical limitations prevent 
satisfactory resolution of anticompetitive copyright abuses under this doctrine.  
                                                                                                                                      
extend to property not covered by copyright. Holding that copyright misuse barred Lasercomb's 
infringement action, the court concluded that “[t]he misuse arises from Lasercomb's attempt to use 
its copyright in a particular expression, the Interact software, to control competition in an area 
outside the copyright, i.e., the idea of computer-assisted die manufacture. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. 
Reynolds, [1990] 911 F.2d 970, 973-77 (4th Cir.) at p. 979.  
203 As one commentator has observed, “the misuse defense has been strongest where the 
justification for copyright is weakest--cases involving fact works or functional works such as 
computer programs.” P Goldstein, International Copyright- Principles, Law and Practice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), p.320; B Ong, supra, n.92, at pp. 505-514 (This response from 
copyright law is necessitated, in part at least, because of the expansion of the copyright system to 
include nonexpressive, quasi-functional and highly technical "works" as copyrightable subject 
matter.) 
204 B Ong, ibid, at p. 512. 
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1. Unclear Legitimacy  
 
 The first limitation is the legitimacy of the doctrine is unclear. Explicit 
application of copyright misuse has been limited to lower courts in the US,205 with 
the Supreme Court only suggesting as dicta that the doctrine may exist.206 Most 
other courts that have considered the copyright misuse doctrine since 1990 have 
declined to apply it.207 Even when one considers the law developed by lower 
courts, there appears to be no consensus on what the rules should be.   
 
 In Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co, 208 the Ninth Circuit 
held that copyright misuse was inapplicable, even where the alleged use was 
essential for competition in a market unrelated to the copyright.209 The Court 
reasoned that there was no appreciable public benefit arising from competition 
with Triad in the downstream service market. The fact that such competition 
provided consumers with a choice for service providers was insufficient.210 Rivals 
had to develop their own OS software and convince Triad computer owners to 
replace their existing software. This conclusion has been criticised as being 
economically unrealistic, as it would require competitors in digital markets to 
incur massive investment to enter markets that only incidentally involve the 
owner’s copyright.211 In contrast, the Court in Alcatel v. DGI Technologies212 
                                                 
205 Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, supra, n. 149 
206 United States v. Loew's, Inc., [1962] 371 U.S. 38, at pp. 45-46  
207 H Hovenkamp et al, supra, n. 14, at p. 3-42.  
208 Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., [1995] 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir) 
209 Without explanation, the Court expressly limited Lasercomb to situations where the license 
agreements prohibited customers or competitors from developing their own software. Supra, 
n.149, at p. 1337. 
210 Ibid.  
211 It is for precisely this reason that the Supreme Court ruled in Eastman Kodak Company v. 
Image Technical Services, Inc [1992] 504 U.S. 451, 480, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 that 
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rejected Triad’s narrow approach, and held that as long as the owner used its 
copyright to indirectly gain commercial control over products that are not covered 
by copyright, copyright misuse was present.  
 
2. Unclear Role 
 
 Second, it is unclear what role copyright misuse has to play in coexistence 
with competition law. Cases teach that in order for misuse to be established, the 
owner must have violated a substantial ‘antitrust norm’, and that this violation 
relates directly to the claim of copyright infringement.213 Authority is split 
whether the misuse doctrine provides an open-ended defence for firms to allege 
that an owner has violated a distinct copyright policy or whether the doctrine 
merely tracks existing antitrust law standards.214  
 
 Those who argue for the continued development of copyright misuse note 
that copyright misuse has departed from antitrust principles procedurally and 
                                                                                                                                      
“one of the evils proscribed by the antitrust laws is the creation of entry barriers to potential 
competitors by requiring them to enter two markets simultaneously.” 
212 [1999] 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir.) In DSC Communications v. DGI Technologies, the Fifth Circuit 
employed the doctrine of misuse to restrict the owner’s attempt to expand copyright beyond its 
scope and obtain a patent-like monopoly over a secondary market. The Court held that it was 
against public policy to afford a remedy to the owner with ‘unclean hands’, even when copyright 
had been directly infringed. To find liability for infringement would in fact be sanctioning the 
owner’s attempt to use the court to extend copyright beyond statutory bounds. 
213 Lasercomb, supra, n.148. 
214 USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., [1982] 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir.) (Maintaining that patent 
misuse is best analyzed using antitrust standards). See J A D White, ‘Misuse or Fair Use: That Is 
the Software Copyright Question’, (1997) 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 251, 275 (collecting 
commentary), with Lasercomb, supra, n. 147 (framing issue as “whether the copyright is being 
used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright”). In recent 
years, Congress has acted to limit misuse in the patent context. Congress passed the Patent Misuse 
Reform Act in 1988 to prevent patent holders from losing patent protection until the misused 
conduct ceased and its effects were purged. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (enumerating cases in which patent 
owners "shall not be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent 
right," including derivation of revenue, licensing to others, seeking to enforce, refusing to license 
for use, and conditioning licensing or sale on acquisition of other licenses or rights).  
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substantively.215 Procedurally, copyright misuse applies where antitrust does not. 
Substantively, the rationale for copyright misuse is more concerned with integrity 
of the judicial process and copyright policy, rather than competition. Copyright 
misuse is not only about ‘monopolistic abuse’, but also serves as an internal 
constraint on efforts to expand the copyright system beyond its bounds; thus, it 
would apply to conduct that antitrust law would not reach.216 Given that copyright 
misuse is raised in the context of copyright infringement rather than an antitrust 
violation, US courts allowed the defence even without proof that the owner had 
technically violated antitrust laws.217  
 
 However, it is difficult to discern a distinct copyright policy in the misuse 
doctrine beyond these rather unimportant differences that seems to mirror the 
substantial antitrust elements of abuse. The analysis is circular, begging the issue 
copyright law needs to resolve, viz, what are the limits to its ability to use its 
copyright to raise barriers to market entry as part of a broader commercial strategy 
to foreclose the market to rivals.218 Since antitrust law include every practice that 
                                                 
215 In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, [2002] 191 F.Supp. 2d 1087. (ND Cal) (Describing 
antitrust and public policy rationales for misuse as two different approaches) Professor Merges 
suggests that an independent role for intellectual property law here can complement the 
competitive protections developed by antitrust law. See R P Merges, ‘Reflections on Current 
Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse’, (1988) 70 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 793, at p.800 
(suggesting that doctrine reasonably expands beyond antitrust because some ‘thin’ markets for 
patented technology would not meet antitrust definition of a market).  
216 Mallinckrodt, Inc v. Medipart, Inc, [1992] 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir.) at 704. (“The concept of 
patent misuse arose to restrain practices that did not in themselves violate any law, but that drew 
anticompetitive strength from the patent right, and thus were deemed to be contrary to public 
policy.”) 
217 The most obvious case is where may be applicable in the EU or Singapore is where the owner is 
not ‘dominant’. Significantly, the Court in DGI Technologies noted that it is irrelevant whether or 
not there was monopoly power involved as long as such enforcement of copyright has effects in a 
secondary market. See R S Katx and A J Safer, ‘Copyright Misuse: Inconsistent Cases from the 
1990s and Simple Formula for the 21st century’ (2000) 17 No. 4 Computer Law 3, at p.7 
(suggesting a simple rule: (1) what is the market which copyright applies (2) is the rights holder 
trying to stifle competition on a separate market) 
218H Hovenkamp et al, supra, n. 14 at §3.3a. “Outside a very narrow category of per se misuse, 
proving misuse will require an accused infringer to demonstrate that the patentee has power in the 
relevant market USM Corp v. SPS Technologies Inc. supra, n. 149 per Posner J. at 512.  (“If 
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could impair competition, it is not easy to define a separate role for abuses of 
copyright monopoly.219 The owner’s refusal to license is objectionable because of 
the threat it poses to competition. If the defendant in a copyright infringement 
action cannot demonstrate harm to competition sufficient to trigger antitrust laws, 
it should not be allowed access through the back door on a lower threshold under 
copyright misuse.  
 
 It is important to note that the only relevant inquiry under copyright is 
whether the owner breached the scope of its copyright. While the degree of harm 
caused by the breach may be relevant, it is not a condition precedent to nullifying 
the copyright infringement. An owner tarred with misuse cannot enforce its 
copyright against any defendant, whether or not there is a relationship between the 
misuse and recovery it seeks. 220 This is because courts hearing subsequent 
infringement cases on the same infringed content are obligated to refuse to enforce 
a copyright for misuse.221 Copyright owners therefore may be unable to enforce 
extremely valuable rights against infringers involved in later litigation because it 
was found to have misused its copyright in an earlier case. This encourages blatant 
infringement by giving undeserving infringers a ‘free-ride’ even on minor 
copyright misuses. This automatic refusal to enforce a misused copyright is harsh, 
                                                                                                                                      
misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust principles, by which principles shall they be 
tested? Our law is not rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the 
day to develop one without in the process subjecting the rights of patent holders to debilitating 
uncertainty.”) 
219 B Ong, supra, n.92, at pp.505-514 (“For a ‘copyright misuse’ doctrine to effectively respond to 
these scenarios, there must be a judicial consensus that (1) claiming copyright in an industry 
standard, when coupled by (2) conduct which induces customer dependence on that standard, such 
that (3) the copyrighted subject-matter is essential to market participation, and that (4) a bona fide 
request for a copyright licence for valuable consideration has been refused without any legitimate 
reason apart from the copyright owner's desire to exclude competitors from entering the market, 
should prevent the copyright holder from succeeding in an action for copyright infringement 
against a competitor which uses the copyrighted subject-matter in his own products”) 
220 M A Lemley, ‘Comment, ‘The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine’, (1990) 
78 Calif. L. Rev. 1599, at pp.1614-20. 
221 Ibid, at p.1615. 
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and may lead courts who anticipate the unfair result in later cases result to refuse 
to find misuse in the first place. In this sense, copyright misuse is like a Pandora’s 
Box: once invoked, its consequences cannot be controlled. At present, the 
boundaries of copyright misuse are poorly defined and unclear. Until this doctrine 
is more developed, it is submitted that antitrust law may provide a more reliable 
and consistent method of dealing with abusive conduct. 
 
 These limitations provide further evidence to the inadequacy of internal 
regulation, and strengthen the case for competition law. However, it is appropriate 
to acknowledge that shortcomings aside, developments in the copyright misuse 
doctrine have laid an important foundation for understanding the competition law 
aspects of copyright.222 Given the inherent difficulties in applying competition 
law to digital copyright,223 an eventual return to copyright misuse may be the best 
means of regulating the interface, once a better understanding of the 
anticompetitive effects of IPRs has been achieved.  
 
C. Compulsory Licensing 
 
 Compulsory licensing is often the remedy for cases involving 
anticompetitive refusals to license. While the Singapore Copyright Act,224 
provides for half a dozen intricately articulated compulsory licensing provisions, 
they generally relate to distribution and reproduction for extremely fact specific 
                                                 
222 D J Gifford, ‘Developing Models for a Coherent Treatment of Standard-Setting Issues Under 
the Patent, Copyright, and Antitrust Laws’ (2003) 43 IDEA 331 (“The misuse doctrines--despite 
their irregular development and the apparently different directions taken by the courts and 
Congress--are in fact pointing the way towards a new synthesis of intellectual property and 
antitrust.”) 
223 See Chapters II, III and IV.  
224 Cap 63, 1999 Rev. Ed. 
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cases, and do not provide a general remedy for anticompetitive refusals to 
license.225 If copyright law is to provide an endogenous solution through 
compulsory licensing, then it will have to develop along the lines of patent or 
semiconductor law, which bear closer similarity to the species used by 
competition law.  
 
 Patent owners in Singapore were initially liable for compulsory licensing if 
they were found not to have ‘used’ their patents. 226  Under the current rules, the 
court may order compulsory licensing to correct anticompetitive practices, which 
may include non-use.227 This signals legislative desire to internalise the regulation 
of anticompetitive abuses. However, like copyright misuse the need to refer back 
to competition principles may cause its invocation to result in circular analysis, at 
least until a more solid foundation of jurisprudence develops.228 Semiconductor 
legislation similarly provides for compulsory licenses to remedy anticompetitive 
practices.229 Copyright law has no such express provisions, and its silence stands 
in stark contrast to legislative recognition that anticompetitive abuses need to be 
                                                 
225 These are directed toward allowing copying for educational institutions, recording of musical 
works, government use, license to translate works, licenses to publish on grounds of non-
availability in Singapore, licences for public performances and broadcast and cable programme 
licenses. See generally, G Wei, supra, n. 14,  at pp.1112-1142.  
226 Sections 55(1) and (2) of the Patents Act 1995 provided that compulsory licenses may be 
available after the first three years from the grant of a patent for non-supply or supply based on 
unreasonable terms. See Annex A.   
227 Like its predecessor, Section 55 of the Patents Act 2002 provides for compulsory licensing as a 
remedy for non-supply or supply based on unreasonable terms. Subsection (2)(c) now expressly 
provides that the owner may show, as a defence, that it had a valid reason not to supply.  
228 See discussion on copyright misuse, at Chapter I, Part III.B.  
229The Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits Act (Cap 159A, 2000 Rev. Ed.).  Section 27(1) 
allows those requiring access to protected layout design as a remedy to anticompetitive practices to 
apply to the Court for a compulsory licence. Section 27(2) goes on to state that if the Court is 
satisfied that this ground is satisfied, the Court may order the compulsory licences on terms which 
the Court thinks reasonable. The licence granted is non-exclusive, non-assignable and subject to 
the payment of remuneration specified by the Court. For a discussion, see G Wei, supra, n. 14, at 
pp. 1316-7.   
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checked. The case for competition law regulating copyright exploitation is 




 Traditionally, copyright owners have had control over the uses typically 
made by commercial and institutional actors and little control over the 
consumptive users by individuals. In its haste to accommodate digital content 
owners without carefully considering counterbalances, copyright law has only 
itself to blame for its present inability to maintain the utilitarian balance. This 
permitted copyright law to be drawn as a complex, internally inconsistent code.230 
Changes in copyright law have tended to cause an extrinsic shrinking effect of the 
exceptions in proportion to the growing rights in addition to the intrinsic 
expansion of subject matter and length of copyright.231 It may well have been this 
legislative myopia, which drew the attention of ‘hawkish’ judges and regulators 
anxious to rectify the imbalance. In this regard, Cornish and Llewelyn noted that:   
 
“(I)n a period when intellectual property rights are being rapidly 
expanded, it must be wise for competition authorities to retain some 
ultimate means of curbing their range in egregious cases which, in the 
scramble to satisfy industrial lobbies, legislation may not have 
sufficiently cogitated.”232 
 
 Whether or not this is true, there are at least three reasons why competition 
law will likely remain on the copyright landscape for the foreseeable future. First, 
it should be remembered that third parties may not have access to the owner’s 
                                                 
230 J Litman, supra, n. 44, at p.19.  
231 Ibid, at p.15. 
232 W R Cornish and D Llewellyn, supra, n.52 at p. 755. 
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content. Internal copyright controls are defences to infringement, rather than 
affirmative courses of seeking redress for anticompetitive abuse as with 
competition law. In many cases, copying is impossible, either because of the sheer 
complexity of the information, the anticircumvention technology, or the laws 
prohibiting the circumventing of that technology. They are therefore largely 
useless in compelling disclosure. Second, copyright infringement litigation takes 
place between private parties. If these disputes are settled by private bargaining or 
worse, end up in collusive agreements, the others seeking access will not benefit. 
In contrast, competition law actions will likely be initiated by the competition 
authority. Even if the case ends before a court hears it, the written decision 
rendered by the authority will serve as a useful precedent for future cases. Third, 
with the enactment of competition law, it is likely that both courts and firms in 
Singapore will find it a novel and more attractive tool to regulate access. Given 
the growing commercial importance of copyright and her commitment to bilateral 
and multilateral agreements, any initiative toward diluting copyright in Singapore 
seems politically inexpedient, and therefore unlikely. Rivals seeking access under 
the open textured wording of Section 47 of the Singapore Competition Act 
2004233 may add flexible and intuitively attractive public policy arguments to their 
arsenal of reasons for access. Perhaps more importantly, complainants may enlist 
the aid of the competition authorities, along with their considerable resources, to 
compel access to copyright content. Courts hearing these disputes enjoy broad 
discretion again by virtue of the open textured drafting. It is conceivable that 
judges may feel they are doing more justice for the parties before them compared 
                                                 
233 See Annex A for the text of Section 47.  
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to doctrinally restrictive copyright infringement disputes, whether or not this may 
really be the case. 
   
IV. THE INTERFACE OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND 
 COMPETITION LAW:  
ANTITHESIS OR SYNTHESIS?  
 
 In introducing competition law to digital copyright, it is important to 
understand how they interact at the level of first principles. Whittled down to its 
simplest form, one may argue that copyrights confer monopolies and competition 
policy prevents monopolies, so the two are in conflict.234 Indeed, carried to its 
logical conclusion, any refusal to license may amount to an ‘abuse’ under 
competition law. As Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen aptly note: “[T]he dilemma 
is that without a legal monopoly not enough information will be produced but 
with the legal monopoly too little of the information will be used.”.235 
 
 The capitalist free market works on the basis that competition works to 
ensure the most efficient allocation of resources in the absence of market failure, 
where due to inherent characteristics of the market, too much or too little is 
produced or consumed. Competition in the market has a direct impact on the 
efficiency of companies. Empirical studies show that free and open market 
                                                 
234 United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp, [1981] 648 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.). (“One body of 
law creates and protects monopoly power while the other seeks to proscribe it”.); Axis v. Micafil, 
[1989] 870 F.2d 1105, 1111 (6th Cir.) (Asserting that because “Patent laws grant a monopoly for a 
limited time in order 'to promote (innovation)” while the “Antitrust laws, on the other hand, are 
designed to promote and protect competition in the marketplace," the two legal regimes "seek to 
further different and opposing policies”). Hon. Giles S. Rich, ‘Are Letters Patent Grants of 
Monopoly ?’ (1993) 15 W. New. Eng. L. Rev. 239    
235 R Cooter and T Ulen, Law and Economics (New York: HarperCollins, 1988) at p.135 
 67
competition disciplines firms into improving efficiency and product quality, with 
inefficient firms unable to respond to consumer needs forced out of business.236 
Companies not subject to the discipline of market forces may find that there is less 
incentive to maintain cost efficiency, and thus these companies risk becoming 
complacent.237 In this regard, competition law protects competition and the 
competitive process by preventing conduct that threatens a free market.238 Under 
price theory, market inefficiency is measured by the extent the marginal price 
exceeds the marginal cost of producing a good.239 Allocative efficiency demands 
them to be equal.  
 
 On the other hand, digital copyright content is costly to produce, but 
costless to reproduce. For the copyright to have any meaning as a market 
mechanism, owners must have some power over price. Granting copyright owners 
exclusive rights limits diffusion to society and prevents competition in the sale of 
the work. It has also accepted that copyright allows owners to eliminate 
competition from unauthorised manufacturers and sellers of protected work.240 
Copyright law recognises that the pricing of digital content includes a reward. In 
economic terms, this means that marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost. With 
                                                 
236 World Bank, Indonesia- Industrial Technology Development for a Competitive Edge 
(Washington, 29 May 1996) Report No. 15451-IND (Citing studies on South Korean and 
Taiwanese firms  a strong correlation between market competition and decisions to invest in 
technology upgrading to increase competitiveness.)    
237 Goh S H, ‘Considering Open Source and Commercial Software Part II’, (2005) 268(05) Inter Se 
January-February 22, at 27. (“In the software market, the availability of open source alternatives 
competing with commercial solutions has also made commercial software vendors more 
responsive to consumer needs, and more committed to delivering better and more innovative 
products and services”) 
238 As Judge Learned Hand famously put it:  “Possession of unchallenged economic power 
deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a 
narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress.” United States v. Alcoa, [1945] 148 F.2d 
416 (2d Cir.) (noting the argument but not necessarily endorsing it). 
239 See Chapter III, Part III for further discussion of this.  
240 H Hovenkamp et al, supra, n. 14. The reasons for competition law accommodating this market 
aberration will be seen in Chapter III in the discussion on ‘Static Efficiency’.  
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reference to Fig 6, this is represented by the difference between the optimal price 
of p* and actual price, pc.241 In addition to the obvious loss to consumers in lower 
output and higher prices, microeconomic theory recognises this deviation creates a 
deadweight loss to society, indicated by the shaded area.242 In this sense, 
copyright is not a response to allocative distortions resulting from scarcity, as real 
property law is. Rather, it is a conscious decision to create scarcity in a type of 
good in which it is ordinarily absent in order to artificially boost the economic 
returns to innovation.243 This characteristic squarely sets copyright apart from real 














                                                 
241 The value of p* in the case of digital goods would be near zero, since information is nearly 
costless to reproduce. Case 53/97 CICRA and Maxicar [1988] ECR 6211, at para. 17.  
242 The cost to society of a market that does not operate optimally.  
243 J E Cohen, ‘Lochner Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of ‘Rights Management,’ 
(1998) 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462, pp.471-473 
244 See in particular, discussion in Chapter II, Part II, Chapter III, Part III, Chapter IV, Part IV. 
Marginal 












Fig. 6 shows the copyright owner’s demand and supply curves. From an 
allocative efficiency viewpoint, competition law is concerned about 
reducing the amount of deadweight loss caused by the exercise of the 
copyright.  p* and q* represent the ideal price and output levels, and Pc and 
qc represent the higher prices and reduced output resulting from market 
power. The real world optimal point lies somewhere between p* and Pc and 
q* and qc respectively, one possible point being where average revenue 
equals to average cost. The challenge regulators face is in finding that point 
while balancing the interests of copyright owners.  
0 
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 The goal of competition law is to reduce the gap as far as practicable,245 
particularly where the owner has anticompetitively abused its copyright to be able 
to perpetually charge pc. The law acts either directly through punitive fines, or 
indirectly through compulsory licensing of rivals that in turn provide cheaper 
alternatives. However, this presupposes that the law can accurately identify when 
the owner has crossed the line dividing legitimate exploitation and the 
metaphysical point of ‘abuse’ has been crossed.246 The truth is that it cannot. 
Courts therefore rely upon a barrage of tests and theories to estimate when to 
intervene. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, even with these rough 
yardsticks, competition law has met with frustratingly mediocre success. 247 The 
challenge is then one of developing a framework that promotes a smooth synergy. 
 
 Those schooled in the common law are familiar with the difficulties of 
applying law and equity to a given set of facts, even when it is broadly understood 
that where the two conflict, equity prevails. This complexity is raised when a case 
concerns conflict between competition law and copyright law. Where should a 
court begin to find a comprehensive resolution between litigating parties when 
both regimes stand equal as creatures of statute?  
 
 Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp was the first case 
to consider whether unilateral refusal to license was abusive. Even today, it still 
                                                 
245 These goals are not uniform, but diverse and sometimes conflicting, as the discussion in 
Chapter III  illustrates.  
246 See Introduction. This is quite apart from difficulties in defining the demand curve, measuring 
marginal cost and finding the ‘right’ amount of deviation to justify action. D W Carlton and J M 
Perloff, supra, n. 22 at p. 643. 
247 See Chapter IV, Part III for a detailed discussion of these problems.  
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provides perhaps the most extensive analysis of the issue. 248 A computer 
manufacturer refused to license its copyright over a diagnostic program to a rival 
independent service provider (ISO). The ISO contended the refusal amounted to 
an illegal maintenance of its monopoly in the downstream service market. In 
response, the manufacturer argued that IPRs were immune from antitrust laws. 
This carte blanche approach was rejected by the Court, which devised a 
framework to evaluate when IPRs might be curtailed in the interests of 
competition. First, the Court held that neither the antitrust nor IP legislation 
worked to erode the scope of other. Second, it recognised the limited copyright 
monopoly was based on Congress' intent that the right to “exclude others from 
using their works creates a system of incentives that promotes consumer welfare 
in the long term by encouraging investment in the creation of desirable artistic 
and functional works of expression”,249 and therefore could not “require antitrust 
defendants to prove and reprove the merits of this legislative assumption in every 
case where a refusal to license a copyrighted work comes under attack."250 Third, 
IPRs, although granted by the State, were not exempt from the application of 
antitrust law. As a result of these three propositions, the court established that 
“while exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist's unilateral refusal to 
license a copyright, an author's desire to exclude others from use of its 
copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justification for any 
                                                 
248 Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp. [1994] 36 F.3d 1147 (1st. Cir.) 
249 Ibid, at p.1187. 
250 An additional explanation for this conflict stems from competition law's focus on attaining 
competitive market conditions not particular outcomes, as opposed to intellectual property law's 
preoccupation with ensuring the optimum amount of innovation. Competition law assumes that 
deterring monopolies will lead to the attainment of economic efficiency, while intellectual 
property law assumes that efficiency will be achieved only if regulators correctly estimate the 
proper mix of incentive and access to copyright as needed to provide the optimal amount of 
innovation.  See D McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age: Computer 
Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. (1996) 
771, 773-74; Thomas F. Cotter, Intellectual Property and the Essential Facilities Doctrine, (1999) 
44 Antitrust Bull. 211, pp.227-28. 
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immediate harm to consumers.”251   
 
 The better view of the Interface then may be that the two laws do not 
operate in the same way and at the same level.252 Copyright and competition law 
are complementary. Copyright puts in place a system of incentives to encourage 
invention and the bringing of new products to market by adjusting investment-
based risk. Copyright facilitates product differentiation,253 but it does not normally 
confer market power. Under copyright policy, any person should remain free to 
produce a work that is similar to a pre-existing work as long as the later work is 
not a clone.  Competition law is more concerned with the use of market power 
than the mere possession of it.254 Competition law explicitly permits firms to 
charge monopoly prices and profit from their lawfully obtained monopoly255 for 
the same reason that copyright laws create property rights - to create and protect 
ex ante incentives for entrepreneurship, innovation, and commercial 
success.256Thus seen, it operates at a behavioural level on an ad hoc basis, 
interfering only when it detects anticompetitive behaviour extending beyond the 
                                                 
251 At p. 1187. 
252 W J Bowman Jr., Patent and Antitrust law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal (University of 
Chicago Press: Chicago, 1973).  
253 See Annex E- Glossary for explanation of product differentiation. 
254 As Judge Learned Hand put it: “A single producer may be the survivor of a group of active 
competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry. In such cases a strong 
argument can be made that, although the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the 
(Sherman) Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime 
objective to foster… the successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned 
upon when he wins.” United States v. Aluminium Co. of Am. supra, [1945] 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir) 
at 430. 
255  Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, [1995] 65 F.3d 1406, (7th Cir.) 
(monopolist that has acquired and maintained its monopoly by lawful means "can . . . charge any 
price that it wants, . . . for the antitrust laws are not a price-control statute"); Olympia Equip. 
Leasing v. Western Union Tel. Co., [1986] 797 F.2d (7th Cir.) at 376 ("(a) monopolist has no duty 
to reduce its prices in order to help consumers").  
256 Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.2 (2000); Olympia Equip. 
Leasing, ibid at 375 ("(a) monopolist, no less than any other competitor, is permitted and indeed 
encouraged to compete aggressively on the merits")  
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copyright grant. Competition law therefore should restrict itself to addressing 
anticompetitive behaviour consistent with the ambit of copyright law.257  
 
 Indeed, when one takes a long-term view of markets, copyright and 
competition law may share a common goal.258 Copyright often bring about greater 
inter-brand competition by encouraging undertakings to develop new products to 
go on the market thus encouraging effective inter-brand competition. Thus seen, 
the grant of a monopoly is a lesser evil to achieve the greater good of increased 
inter-brand competition. Identifying complementary goals for the two laws does 
not end the inquiry. They strive toward these goals in ways that are often in 
tension. Where the two laws come into contact, judges must reconcile this tension 
between them. Efficient maximisation of social welfare requires that rules are 
developed to help draw a line between what is permissible and what is not.  
 
   
  
                                                 
257 P  Torremans, Holyoak and Torremans Intellectual Property Law (3rd ed, Butterworths, 2001), 
at 302-309; see also the introductory comments in R Whish, Competition Law (4th ed, 
Butterworths, 2001), at 676. 
258 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., [1990] 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.). The court 
in Atari explained that “the aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first 
glance, wholly at odds [but] the two bodies of law are actually complementary as both are aimed at 
encouraging innovation, industry and competition”. See also C A Kranick ‘Copyright Law-
Copying For The Purpose Of Future Compatibility Is Not Fair Use - Atari Games Corp. v. 

































He that would govern others first should be master of himself.  
 
     Philip Massinger259 
 
 In Singapore, the principal rule applicable to cases falling under Section 47 
of the Competition Act is that an undertaking, on becoming dominant, must not 
abuse its market power. The court must determine two issues.260 First, the 
complainant must show that the offending copyright owner was ‘dominant’. If it 
fails, the inquiry ends. Competition law has pragmatically adopted this de minimis 
approach to filter out conduct without significant impact on the market. Second, 
the owner must have ‘abused’ that dominance on a ‘relevant market’. ‘Abuse’ 
turns upon whether the owner “protects, enhances, or perpetuates” its dominant 
position “in ways unrelated to competitive merit”.261 Once the complainant has 
discharged its legal burden, the owner will be found liable for predatory conduct 
unless it can offer some pro-competitive “objective justification”.262 These are the 
rules at the Interface.  
 
 From a study of US and EU cases, Chapter II suggests that these rules do 
not sufficiently take into account the differences between digital copyright 
markets and those in traditional industries. Part II begins by examining the 
                                                 
259 P Massinger, Timoleon in ‘The Bondman, act 1, scene 3’ (1624), P Edwards and C Gibson, 
Poems of Philip Massinger, (Gloucestershire: Clarendon Press, 1976)  
260Competition Commission of Singapore Draft Guidelines on the Section 47 Prohibition (CCS 
Guidelines), para. 3.1, available at: 
  http://www.ccs.gov.sg/Doc/GuidelinesConsultation/Abuse_of_Dominant_Position29032005.pdf 
(“There is a two-step test to assess whether the section 47 prohibition applies: (1) whether an 
undertaking is dominant in a relevant market, either in Singapore or elsewhere (2) if it is, whether 
it is abusing that dominant position in a market in Singapore.”) 
261 Ibid, at para. 2.1.    
262 Ibid. at para. 4.6.(“Where the dominant undertaking can show that the conduct leads to 
improvements in economic efficiency and that the benefits could not be achieved without 
producing such anti-competitive effects, the CCS will not find abuse.”)  
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implications of Section 47 being an open-textured directive. While this allows 
flexibility to regulate vastly different industries, this open-texture introduces a 
degree of arbitrariness. This may be remedied in part by drawing on the 
relationship between generic competition law and sector-specific regulation. Part 
III examines the concept of “dominance”, the first limb of the Section 47 test, and 
suggests how it should be modified when applied to digital copyright markets.  
 
 The focus of Chapter II is, however, on Part IV. Here, an analysis is 
conducted on the forms and tests for “abuse”, the second limb of the Section 47 
test. As will be seen, it is nearly impossible for a court to confidently make a 
finding that the copyright owner has abused its dominance simply in refusing to 
license. Over the years, courts have developed various categories of, and tests for, 
“abuse”, but they are closer to being presumptions, rather than bright line rules. 
Chapter II concludes that in order to develop a clear and useful set of rules at the 
interface, courts and policy makers in Singapore need to first settle on a well-
defined consensus of two things: the economic goals of competition policy and the 
underlying legal analysis which supports the test for ‘abuse’. These ideas will be 
developed further in Chapters III and IV respectively.  
 
II. SECTION 47: TWO OBSERVATIONS 
 
 Like Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 82 of the EC Treaty, 
Section 47 has been drafted in a broad textured manner, leaving judges to develop 
generic competition law through subsequent interpretation. Section 47 is brief and 
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more readable compared to other forms of detailed commercial legislation.263 
However, the operative terms – ‘dominant’ and ‘abuse’ - are opaque. As the US 
Supreme Court in the recent landmark case of Verizon Communications Inc. v. 
Law Offices of Trinko observed “[u]nder the best circumstances, applying the 
requirements of §2 can be difficult, because the means of illicit exclusion, like the 
means of legitimate competition are myriad.”264  
 
 Those seeking clarification of the key terms through either the 
parliamentary debates preceding their enactment and the Guidelines drafted 
thereafter will be disappointed, for they cast only a dim light. 265 This means that 
courts have tremendous discretion to craft competition law in a manner 
unparalleled in modern commercial laws in Singapore, which have been more 
commonly based on detailed statutory provisions. Given the recent vintage of the 
Competition Act, Singapore courts will doubtlessly spend many years supplying 
the meaning of these terms. 
 
 The second observation relates to how generic competition law relates to 
sector-specific regulation. The US and EU seem divided in their approach. Trinko 
held that there was no space for competition law remedies once a sector-specific 
                                                 
263 See for example, the rules governing formation and winding up in Company Law. W Woon, 
Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell: Singapore, 1995), at pp. 31-52, 653-729. 
264 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Cutris V. Trinko,(‘Trinko’) [2004] LLP 540 US 
682. Citing the Court of Appeals (DC Circuit in Microsoft ). United States v. Microsoft Corp. 
[2001] 253 F.3d 34 at 58.  
265 As Burton Ong noted: “While it may not be practical for precise definitions to be given to the 
key words and phrases used in the statutory provisions, many of which are based on economic 
concepts which mean different things in different contexts, it is entirely appropriate for the statute 
to articulate how these words and phrases will be interpreted and applied – a non-exhaustive list 
of relevant factors, major considerations, and other qualifying criteria would provide much-needed 
depth to the legal framework.” (emphasis mine) B Ong, Second Consultation Paper on the 
Singapore Competition Bill. On file with author.  
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regime has been established.266 In contrast, the EU Commission decision of 
Deutsche Telekom,267 held that competition law may apply regardless of the 
presence of such regulation. This discussion is particularly significant to the 
Interface because copyright is a form of sector-specific regulation, and 
conclusions distilled may point the way forward.     
 
A. The Benefits and Perils of Open Textured Legislation 
 
 It may first be said that open-textured legislation is neither uncommon nor 
undesirable. Parliament may have intentionally left the task of tailoring 
competition rules to judges. As in other growing areas of the law, it anticipates 
that judges will draw on foreign developments to craft a system of competition 
law. The technicalities that sector-specific considerations may pose do not detract 
from the acceptability of open textured drafting. Judges have proven themselves 
competent enough to handle both technical complexities in biotechnology and 
commercial nuances in corporate insolvency and taxation. It is not immediately 
apparent why competition law should any different.268 Second, open-textured 
legislation provides the malleability in interpretation and subsequent application 
required in diverse industries governed by generic competition law. Broad judicial 
discretion allows the law to adjust quickly to confront new realities.269 This is 
                                                 
266Trinko, supra, n.6, at p.881(“One factor of particular importance is the existence of a regulatory 
structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm. Where such a structure exists, the 
additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it 
will be less plausible that the antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny.”).  
267 Commission Decision No. 2003/707/EC of 21 May 2003, Deutsche Telekom AG OJ L 263 of 
14 October 2003, pp. 9-41. See R Kloz and J Fehrenbach, ‘Two Commission Decisions on Price 
Abuse in the Telecommunication Sector’ (2003) 3 Competition Policy Newsletter, at p. 8.  
268 Though as will be seen, there are significant differences. See Chapter III, Part IV.  
269 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678-80 
(Discussing conception of fair use doctrine as delegation to courts to develop the contours of the 
principle); see also C M Rose, ‘Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water 
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superior to legislating detailed but inflexible rules that may be in danger of being 
both over-inclusive or under-inclusive.  
 
 However, from this rose-tinted vantage point, it is easy to gloss over two 
fallacies. First, the fact that judges have been responsible for developing 
technically complex areas of the law says nothing of its desirability. Indeed, there 
are cogent reasons why it may not be. One reason is that while articulation of 
broad legal principles poses little difficulty, applying those principles in 
competition law cases may pose distinct challenges not found in other areas. 
Unlike other areas of common law, competition law hinges on economic theory. 
This theory rests on strict assumptions that courts may not have fully appreciated 
in the digital context.270  
 
 Second, Section 47 stands in stark contrast to the detailed legislation 
covering other areas of commercial conduct. For example, the Company Act 
details provisions on the formation, conduct of business and dissolution; 271 and IP 
legislation details rules relating to grant, infringement and the applicable 
exceptions, limitations and defences.272 It is significant that during the 
consultation process leading up the enactment of the Competition Act, Temasek 
Holdings argued that the law was “too general”.273 In particular, it noted that the 
                                                                                                                                      
Rights’, (1990) 19 J. Legal Stud. 261, 267-94 (Discussing evolution of water rights property 
schemes). Given the dynamic nature of the Internet, some have argued that this model promotes 
more flexible and effective rules; S Sherry, ‘Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law 
in Cyberspace’, (2002) 55 Vand. L. Rev. 309, 312 (arguing that the nature of common law 
adjudication, which allows for constant re-evaluation, provides a vehicle superior to legislation in 
regulating fast-changing technologies). 
270 This argument will be fully considered in Chapter IV, Part IV. 
271 See generally, W Woon, supra, n.5.  
272 See generally, G Wei, , The Law of Copyright in Singapore, (SNP Editions: Singapore, 2000).  
273 ‘Temasek: Focus Competition Law on Sectors with Natural Monopolies’, The Straits Times, 4 
June 2004. 
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Act left too much discretion to the Competition Commission of Singapore to 
decide what would be prohibited. Temasek argued that all rules should to be 
clearly defined upfront, “so as not to introduce another layer of administrative and 
market costs” stemming from commercial uncertainty. 274 It may perhaps be 
understandable then that firms like Temasek are concerned with vague provisions 
such as Section 47.  
 
B. Section 47 and Sector-Specific Regulation 
 
 In Trinko,275 Verizon was compelled by the Federal Communications 
Commission under the US Telecommunications Act 1996276 to share its local 
networks with entrants. Trinko, a firm that bought services from one of the 
entrants alleged that Verizon had violated Section 2 by filling rival’s orders in a 
discriminatory manner to discourage customers from joining the entrants. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court placed strict limitations to the situations where antitrust  
law could interfere with market with sector-specific regulation, suggesting that the 
existence of sector-specific regulation should leave little scope for antitrust 
                                                 
274 Ibid. More than once, the US Supreme Court has held that a state statute void for uncertainty, 
even though it was argued that these statues were no more uncertain than the Sherman Act. 
Connally v. General Construction Co. [1926] 269 US 385 and Cline v. Frink Dairy Co.[1927] 274 
US 445. In each case, the Court distinguished the Sherman Act on two grounds. First, it satisfied 
the level of certainty required by due process. Second, since the Sherman Act’s ‘rule of reason’ 
embodies rules declared by common law precedents, it afforded a definite and certain objective 
standard. Because the exclusionary effect of copyright is prima facie legal, all refusals to license 
are subject to ‘rule of reason’ type analysis, whether the jurisdiction acknowledges it or not. While 
the constitutionality of Section 47 may unquestionable despite its vagueness, it provides cold 
comfort to those seeking legal certainty in this provision. 
275 Trinko, supra, n.6.   
276 Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56.  
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intervention.277 In contrast, the EC in Deutsche Telekom held that sector-specific 
regulation did not preclude competition law.278  
 
 Damein Geradin, an EU commentator supports the view taken in Trinko. 
He argues that competition law should not intervene where there is an “effective” 
sector-specific regulatory regime in place,279 giving two reasons for this. First, 
sector-specific regulators are better placed than both courts and generic 
competition regulators to address access issues requiring technical expertise.280 
Second, having two sets of rules administered by two authorities involved in 
similar issues risks contradictory decisions and inconsistent remedies. This is 
similar to the argument made earlier in the context of applying copyright misuse 
to anticompetitive abuses. This must be right. The existence of sector-specific 
regulation in areas such as telecommunications, gas and electricity suggest that a 
blanket approach is undesirable. Like company law, regulation makes sense only 
if applied to relatively stable and uniform circumstances. 
 
  A move toward abandoning generic competition law in favour of sector-
specific regulation because of miniscule differences in their underlying economics 
should be stoutly resisted; broad stroked application of a generic competition law 
seems equally hazardous. On the other hand, where sector-specific regulation is 
                                                 
277Trinko, supra, n.6.   
278 Deutsche Telekom, supra, n.9  at para. 53 (The Commission noted that “competition rules may 
apply where sector-specific regulation does not preclude the undertakings it governs from 
engaging in autonomous conduct that prevent, restricts or distorts competition.”) 
279 D Geradin, ‘Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the EC Treaty: What can the EU learn from the 
US Supreme Court’s Judgement in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, IMS and Deustche Telekom?’ 
(2005) Common Law Market Review. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=617263 
at p.27. 
280 See Chapter IV for a discussion of this in the context of the Cost-Benefit Approach. 
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ineffective, because of limiting deficiencies in the rules or regulatory capture,281 
regulators should be left free to invoke proceedings under competition law.282 In 
sum, while ‘open-textureness’ of Section 47 seems to be the most administratively 
efficient means of regulating abuses, there will likely be times when rules 
transplanted from industries will be inappropriate in digital copyright markets. 
These issues will become more apparent as each limb of the Section 47 test is 
considered.   
 
III. DOMINANCE AND DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 
 
 It is incumbent upon any complainant alleging abuse under Section 47 to 
show that the copyright owner does indeed have market power. Without market 
power, the owner is naturally constrained by its rivals, and competition law has no 
cause to intervene. With market power, the copyright owner can eliminate rivals, 
exploit consumers and retard innovation. 283 This begs the question what the test 
for market power should be. Courts have relied on two measures. The first is a 
static snapshot of the market, based on cost-price differentials and market shares. 
                                                 
281 The issue of regulatory capture is explored further in Chapter IV. See Glossary in Appendix E 
for explanation.  
282 D Geradin, supra, n.21 at p.23. 
283 CCS Guidelines, ibid, at para. 3.3 (“Market power can be thought of as the ability to profitably 
sustain prices above competitive levels or to restrict output or quality below competitive levels. An 
undertaking with market power might also have the ability and incentive to harm the process of 
competition in other ways, for example by weakening existing competition, raising entry barriers 
or slowing innovation. Market power arises where an undertaking does not face sufficiently strong 
competitive pressure. Both buyers and sellers can have market power.”) In the EU, market power 
is a position of economic strength which enables the undertaking “to prevent effective competition 
on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers” United Brands v. European 
Commission, [1978] E.C.R. 207. For a similar US perspective, see United States v. Microsoft 
Corp. [2001] 253 F.3d 34 at 57-58 (“Direct evidence of monopoly power includes setting price 
without considering rivals' prices”); R A Posner, ‘The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation’ 
(1975), 83 Journal of Political Economy 807. For an economic analysis, see J Tirole, The Theory 
of Industrial Organisation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987). One possible area of difficulty is 
whether the market share of licensees should be taken into account in calculating the market share 
of an alleged dominant undertaking. 
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The second is a dynamic measure based on ease of rival entry as a competitive 
constraint of the owner.  
A. Static Indicators  
 
 Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand as the guiding mechanism of 
the economy is essential to understanding the regulator’s concern with economic 
dominance.284 Competition is the principal regulator of commercial forces in a 
capitalist market ensuring optimal welfare for society. Popular economic theory 
posits that resources are most efficiently allocated under conditions of ‘perfect 
competition’,285 driving prices down to their marginal costs of production. 
Accordingly, any deviation from marginal cost indicates market power that should 
catch the attention of vigilant regulators.  
 
 Where market power cannot be measured directly, it may be inferred by 
market shares.286 Market power thus turns upon the owner’s ability to exclude or 
eliminate competition in the “relevant market”.287 The Guidelines state that 
                                                 
284 Smith presumes that self interest drives individual competitors’ to persuade customers on 
grounds of quality and value to make a particular purchase. A Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York: The Modern Library, 1937) See also S. 
Willimsky, ‘The Concept of Competition’ (1997) 1 ECLR 54. (“It is believed that only selection, 
expressed through consumer choice, would lead to an equilibrium of demand and supply and 
hence further the interests of society as a whole. Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ … would lead to 
the best overall solution.”) 
285 This economic Shangri-la is characterised by negligible entry barriers, fungible goods and 
infinite sellers and buyers, resulting in goods and services being sold to all consumers willing and 
able to pay the opportunity cost of production. See S Martin, Industrial Economics: Economic 
Analysis and Public Policy, (New York: Macmillan, 1994) at 15.  
286 “Firms are subject to three main sources of competitive constraints: demand substitutability, 
supply substitutability and potential competition. From an economic point of view, for the 
definition of the relevant market, demand substitution constitutes the most immediate and effective 
disciplinary force on the suppliers of a given product.” Commission Notice on Market Definition, 
(1997) OJ C372/5, para. 13. 
287 This includes the relevant product and geographical markets. See CCS Guidelines, supra, n.2, 
at para. 3.2; United States v. AT & T Co.,[1981] 524 F.Supp. 1336, 1347-48 (D.D.C.) (“a 
persuasive showing ... that defendants have monopoly power ... through various barriers to entry, 
... in combination with the evidence of market shares, suffice[s] at least to meet the government's 
initial burden, and the burden is then appropriately placed upon defendants to rebut the existence 
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dominance is presumed if the undertaking has a 60% market share.288 For 
copyright owners, how the relevant market is defined will have a significant 
impact on the ultimate determination of anticompetitive liability. For example, if 
the court regards the relevant market as coextensive with the scope of the 
copyright, mere ownership confers dominance.289 The problem is that unlike 
tangible goods, copyright may only exist through its exercise.290 Further, 
copyright exists to limit access artificially, so that prices can be raised above 
marginal costs.291 
 
 The digital dimension that copyright owners operate in further makes their 
conduct suspect. Digital copyright markets are subject to ‘instant scalability’. In 
                                                                                                                                      
and significance of barriers to entry:). US Courts have indicated that products “reasonably 
interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes” constitute this market. United States v. E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co., [1956] 351 U.S. 377, 391, 76 S.Ct. 994, 100 L.Ed. 1264. (“Because 
the ability of consumers to turn to other suppliers restrains a firm from raising prices above the 
competitive level, the definition of the 'relevant market' rests on a determination of available 
substitutes.”).; Continental Can v. Commission [1973] ECR 215 (“The possibilities of competition 
can only be judged in relation to those characteristics of the products in question by virtue of 
which those products are … interchangeable with other products”) at para. 14.  Hoffman-La Roche 
v. Commission, [1979] ECR. 461. In defining the relevant product market, Courts and Regulators 
have adopted the US tests for demand and supply substitutability, Commission Notice on 
Definition of Relevant Market, supra, n.28. In defining the relevant geographic market, Courts 
look at the region “where the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogenous for the effect 
of economic power of the undertaking concerned to be evaluated” United Brands v. Commission, 
supra, n. 23, at  para. 11. 
288 CCS Guidelines, supra, n.2, at para. 3.8. (Market shares between 47%-50% or between 50%-
55% have been considered insufficient: Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 
[1997] 133 F.3d 103, 107-08 (1st Cir.); but in other cases a 24% market share has been considered 
sufficient. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., [1982] 676 F.2d 1291, 1298 
(9th Cir.)) 
289 Thus in Volvo v. Veng (UK) Ltd  Case 238/87 [1988] ECR 6211, the relevant market was found 
to be in Volvo spare parts. Volvo accordingly held a dominant position, which it could abuse by 
refusing to license to service repair shops. 
290 A Robertson, ‘The Existence and Exercise of Copyright: Can it Bear the Abuse?’ [1995] 111 
LQR 588 at 588 (Noting in the context of Magill, that the distinction between existence and 
exercise of copyright is unconvincing, since its existence lies in its exercise.) For example, a car 
owner may use his car as a shelter from the rain or to listen to music, even if he does not exercise 
its primary function as a mode of transport. In contrast, for copyright, the only form of exercise is 
in being able to exclude imitation and access without adequate payment.  
291 This simply reflects a market situation where each firm is seeking to recover its unusually high 
investment costs by pricing above marginal cost. Thus a vigorously competitive market may exist 
despite each firm's pricing well above marginal cost See discussion in Chapter I, Part IV; see also 
H Hovenkamp et al, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual 
Property (New York: Aspen Law, 2003) at § 4.1c.  
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non-digital markets, the dominant firm’s market share indicates to some degree, 
its ability to restrict the aggregate industry supply, hence the greater its market 
power. This power stems from the positive and increasing marginal costs of 
production faced by non-dominant rivals. As these rivals expand sales in response 
to the dominant firm’s reduction, the expansion is choked off by rising marginal 
costs. In the case of digital content, marginal cost is negligible over full scope of 
the expected market. If the dominant producer restricts its output, non-dominant 
rivals can easily expand their output.292 Entrants could simply enter the market, 
produce at the same output level as the largest incumbent, and enjoy costs as low 
as those of incumbents. This is particularly so in software industries, where 
marginal costs are negligible.293 Large market shares by themselves therefore do 
not automatically translate into market power. A more relevant measure of market 
power in digital copyright markets may be the extent that alternative technologies 
exist, or the number of firms offering such technology. These are a better gauge of 
the competitive constraints copyright owners face in these fluid markets. 
 
 Finally, with the rapid technological change characteristic of digital 
copyright markets, market definition in one case may quickly become irrelevant in 
the next case when different facts arise. Observers agree that the functions of the 
PC operating systems (OS) have grown and will continue to grow. New software 
packages, such as Windows XP, incorporate additional functions found in 
                                                 
292 The assumption is here is that there are no capacity constraints. See G J Stigler The 
Organization of Industry, (Univeristy of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1968) at p. 67 
293 Economies of scale therefore do not constitute a barrier to entry if both entrants and incumbents 
have access to the same cost curve. Accordingly, if Microsoft were to restrict sales of Windows, 
IBM could easily expand its output of OS/2 by duplicating Microsoft’s licence with OEMs. The 
collective expansion of non-dominant producers would then be able to offset fully the supply curb 
of the dominant producer. In this case, there would be no correlation between market share and 
market power. 
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previously separate products. New demands require OS to manage hardware that 
is more diverse or demanding. While this enhanced functionality may ultimately 
benefit consumers.294 this may work against efforts to define the boundary 
between OS and applications software, and thus the relevant market.295  
 
 It is comforting to note that even in its embryonic form, the authorities in 
Singapore have committed to the position that the competition law does not 
prohibit dominance per se.296 The Guidelines prudently recognise that market 
shares represent only a snapshot of the market situation, and may not be a reliable 
guide to market power “both as a result of shortcomings with the data and for 
reasons such as low entry barriers, successful innovation, product differentiation, 
responsiveness of buyers to price increases and price responsiveness of 
competitors”.297 It follows that the next measure of dominance becomes even 
more determinative.   
 
B. Dynamic Indicators  
 
 Entry barriers provide a dynamic dimension to the analysis of market 
power in digital copyright markets by taking into account competitive pressure 
                                                 
294 For example, the popularity of Internet applications has led Web browsers to become routinely 
integrated into or bundled with OS products. Microsoft’s Internet Explorer was integrated into 
Windows 98 and its progenies But Microsoft is hardly alone. IBM has led this trend, developing its 
own browser for OS/2. Sun Microsystems’ Solaris and Java OS, SCO’s UnixWare and Open 
Server all provide browsing by bundling Netscape Navigator with OS. 
295 S J Davis et al, ‘Economic Perspectives on Software Design: PC Operating Systems and 
Platforms’, in David S. Evans, Microsoft, Antitrust and the New Economy (Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2002) at p.362 
296 CCS Guidelines, supra, n.2 at para. 2.1 (“The section 47 prohibition only prohibits abuse of a 
dominant position. It does not prohibit undertakings from having a dominant position or striving to 
achieve it.”) 
297 Ibid, at  para. 3.6-7.  
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from potential rivals. 298 The more difficult it is for rivals to enter the market, the 
more incumbents can raise prices above the competitive level.299 Competition 
authorities are concerned with the strategies dominant firms use to raise entry 
costs, 300 as these have been empirically found to reduce social welfare.301 The 
ability to raise entry barriers is therefore a sign of market power.302 
 
 The Guidelines suggest that competition authorities will rarely regard 
digital copyright as being a significant entry barrier. 303 This is because copyright 
does not prevent third parties from compiling the same material from a common 
source. 304 For example, Microsoft’s copyright over its Windows OS only allows 
                                                 
298 The traditional understanding of entry barriers refer to the cost advantages of incumbents over 
entrants. Economics of large scale, product differentiation, and absolute cost advantages of 
incumbent firms compared with entrants are the main determinants of entry conditions. J S Bain, 
Barriers to New Competition, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA,1956) at p.10. 
299 The difference between the competitive price and the entry-inducing price reflects unit costs 
borne by an entrant but not by an incumbent. See also CCS Guidelines, supra, n.2, at para. 3.11. 
(“Entry barriers are important in the assessment of potential competition. The lower the entry 
barriers, the more likely it will be that potential competition will prevent undertakings already 
within the market from profitably sustaining prices above competitive levels. Even an undertaking 
with a large market share would be unlikely to have market power in a market where there are very 
low entry barriers. An undertaking with a large market share in a market protected by significant 
barriers is likely to have market power.”) See also Commission Notice on Market Definition, 
supra, n.28, at para. 24. (“The third source of competitive constraint, potential competition, is not 
taken into account when defining markets, since the conditions under which potential competition 
will actually represent an effective competitive constraint depend on the analysis of specific 
factors and circumstances related to the conditions of entry.”) 
300 R A Posner, supra, n.27 at p. 11.  
301 Available estimates of the social cost of monopoly power are imprecise, but fall within a range 
of 1 percent and 13 percent of national income in the US per year.  I Powell, ‘The Effects of 
Reductions in Concentration on Income Redistribution’, (1987) 69 1 Review of Economics and 
Statistics 75.  
302 As Oscar Bronner noted: “In order for refusal of access to amount to an abuse, it must be 
extremely difficult not merely for the undertaking demanding access but for any other undertaking 
to compete. Thus, if the cost of duplicating the facility alone is a barrier to entry, it must be such as 
to deter any prudent undertaking from entering the market.” (Emphasis mine) Oscar Bronner 
GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs [1998] ECR I-07791. [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. at 66. 
303 See Para. 10.15 (Recognising that IPRs often do not confer monopoly power, since owners hold 
fragments of the entire technology required in the market) However, whether this will actually be 
so will depend on the competition policy model Singapore adopts.  
304 Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro Case 78/70 [1971] ECR 487 (“A manufacturer of recordings 
who has a protection right analogous to copyright does not however have a dominant position 
within the meaning of Article [82] of the Treaty merely because he exercises his exclusive right to 
market the protected articles”) See Sirena Srl v. Eda Srl [1971] ECR 69 for a similar position on 
trademarks.; Tritton, p. 804. (“Generally IPRs do not play an axiomatic role in assisting an 
undertaking to achieve a dominant position in a relevant market.”)  
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it to exclude others from making a clone. Only in this limited market defined by 
the Windows OS and its close technological substitutes does Microsoft have 
‘market power’. 305When one considers the market for software, or even for rival 
OS, Microsoft enjoys little market power through its copyright. There will often 
be sufficient actual or potential close substitutes for the product to prevent 
abuse.306 The Guidelines also correctly recognise that even if copyright creates 
barriers, they are often temporal.307 On the other hand, where copyright owners 
block access to a key aspect of the technology, they may prevent effective actual 
or potential competition.308  
 
 However, courts and regulators in Singapore should be wary of two 
pitfalls. First, regard for entry barriers should not extend to those in hypothetical 
markets. In Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp, a US Court accepted that the ‘relevant 
market’ could be a notional market for innovation. If a company asserts its IP to 
retard innovation or chills development, this could be abusive even if the 
commercial market for the innovation/developments that have allegedly been 
                                                 
305 In Deutsche Grammophon, ibid,  the ECJ observed that the exercise of exclusive distribution 
rights under a sound recording copyright do not automatically translate to dominance; there must 
be some further showing of "the power to impede the maintenance of effective competition over a 
considerable part of the relevant market”. 
306 US Antitrust Guidelines for Intellectual Property 1995, at para. 2.2, (“the US Antitrust 
Guidelines for Licensing and Acquisition of IP, issued jointly by the FTC and Antitrust Division of 
the DOJ, specifically reject the market power presumption: The Agencies will not presume that a 
patent, copyright or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner. Although the 
intellectual property right confers the power to exclude with respect to the specific product, 
process, or work in question, there will often be sufficient actual or potential close substitutes for 
such a product, process or work to prevent the exercise of market power”);  P E Areeda et al, 
Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Application, Vol IIA, ( Boston: Little 
Brown, 1995) at 119 (stating that the uniqueness of a product is only a concern if it is connected 
with a demand advantage.)  
307 CCS Draft Guidelines, supra, n. 1, at para. 10.15. (“Where IPRs constitute a barrier, it does not 
always imply that competition is reduced. Although an IPR may constitute an entry barrier in the 
short term, in the long term a rival undertaking may be able to overcome it by its own innovation. 
The short term profit which an IPR can provide acts as an incentive to innovate and can thus 
stimulate competition in innovation.”) 
308 Ibid, at para. 10.15. Thus rivals may be forced to sell a more expensive substitute or preclude 
them from selling any substitute at all. See H Hovenkamp supra, n. 27 at p. 10-2b2. 
 87
inhibited does not actually exist yet.309 Similarly the EU Commission argued in 
Microsoft (EU):  
 
“If Microsoft’s competitors had access to the interoperability 
information that Microsoft refuses to supply, they could use the 
disclosures to make the advanced features of their own products 
available in the framework of the web of interoperability relationships 
that underpin the Windows domain architecture.”310  
 
 This paranoia over harm to ‘phantom markets’ rests on the basis that 
innovation may be stifled, rather than on any convincing empirical proof it has. It 
is odd logic to justify interference to a copyright owner’s exclusive right on 
speculative conjectures rather than credible proof.  Regulators have no business 
pretending they know what outcomes the market wants, or should have.311 Such 
speculative intervention imposes on copyright owners more than a duty to refrain 
from acting anti-competitively according to the general tenor of the Competition 
Act - it forces owners to promote competition at the expense of their own 
copyright. This tilts the balance too far in favour of the public. 
 
 Second, Singapore competition law should not regard network effects per 
se as barriers to entry.312 In assessing the difficulty of entry, it is not enough 
simply to mention the existence of network effects. Network effects imply only 
                                                 
309 [1999] 195 F.3d 1346, 1999-2 (“Firms do not compete in same market, as required to support 
monopolization claim, unless, because of reasonable interchangeability of their products, they have 
actual or potential ability to take significant business away from each other. Sherman Act, § 2.”) 
310EC Commission v. Microsoft [2004] Case T-201/04 (emphasis added). See also RTE v. 
Commission 1995] ECR I-743, where the ECJ held that “It is sufficient to establish that the 
conduct is capable of having such an effect”, at para. 4. 
311 Chapter III discusses studies which show that the market often picks the best products and 
streams of innovation perfectly well without any regulatory interference. Chapter IV shows that 
competition law is inept at picking winners, and should never attempt to do so. 
312 CCS Draft Guidelines, supra, n.2, at para. 3.12. (The Guidelines explain that “network effects 
occur where user’s valuation of the network increase as more users join the network… network 
effects may make new entry harder where the minimum viable scale is large in relation to the size 
of the market.” At para. 10.21-2.) Network effects are discussed more fully at Chapter III, Part IV.  
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that successful entry is difficult, not that it is impossible. Moreover, although 
network effects imply that the probability of successful entry is lower than it 
would be otherwise, they also imply that the payoff from successful entry is larger 
than it would be otherwise.313 The question must then turn upon whether there has 
been a price increase or some evidence of innovation being prejudiced. Price 
increases314 and stifling of innovation, particularly in potential markets,315 are 
controversial indicators of consumer harm. Prices deviations from marginal cost 
be due to increase in demand for copyright content from network externalities 
rather than consumer exploitation.316 This is graphically represented in Fig 7. 
Network effects operate to make the product more attractive,317 increase the 
demand for the product The demand curve, D1 shifts outward as demand increases 
to D2, resulting in higher price, P2 but also output Q2. This price increase is 
therefore the result of conscious consumer choice rather than exploitation by the 
copyright owner.  
                                                 
313 R A Cass and K A Hylton, ‘Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and 
Microsoft’ in D S Evans (ed.), Microsoft, Antitrust and the New Economy: Selected Essays, 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) at 447. 
314 Since a price increase may be as likely to come from an increase in consumer demand as by a 
unilateral attempt to exploit customers. The former cannot be anticompetitive, since it merely 
reflects the greater value consumers now place on the network, because more users have joined, or 
because more compatibles are available, or that the quality of the platform itself has increased. See 
Chapter II, Part III.B.  
315 See Chapter II, Part IV. 
316 Chapter III addresses in detail the consequences of relying of this popular measure as a goal of 
competition policy in digital markets.   
317 Increased network effects could mean greater interoperability between users in the network, a 
greater variety of complementary products produced for the network and a better system of after-












 In sum, it is suggested that intervention should be restricted to actual 
markets, rather than potential ones. Further, regulators should be slow in drawing 
adverse conclusions from entry barriers caused by network effects until more 
research has been done to show conclusively that there is cause to believe 
otherwise.  
 
III. ABUSE AND DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 
 
 In UK, ‘abuse’ occurs when the copyright owner “uses practices different 
from those normally adopted in the course of competition on the merits”.318 The 
difficulty in Singapore, having followed the UK, will doubtless be deciding what 
‘normal’ is.319 As the Guidelines made clear, refusals to license are exclusionary 
                                                 
318 The Chapter II Prohibition (OFT 403) Para. 2.3. (Emphasis mine)   
319 Section 47 mirrors Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Section 18 of the UK Competition Act 1998 
in elaborating on two different concepts of abuse. (See Para. 10.23 and 10.28.of the Guidelines, 
supra n.2) Provisions (a) and (b) of the UK and EU legislation illustrate the first, narrower concept 
of exploitative abuse, where the dominant undertaking uses its market power to extract 





D2 D1 D1 
Q2 
Fig.7: The diagram on the left shows a price increase due to increase demand 
from network effects; the diagram on the right shows the same price without 
any output increases characteristic of abuse of dominance cases which 
competition authorities are traditionally concerned about.  Consumer welfare 
is harmed in the second case only.    
Q2 
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practices,320and may be caught under Sections 47(2)(a) prohibiting “predatory 
behaviour”321 or (2)(b) prohibiting conduct which limits “production, markets or 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers”.322 The latter may be 
directed at conduct which, although does not eliminate rivals, nonetheless 
prevents rivals from offering consumers a new product for which there is a ready 
demand.323  
 
 A study of cases in the EU and US reveals that refusals to license broadly 
give rise to two forms of anticompetitive ‘abuse’. In the context of digital 
copyright, the first occurs where refusals to license allow the content owner to 
leverage its market power from the primary content market onto a secondary 
market which uses the content as an input. The second form of abuse arises where 
the content owner refuses access to components essential to compete in either the 
primary or secondary market. Cases, even within the same jurisdiction, have taken 
different approaches to deciding when a refusal amounts to ‘abuse’.  This chapter 
                                                                                                                                      
concept of exclusionary abuse seen in provision (c) and (d) prohibit conduct attempting to exclude 
competitors from markets, such as discriminatory treatment and tie-ins. See for an excellent 
exposition. See S D Anderman, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, (Clarendon 
Press: Oxford, 1998) at p.180. Note, however that there is no parallel to the prohibition on 
excessive pricing in Singapore. The position here is that general regulators (as opposed to sector 
specific ones) are not equipped to determine the ‘right’ prices undertakings should charge, 
preferring instead to let market forces decide. In light of the considerable pricing problems faced 
by UK regulators, as renown as they are for their innovative RPI-X approach, there is much to 
commend for Singapore’s non-interventionist approach.  
320 Paragraph 10.28, supra, n.2.  
321 It is a novel addition not found in the EU or UK legislation. As discussed earlier, refusals to 
license are predatory because by denying access to rivals or customers, copyright owners may 
eliminate them from the relevant market. See Chapter II, Part I.   
322 Emphasis mine. The Guidelines state that this means “slowing innovation”. CCS Draft 
Guidelines, supra, n.2 at para. 3.3. However, the distinction between the various parts of Section 
47 may be academic. EU courts have unequivocally stated their reluctance to be limited by the 
categories of misconduct listed. Indeed, they and have explicitly expanded the categories of abuse 
under Article 82 to include refusals to deal (Commercial Solvents v. Commission [1985] 1 CMLR 
481) and license (Magill, supra, n. 50). Section 47, by following in the use of the permissive ‘may’ 
suggests that the categorisations are merely illustrative, and do not in any way restrict either the 
Court or Commission from including new situations where the goals of competition policy may be 
infringed. 
323 EC Commission v. Microsoft , supra, n. 50.  
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aims to resolve some areas of inconsistencies, and propose an approach that takes 
into account important considerations in digital copyright markets.   
 
A. Leveraging Copyright 
  
  Refusals to license are effective tools for leveraging.324 Copyright owners 
may be able to leverage simply because they were the first to enter a market with 
little existing competition. They then maintain their market power by refusing 
access to their content that may prevent rivals from offering new products in 
downstream markets. Alternatively, owners may have competed successfully to 
gain dominance, but have since stagnated in their efforts to innovate. Instead, they 
use their market power to prevent more efficient competition from appearing. In 
either case, leverage tactics have three characteristics in common. First, the 
restrictive impact of the conduct is felt at the point removed from the source of 
power. Second, the effort to maximise monopoly returns makes them always 
exploitative in nature. Third, they restrict the competitive process through 
preventing rivals and customers to gain access, and are therefore exclusionary.  
 
                                                 
324 Even at this threshold, terminology is problematic. Some US courts have found leveraging to 
violate antitrust laws merely by obtaining a competitive advantage in the second market, even in 
the absence of monopolisation. See Kodak, supra, n.3. Others require proof of owner’s use of 
monopoly power in one market to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a monopoly in the leveraged 
market. Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines [1991] 948 F.2d 536 at p. 544. The EU seems to have 
adopted for the latter. In Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission, the ECJ prohibited a firm with 
dominant position in one market from engaging in anticompetitive practices in a second market 
where it did not enjoy dominant position if the second market has close associative links with 
primary market. Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission, [1994] E.C.R. II-755. Because is 
difficult to prove that a product is indispensable, the first approach offers plaintiffs better odds of 
success. 
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 Unsurprisingly, the Guidelines presume leveraging to be 
anticompetitive.325 In the digital copyright context, this may be because 
copyright’s role in securing the owner’s reward is expected to take place in the 
primary content market.326 The owner may justify the need to refuse access in 
order to prevent competition by imitation. However, it should not need to extend 
its rights to secondary markets either to appropriate returns on its investment or to 
promote innovation, since it should have calculated its expected monopoly returns 
from the primary market alone. The presumption is that by extending the effects 
of copyright into the secondary market, the owner has acted beyond the scope of 
its copyright, and should be stopped by competition law.327The difficulty with 
using leveraging as a reason to condemn refusals to license becomes apparent in a 
study between two landmark cases decided in the US. They are excellent cases 
studies because though both share nearly identical facts but by a twist of judicial 
quirkiness, arrived at opposite outcomes.  
 
                                                 
325 CCS Guidelines, supra, n.2, at para. 4.3. (Stating that “leveraging market power from one 
market to another” may give rise to “concerns”.) Note though that unlike the Singapore and the 
EU, leveraging cases in the US are treated as “attempted monopolisation”, rather than 
monopolisation. However, in practice, characteristics are similar in substance. The US Supreme 
Court endorsed this in Kodak noting: “If Kodak adopted its parts and service policies as part of a 
scheme of wilful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, it will have violated § 2.” Supra, 
n.3. at 482-83. “Wilful acquisition” or “maintenance of monopoly power” involves “exclusionary 
conduct,” not power gained “from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acumen, or historic accident.” 
326 L A Sullivan and A I Jones, ‘Monopoly Conduct, Especially Leveraging Power’ in Antitrust, 
Innovation and Competitiveness (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1992) at p.172. (Suggesting that 
the defendant should have the burden of showing some efficiency rationale for leveraging, since it 
knows both the information on which it acted as well a the analysis on which it relied.)  
327 However, being merely a presumption, the owner may nonetheless exculpate itself through 
showing that some legitimate business justification for the refusal. Image Tech. Services, Inc v. 
Eastman Kodak Co. [1997] 125 F.3d 1195, 2 Trade Cases P 71,908 (Kodak III), at p.1217. 
(“Under current law the defense of monopolization claims will rest largely on the legitimacy of the 
asserted business justifications”) 
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 In Image Technical Services Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak),328 
Kodak changed an existing policy and stopped selling patented and unpatented 
parts to independent service organisations (ISOs) that repaired Kodak copier 
equipment in competition with Kodak’s service business. Their market 
relationship may be seen graphically in Fig 7 below. The Court of Appeals 
adopted a modified version of the rebuttable presumption laid down by Data 
General.329 It held that while there was a presumption of legitimacy in refusing to 
license, refusals that created or maintained a monopoly would be prohibited 
absent a valid business justification. This presumption of legitimacy could be 
rebutted either by evidence that the monopolist acquired the IPRs unlawfully, or 
“by evidence of pretext.” 330 An IP owner was thus not entitled to employ its 
exclusionary right in ways that directly threatened competition. It finessed this 
argument by finding Kodak’s reliance on the ground that only a minute 
percentage of its parts were covered by IP, and added that discontinuing supply to 
an existing customer gave further evidence of the “pretext”. 
 
                                                 
328 Ibid. The case history is complicated, having gone up to the US Supreme Court, and was sent 
back on remand. Parts of what Kodak stands for were added along the way. This dissertation 
discusses it in totality.  
329 See Chapter I, Part  IV. 
330  Data General Corp v. Grumman Systems Support Corp [1994] 36 F.3d 1147 (1st. Cir.), n. 67 
(“Neither the aims of intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws justify allowing a monopolist 











 In contrast, under a market relationship similar to the one shown in Fig. 8, 
In re Independent Service Organisations Antitrust Litigation (Xerox),331 the 
Federal Circuit found that Xerox did not violate antitrust laws by its refusal to 
sell patented replacement parts to ISOs that serviced and repaired Xerox copiers 
in competition with Xerox. The Federal Circuit concluded that Xerox had no 
obligation to sell or license patented parts and that Xerox’s motivation for its 
unilateral refusal was irrelevant. While the Court acknowledged that an IP 
owner’s right to exclude is not without limit,332 antitrust intervention could only 
occur when: 
 
(i)  The defendant obtained its patent through fraud;  
(ii)  The infringement suit is objectively baseless and subjectively 
 motivated by a desire to impose collateral, anticompetitive injury, 
 rather than to obtain a justifiable legal remedy; or  
                                                 
331 Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig. CSU  [ [2000] 203.F3 1322 cert. denied, [2001] 531 US 
1143. 
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Fig. 8. Illustrating the 
relative positions of 
stakeholders in the market. 
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(iii)  The patent was used as part of an illegal tying strategy to extend 
 market power beyond the legitimate scope of the patent grant.333 
 
1. Rebuttable Presumptions  
 
 The Kodak test of the legitimacy of the business justification proffered for 
the refusal to supply is an objective one hinges upon the effects of the dominant 
firm's behaviour.334 Despite the pains the Court took to clarify the “pretext” test, it 
remains a difficult one to apply in practice. The test focuses solely on the net 
anticompetitive effects of IPRs, and suffers from two significant limitations. First, 
there is no indication how the balancing should be done. “Pretext” implies some 
form of subjective knowledge or intent. A subjective standard may be workable 
when used to identify rogues defrauding creditors under the separate entity 
doctrine recognised under Singapore company law.335 In such cases, there is often 
a clear distinction between acceptable business conduct and what amounts to 
defrauding creditors.336  However, it is not a feasible standard for identifying 
anticompetitive refusals to license, since the refusal may simply be a legitimate 
exercise of rights within the bounds permitted under copyright law. Virtually any 
                                                 
333  Ibid, at p.1327-28. 
334 Oscar Bronner suggests that EC competition authorities and courts would accept many of the 
same business justifications as US courts, including “legitimate technical or commercial reasons” 
or “on grounds of efficiency.” Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, supra, n.45.  
335 The doctrine of separate legal entity is a fundamental concept in Singapore company law. 
Attributed to the seminal case of Salomon v. Aron Saloman & Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22. As Walter 
Woon explained: “While organisationally and operationally the business was managed solely by 
Salomon, in law he and the company were separate persons.” W Woon, supra, n.5 at p.46.  
336 Even on the facts of the controversial case of Adams v. Cape Industries [1990] 2 WLR 657, it is 
clear that a subjective intent to limit tortuous liability through subsidiaries is different from 
instances of avoiding a court order for specific performances (Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832) 
or contractual obligations not to compete (Gilford Motor v. Horne [1933] Ch 935). See W Woon, 
ibid at pp.52-72.   
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invocation of an IPR to justify refusals to license would be held “pretextual”, 
since copyright by its nature distorts competition.337  
 
 Second, while distinguishing between relevant markets is useful in the 
‘dominance’ limb, it is dangerous as an instrument to determine ‘abuse’. As Fig. 8 
shows, exploitation of IPRs may often transcend more than one relevant market. 
Xerox points out that there can be no competition leveraging of monopoly power 
when a patent holder merely exercises its rights inherent in the IPR.338 IP owners 
are not under any obligation to create competition against themselves within the 










 The scope of a legal monopoly is defined by the claims of a patent, or 
normative boundaries of copyright,340 not by what a court determines is the 
                                                 
337 See Chapter I, Part IV, and Chapter II, III.A.   
338 Xerox, supra, n. 71.    
339 Ibid, at 1151. (“Where a patent has been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible 
under the patent laws cannot give rise to liability under the antitrust laws.”). 
340 The Court explicitly intended this to apply to copyright as well as it noted that:  
The Copyright Act expressly grants a copyright owner the exclusive right to distribute the 
protected work by “transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. Hence, if [it] pleases, may 
refrain from vending or licensing and content [itself] with simply exercising the right to exclude 
others from using [its] property.” Ibid, at 1176. 






Fig.9 shows that the 
scope of subject matter 
covered by IPRs may 
encompass both the 
primary and secondary 
relevant markets under 
competition law. 
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relevant market. In contrast, the scope of an economic monopoly refers to a firm's 
power to control the price of a product in a properly defined relevant competition 
market.341 Since the reward of an IPR is the right to exploit the entire field it 
covers, they can implicate multiple competition markets. Accordingly, there 
should not be liability for refusing to license within the market defined by its legal 
monopoly, regardless of the number of competition markets this implicates. By 
restricting this exploitation, the legitimate extent of exploitation may be 
eviscerated. The failing of the Kodak test lies in assuming that IPRs could create 
economic monopolies that fit neatly into competition law markets.342 In doing so, 
it overlooks the critical distinction between a legal monopoly and economic 
monopoly 
 
 In sum, under the Kodak test, it may be impossible to know what market 
the products incorporating the technology will be. It is equally uncertain whether 
these products, if successful, will define their own market. For this reason, it may 
be frequently difficult to tell whether two firms are competitors in a relevant 
market, or indeed, what the relevant market should be.343 
 
                                                 
341  Ibid, at 1135 
342  This is evinced by Kodak II’s reasoning "that power gained through some natural and legal 
advantage such as a patent, copyright or business acumen can give rise to competition liability if a 
seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next market”. 
Kodak II, supra, n.2.  
343 R C Lind and P Muysert, ‘The European Commission’s Draft Technology Transfer Block 
Exemption Regulation and Guidelines: A Significant Departure form Accepted Competition Policy 
Principles’, [2004] 4 ECLR 181 at p.188.   
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2. Copyright Immunity? 
 
 While the Kodak test arguably tilts in favour of public access, the Xerox 
test suffers from being too skewed in favour of the owner. Xerox limits access to 
three narrow exceptions to a general immunity rule. On closer scrutiny, these 
exceptions appear problematic. First, enforcing a fraudulently granted IPR is not a 
competition law exception to the right to exploitation, since there is no valid IPR 
to speak of. Second, abusing the legal process and using the IPR as part of an 
illegal tie both share common roots in patent misuse and abuse of dominance 
under EU law. However, it is difficult to see any rational basis for limiting it to 
such narrow grounds. Third, while it is well settled that tying can amount to patent 
misuse, it is difficult to see how it can be the only anticompetitive situation in 
where competition law should intervene. Anticompetitive abuses of IPRs cover 
wide range of conduct, such as resale price maintenance clauses, territorial 
agreements and predatory pricing. All of these may well harm competition; none 
of them would be caught under Xerox’s narrow rule. Against an otherwise broad 
immunity, this gives a virtually unfettered right of an IP owner to refuse to 
license. It is therefore too under-inclusive to be effective even for sector-specific 
regulation.  
 
 Given the ambiguous effects of alleged anticompetitive IP conduct, US 
courts have traditionally adopted the ‘rule of reason’: balancing the impact on 
economic incentives to innovate against consumer harm from anticompetitive 
effects.344 Without adopting the same label, EU courts have also been conscious 
                                                 
344United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. [1918] 247 US 32 
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to incorporate balancing measures into their analysis.345 On occasions, courts 
have botched up the balancing process, paying lip service to access or incentives 
and deffering to the other with little or no sound economic reasoning.346 However, 
by skirting the balancing process completely in favour of per se rules, the Court 
makes an unjustifiable departure from good legal sense. In this regard, Xerox has 
upset that traditional balance in a way that has disturbing implications for the 
future of competition policy in digital industries without necessarily encouraging 
the innovation process.347 Indeed, turning the Xerox argument on its head, 
regulators may argue that the scope of copyright conferred is smaller than the 
relevant competition law market. 348 This may well be the more correct result, 
since copyright confers monopoly over products rather than markets.  
  
 Despite the benefit of hindsight, determining liability in leveraging cases 
will likely be as much a challenge for Singapore courts, not least because 
economic theory is undecided about its effects on competition. Economists have 
long been sceptical that leveraging could be either feasible or profitable. 
Leveraging often double-counts monopoly power, because it assumes that the 
monopolist increases its power through the leverage, when in reality the 
monopolist has only one source of monopoly power unaffected by leveraging- in 
                                                 
345 Oscar Bronner supra, n.47 at 76 (“In assessing such conflicting interests particular care is 
required where the goods or services or facilities to which access is demanded represent the fruit of 
substantial investment. That may be true in particular in relation to refusal to license intellectual 
property rights. Where such exclusive rights are granted for a limited period, that in itself involves 
a balancing of the interest in free competition with that of providing an incentive for research and 
development and for creativity. It is therefore with good reason that the Court has held that the 
refusal to license does not of itself, in the absence of other factors, constitute an abuse.”) 
346 See Chapter IV, Part IV.  
347 D J Gifford, ‘Developing Models for a Coherent Treatment of Standard-Setting Issues Under 
the Patent, Copyright, and Antitrust Laws’ (2003) 43 IDEA 331 
348 See discussion in Chapter II, Part IV.A.  
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the market where it has its first monopoly.349 For example, Microsoft may extend 
its monopoly power into the office applications market. If Microsoft then required 
each customer to buy its Office XP applications software with its Window XP OS, 
or increases the price of Office XP, its profits would not increase. This is because 
the demand curves of both products share a positive relationship. If Microsoft 
exploits its consumers in the Office XP market, the quantity demand of Office XP 
will fall. At the same time, since the consumers in Windows XP market will also 
fall due to contracted demand as the Microsoft ‘package deal’ becomes less 
attractive. In sum, Microsoft can only earn monopoly profit if it sells one product 
competitively. Further, Microsoft can only crowd out rivals that sell to customers 
not using Windows. But that is only because it has competed “on the merits” and 
won, something which Singapore competition law encourages.350 Clearly then the 
catchword for Singapore courts and regulators is – “caution”.     
 
B. Digital Copyright: An Essential Facility? 
 
 The essential facilities doctrine (EFD) imposes the most far-reaching 
obligations on copyright owners.351 The focus of an EFD inquiry is not on the 
conduct of the firm, but rather on the structural conditions of the relevant market, 
                                                 
349 S J Liebowitz and S E Margolis, Winners, Losers & Microsoft, (Oakland: The Independent 
Institute, 2000) at p. 249.  
350 CCS Guidelines, supra, n.2. An observation may also be made that it is one thing to say 
Microsoft, by tying its dominant Windows OS to Office applications cannot extract a higher 
monopoly rent today than it could for Windows alone. It is another to assert that this tying is 
competition “on the merits”. In the longer term, this strategy is a plan to drive out competing 
applications programs so that the Windows OS is more assured of continuance of its market 
dominance.  
351 For a good discussion of essential facilities in the intellectual property context, see T I 
Donahey, ‘Terminal Railroad Revisited: Using the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Ensure 
Accessibility to Internet Software Standards’, (1997) 25 AIPLA QJ 277; D McGowan, ‘Regulating 
Competition in the Information Age: Computer Software as Essential Facility under the Sherman 
Act’, (1996) 18 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 771.  
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typically “bottleneck” situations, where the copyright owner controls a ‘facility’ 
which is indispensable to its competitors and refuses to grant access to it. 352 It 
eschews copyright’s rationale for protecting market power, and imposes a duty to 
deal fairly with rivals, or continue a relationship once it has begun.353 Access must 
therefore be giving on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. Further, the EFD 
is most likely to condemn copyright in precisely those circumstances in which 
intervention is least defensible: the more an invention is unique, valuable, and 
difficult to duplicate, the greater is the obligation to share it.354 
 
 The EFD grew out of a number of cases in which a vertically integrated 
company had exclusive control over some facility, and used that control to gain 
an advantage over competitors in an adjacent or downstream market. 355 The 
locus classicus is MCI Communications Co. v. AT&T (MCI).356 Essentially, the 
owner denied access to a non-duplicable facility that it controlled, where it was 
                                                 
352 P E Areeda et al, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Application, Vol 
IIA, ( Boston: Little Brown, 1995) at pp.650-51. 
353 Oscar Bronner, supra, n.47 122. (“[I]n certain cases a dominant undertaking must not merely 
refrain from anti-competitive action but must actively promote competition by allowing potential 
competitors access to the facilities which it has developed.”) See also United States v. Terminal 
R.R. Assn., [1912] 224 US 383.   
354 A B Lipsky, Jr. and J G Sidak, ‘Essential Facilities’, (1999) 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1187 at 1219. 
355 The EU Commission has defined an essential facility as a “facility or infrastructure which is 
essential for reaching customers and/or enabling competitors to carry on their business, and which 
cannot be replicated by any reasonable means”. Notice on the Application of the Competition 
Rules to Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector [1998] O.J. C265/3, August 22, 
1998, at para. 68.  A wide variety of facilities have been found to be essential. EC competition law 
initially applied the EFD to port facilities, but later extended it to include ground handling 
services, telecommunications networks, oil and gas pipelines, television listings information, 
computer reservation systems and most importantly, IPR. See Richard Whish, Competition Law, 
4th Edition, 2001 at p. 622.  US courts have found a group of railroads jointly owning a key bridge 
that refused access in breach of the doctrine. United States v. Terminal R.R. Assn. ibid. In Otter 
Tail, the public utility owning all the transmission lines into a municipality refused to allow the 
municipality to ‘wheel’ power over those lines from outside plants because the utility itself wanted 
to provide power to the municipality. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States [1973] 410 US 366.    
356 [1983] 708 F. 2d at 1081.   
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feasible to grant it.357 Refusal to grant access to an essential facility without 
objective justification or granting access only on discriminatory terms represents 
an anticompetitive abuse. While the MCI Court did not discuss this directly, US 
cases have thus far limited the doctrine to foreclosure of competition in the 
downstream market or where the refusal helped the owner to acquire or maintain 
a monopoly in that market.358 The ‘exceptional circumstances’ test developed by 
European courts are broader.359 Section 47 and Article 82 are not as limited as 
Section 2 since their prohibition is directed toward a broader concept of ‘abuse’. 
This conceivably includes using the essential facilities to prevent rivals entering 
or remaining in the primary market.360  As the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
IMS Health explained:  
 
“Four concurrent conditions are necessary and sufficient to find that the 
refusal by a copyright holder in a dominant position is abusive: the 
product protected by copyright must be indispensable to compete in the 
secondary market, the refusal to licence copyright must prevent the 
emergence of a new product for which there is a potential consumer 
demand, it must not be justified by objective considerations and it must 
be likely to eliminate all competition in the secondary market.”361   
 
                                                 
357 The Seventh Circuit designed a four step test to determine whether access should be granted: 
(1) control of the facility by the monopolist (2) the rival’s inability practically or unreasonably to 
duplicate the essential facility (3) denial of the use (4) feasibility of providing the facility.   
358 Otter Tail and MCI both had such a characteristic. Hovenkamp et al argue that so does Aspen 
on the grounds that primary market access “could open the door to all sorts of claims in which 
competition is not really at stake.”, see H Hovenkamp supra, n. 27, at §13.3.   
359 The test stemmed from Volvo’s recognition of liability through “arbitrary refusals” to supply 
spare parts based on design rights as abuse under Article 82. As the Court explained, this included 
“arbitrary refusal to supply replacement parts to independent repairers, the fixing of prices for 
spare parts at an unfair level or a decision no longer to produce spare parts for a particular model 
even though many cars of that model are still in circulation.” Volvo, supra, n. 32. at pp.135-36.  
360 J S Venit and J J Kallaugher, ‘Essential Facilities: A Comparative Approach’, (1994) Fordham 
Corp. L. Inst. 315, at p.333. (Stating that: “In the United States the essential facility doctrine 
focuses on effects in markets where a firm holds market power subject to control under Section 2. 
The Article 86 [now Article 82] cases, in contrast, appear to apply the concept in a monopoly 
leveraging context without extensive consideration of the extent to which the dominant firms holds 
a dominant position in the downstream market.”) 
361 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH  & Co. KG, [2004] ECR 0000. (Stating 
that courts were entitled to take into account “other circumstances of exceptional character when 
assessing a refusal to supply.”)  See paras [38] and [52]. 
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 The European Commission in Microsoft (EU) noted that was no 
exhaustive checklist of “exceptional circumstances”,362 but that it was necessary 
to analyse the entirety of the circumstances and take a decision based on the 
results of a comprehensive investigation.363 This makes the “exceptional 
circumstances” test malleable for both leveraging situations discussed above, as 
well as EFD situations here. 364  However, the line between the two categories is 
not a bright one. EFD situations may involve horizontal requests for access and 
use of content from rivals in the same content market,365 but it may equally 
involve vertical requests by downstream derivative users that may also be 
competing with the content owner there.366  
 
 While there is nothing within the EFD that inherently derails innovation, it 
will be seen that overbroad application can lead to perverse results where digital 
copyright is concerned. The issues here rest on the scope of the doctrine – when is 
a ‘facility’ essential? What obligations does it trigger? The latter examines two 
situations: requests for primary market access where the copyright itself is the 
essential facility, and secondary market access, where IP is incidental to the 
essential facilities claim. Although there are many EFD cases, commentators have 
expressed surprise how little light these cases shed on these issues.367  
                                                 
362 EC Commission v. Microsoft, supra, n. 52, at para 555 
363 Ibid, at para 558 
364 European courts have treated the EFD as synonymous with refusals to license. J S Venit and J J 
Kallaugher, supra, n. 98 at p.333.  
365 IMS Health, supra, n. 97 Aspen Skiing, supra, n. 3.  
366 See for example, Magill and Microsoft (EU), supra, n. 50, Kodak III, supra, n. 67, Xerox, 
supra, n. 71. What an “objective justification” or something that would make granting access “not 
feasible” is a difficult question that cries out for an answer.    
367 P Areeda, ‘Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles’, (1990) 58 Antitrust 
L.J. 841 (“You will not find any case that provides a consistent rationale for the (essential 
facilities) doctrine that explores the social costs and benefits of the administration costs of 
requiring the creator of an asset to share it with a rival. It is less of a doctrine than an epithet 
indicating some exceptions to the right to keep one’s creations to oneself, but not telling us what 
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 1. Horizontal Access to Primary Market 
 
  An essential facility may be an input - some component that must be used 
in providing the competitive product or service. EU and US law agree that the 
need must be substantial. Inconvenience or cost increase resulting from 
unavailability will not suffice.368 Where deemed ‘essential’, the owner is entitled 
to raise a defence of objective justification similar to the case in leveraging.369 
Whether copyright itself may be a ‘essential facility’ is unclear. In BellSouth 
Advertising v. Donnelley Information,370 BellSouth sued Donnelley for copyright 
infringement after Donnelley copied the organisation of its telephone “yellow 
pages.” Donnelley counterclaimed because the Bell yellow pages were an 
essential facility to which it was entitled access. The Court held that   
 
“Although the doctrine of essential facilities has been applied 
predominantly to tangible assets, there is no reason why it could not 
apply, as in this case, to information wrongly withheld. The effect in 
both situations is the same: a party is prevented from sharing 
something essential to compete.”371  
 
 In IMS Health v. NDC, the market relationship was similar. IMS divided 
Germany into 1860 ‘bricks’, and claimed copyright in the brick structure. New 
entrants started using IMS's brick system until sued successfully for infringement 
of copyright. They complained to the Commission that IMS was obliged to grant 
                                                                                                                                      
those exceptions are.”); C Ahlborn, et al, ‘Competition Policy in the New Economy: Is European 
Competition Law up to the Challenge?’ (2001) 5 ECLR 156, at pp.164 (“At present, both points 
are unclear as the essential facility doctrine is in a state of flux.”) 
368 Alaska Airlines, supra, n. 65, at p.544-546. (Holding that the airlines computer reservation 
system was not an essential facility because airlines could compete without it, albeit at higher 
cost.); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz [1986] 807 F. 2d 520, at 539-540. 
369 CCS Guidelines, supra, n.2; Kodak, supra, n.2; Magill, supra, n.50.     
370 [1988] 719 F. Supp. 1551 (SD Fla.), reversed on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) 
371 Ibid, at 1566. While the court did not discuss the copyright infringement in the context of the 
essential facilities claim, since it had just concluded that the directory was copyrighted, it 
necessarily must have concluded that a copyrighted work could be an essential facility. 
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its competitors a compulsory license for this database under the EFD.372 The ECJ 
refused to accept this argument, holding that access to primary markets would 








  In Intergraph Corp v. Intel Corp., Intergraph sued Intel after Intel cut off 
its supply of microprocessors and proprietary information.373 Intergraph argued 
that access to Intel’s chips was essential to its business. The District Court granted 
a preliminary injunction, finding that Intel’s IPRs related to its chip architecture 
were essential facilities. The Federal Circuit reversed the decision, and limited the 
EFD to situations where the owner and third party competed in the downstream 
market which required access to that facility. It reasoned that the gravamen of the 
EFD rested on an attempt to gain an unfair advantage in downstream markets. 
Since Intel and Intergraph were not competitors in that market, there was no 
antitrust liability.374 In Intergraph and IMS Health, the plaintiff’s claims seem to 
founder primarily on obtaining or continuing privileged access not provided to 
                                                 
372 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH  & Co. KG, Commission Decision of 3 
July 2001, at 18-19, 22 at 25.  
373 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., [1998] 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (ND Ala).  Intergraph made 
computer workstations using Intel architecture and Intel microprocessors, and had threatened to 
sue Intel’s customers for violating Intergraph patents, which triggered Intel’s obligation to defend 
those customers by threatening to stop supplying Intergraph with chips or technical assistance 
unless Intergraph dropped its patent suit. .   




Fig. 10 The horizontal market 
relationship in IMS Health between 
competitors. 
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anyone seeking it. Thus, while access may be been ‘essential’ to the plaintiff’s 
business model, in both cases, it did not qualify as an essential facility under the 
competition laws. More recently, Trinko gave the strongest indication that the 
EFD only applies to downstream market situations. The Supreme Court 
significantly limited the circumstances which antitrust law may compel access to 
infrastructure, expressing concern with the negative impact on investments.375   
 
 The damage that the EFD can cause is especially acute in digital copyright 
markets, where appropriability is a critical factor in inducing investment. These 
markets may be surprisingly dynamic, and find ways around many apparent 
bottlenecks.376 Catalysed by the presence of strong financial and technical 
players, there is a high tendency towards radical innovation which ‘leap-frogs’ 
over blocking technology. However, there is always the temptation of a quick fix, 
and the immediate results of immediate access in terms of falling prices and 
increased output may be too hard for courts and regulators to resist.  
 
 In Microsoft (US), the court found that because competitors cannot 
feasibly duplicate Windows, there is a strong presumption that its APIs should be 
treated as essential facilities, though the label was not used.377 It is plausible; even 
                                                 
375 Trinko, supra, n.6. 
376 For example, having failed to obtained a licence for interoperability with Apple’s music store, 
Real developed its own codes which made interoperation possible. A Salkever, ‘A Bitter Apple 
Replay?’, (14 October 2004) BusinessWeek Online at: 
 http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2004/tc20041014_9962_tc056.htm 
377 United States v. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, PP 18-29 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact) at p.37. 
(According to the Court, there were “no products, nor are there likely to be any in the near future, 
that a significant percentage of consumers worldwide could substitute for Intel-compatible PC 
operating systems without incurring substantial costs. Furthermore, no firm that does not currently 
market Intel-compatible PC operating systems could start doing so in a way that would, within a 
reasonably short period of time, present a significant percentage of consumers with a viable 
alternative to existing Intel-compatible PC operating systems.”) C Ahlborn et al., supra, n. 105, at 
159 (“These new economy industries are particularly prone to application of the essential facilities 
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likely, any refusal to license APIs required to develop a new OS or compatible 
products would be insurmountable. 378Even if there was doubt about market 
competitiveness, the existence of other operating systems such as UNIX, Linux 
and Netware and the supporting applications software that run on them, confirms 
that it is feasible to develop OS as alternatives to Windows.  If the creation of an 
alternative to Windows was technically and economically feasible, then the main 
condition under the MCI test for qualification as an essential facility would 
unlikely be met.379 
 
 It is submitted that copyright cannot itself constitute an essential facility. 
The EFD is premised on the fact that the facility is a structural requirement for 
access, thus possessing the characteristics of a natural monopoly. While the EFD 
has been successfully applied to regulated natural monopolies where the owner 
uses its market power to suppress competition in a downstream market, copyright 
is rarely coextensive with such monopolies. To the extent that they prevent 
competition, it is simply part and parcel of the incentives conferred by copyright. 
Hence, the essential facility cannot itself then be said to have been illegally 
monopolised, if it was legally granted the monopoly ab initio. As John Temple 
Lang put it:  
  
“In a single market situation, something that is necessary to compete can 
                                                                                                                                      
doctrine because they "produce for markets that exhibit 'network effects'; that is, their products are 
more valuable to each user if more people use them.”).  
378 J E Lopatka and W H Page, ‘A (Cautionary) Note on Remedies in the Microsoft Case’, (1999) 
13 Competition 25 at pp. 27-28. 
379 R. C Romaine and S C. Salop, ‘Slap Their Wrist? Tie their Hands? Slice Them Into Pieces? 
Alternative Remedies for Monopolization in the Microsoft Case’, (1999) 13 Competition 15, at 
pp.17-18 (Distinguishing between two possible licensing remedies: ‘compulsory licenses’ and a 
“one-time licensing auction.” The latter would not require the sharing of newly developed IP over 
a long period of time because of the one-time nature of the entitlement). See also S Lohr, ‘On 
Breaking up Microsoft Into “Baby Bills”, N.Y Times, Mar. 5 1999, at C2. 
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only be a competitive advantage…. (in contrast, the EFD) … applies in 
two-market situations because a competitor in the downstream market 
that gains control of a necessary input is not offering a better or a 
cheaper product in the downstream market, but only getting power to 
harm consumers in that market by shutting out its competitors.”380 
 
  The illegality alleged in EFD situations must therefore be confined to 
vertically related markets. Little sympathy should be given to a complainant who 
has taken a short cut to producing its work by making unfair use of the owner’s 
content, especially when the two works are likely to compete. Indeed, this is 
nothing more than recognising of the essence of copyright.381 Easy access may 
discourage competitors from developing alternative competing facilities. At the 
end of the day, it is better to have supply by a monopolist than no facility at all.382 
To grant access without the normal prerequisite that the owner has sought to 
expand the scope of the right beyond its copyright would be revolutionary.   
 
2. Vertical Access from Secondary Markets 
 
 In contrast to the more cautious approach taken with regard to requests to 
access primary markets, the European courts have uniformly condemned refusals 
to supply downstream customers.383 Such refusals are considered anticompetitive 
because market entrants would have to enter into both markets to compete. This 
may also have an anticompetitive effect if it creates a cost disadvantage for 
                                                 
380 J T Lang, ‘Anticompetitive Abuses under Article 82 Involving Intellectual Property Rights’, 
paper presented at the Eighth Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, The Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 6-7 June 2003.   
381 D I Bainbridge, Intellectual Property, (5th Edition) (Essex: Longman, 2002) at p. 13. 
382 V Korah, ‘The Interface Between Intellectual Property And Antitrust: The European 
Experience’ (2002) 69 Antitrust L.J. 801 
383 Commercial Solvents, supra, n.62. According to Temple Lang, the principle of a general duty 
of dominant companies to supply was so well-established in the EU that it was not necessary later 
to distinguish essential facility cases from other cases of exclusionary abuse. J T Lang, ‘Defining 
Legitimate Competition: Companies' Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to Essential 
Facilities’, (1994) 18 Fordham Int'l L.J. 437, 498 at p. 445. 
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entrants or small existing firms that were previously sharing secondary market 
firm capacity.384 The exercise of copyright may increase rival’s costs even if the 
owner may not be able to directly increase its price or restrict output itself. This is 
because the resulting increase in costs of producing substitute products may force 
competitors to raise their prices and limit their output, thereby also harming 
consumers. Empirical evidence also shows that in industries where a dominant 
undertaking has this power to raise rivals costs, there is a lower willingness to 
innovate by both parties.385  
 
 This anticompetitive refusal can work only if two conditions are present. 
First, the copyright owner must possess market power in the primary market. 
Without a large share of this market, the owner’s decision to refuse to deal with 
downstream firms would not warrant the attention of competition law. Second, the 
anticompetitive mechanism requires large economies of scale. Only in this way 
will new entrants and existing competitors in the upstream face a cost 
disadvantage. 
 
 Digital copyright markets here raise three concerns. First, mandating 
sharing may undermine the incentive to innovation which copyright was given to 
promote. Second, content owners may seek to protect its own market interests 
                                                 
384 If the cost disadvantage makes the entry or the continued existence of competing primary 
market rivals more difficult, the copyright owner has strengthened and maintained its market 
power. D W Carlton and M Waldman, ‘The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market 
Power in Evolving Industries’ (Working Paper No. 145, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of 
the Economy and the State, Univ. of Chicago, Mar. 2000) (Showing that there may be a direct 
monopoly maintenance effect if the competing suppliers of the ‘tied good’ that are driven out of 
business (or reduced to a small scale) are potential future competitors for the manufacturer's "tying 
good,” a condition they claim may fit the facts of the Microsoft litigation. See also D W Carlton, 
‘A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak Are 
Misguided,’ (2001) 68 Antitrust L.J. 659.  
385 J B Baker, ‘Fringe Firms and Incentives to Innovate’ (1995) 63 Antitrust LJ 622, at pp. 636-639  
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downstream as a precursor to vertical integration. The initial loss in competition 
may be more than compensated for by consumer benefits post-vertical integration. 
Third, owners may refuse downstream access to prevent rivals there from 
integrating upwards and usurp of the owner’s primary market. 
 
(1) Undermining Copyright: The economic rent earned by owners may be 
necessary to provide the content in the first place. Opening access may reduce 
returns below the level necessary for recouping these costs. Potential creators may 
thereby be discouraged from competing in risky digital content markets if even 
upon winning, it becomes penalised. 386 In Oscar Bronner, AG Jacobs warned 
against a wide concept of essential facilities for reducing the incentive to the 
original investment, to duplicating it and requiring regulation over the price to be 
paid for access.387 The EFD cannot properly be applied to require licensing of 
copyright merely because in the absence of such a licence, rival firms will be 
unable to compete with the product incorporating the IP.388 Similarly, in Trinko, 
the US Supreme Court recognised the erosion of incentives if the EFD were 
recognised and actively used.389 It is likely that what was said in the context of 
access to telecommunications networks applies to digital copyright. 
 
                                                 
386 In Microsoft (EU), supra, n. 50, Microsoft justified its refusal to provide interface information 
because it need to “protect the outcome of billions of dollars of R&D investments in software 
features, functions and technologies. This is the essence of intellectual property rights protection. 
Disclosure would negate the protection and eliminate future incentives to invest in the creation of 
intellectual property.” Commission Decision of 24.03.2004 (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft)), 
at para.709.  
387 V Korah, supra, n. 118. 
388 P D Marquardt, M Leddy, ‘The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Intellectual Property Rights: A 
Response to Pitofsky, Patterson, and Hooks’ (2003) 70 Competition L.J. 847 
389 Trinko, supra, n.6 at 883. (“The Sherman Act is indeed the ‘Magna Carta of free enterprise,’ … 
but it does not give judges carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its way of doing business 
whenever some other approach might yield greater competition.”) See also footnote 151.  
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 Here, digital copyright is pulled in opposite directions. On one hand, cases 
like those in the EU require a more onerous standard to be met for illegalising the 
use of IP. In Magill, the ECJ held that the input had to be indispensable for the 
production of a “new product” for which there was unsatisfied consumer 
demand.390 On the other hand, it seems wrong that copyright owners are allowed 
to hide behind a regime that seems to have been corrupted by inhibiting access to 
digital content that fits uneasily into its traditional utilitarian justification over 
protecting literary, artistic, and musical works.391  EU case law has repeatedly 
held that competition law cannot be used to address situations where judges think 
that such products do not deserve protection.392 It is therefore ironic that EU 
courts have been the most fervent in persecuting allegations of abuse, particularly 
where copyright covers digital interfaces. 
 
 In attempting to reconcile these two competing ideals, EU law has required 
complainants to show that the owner has prevented rivals from offering a “new 
product” which it does not. Conceptually, this indicates that the owner’s conduct 
falls outside the scope of its IPR, and application of competition law should be 
unobjectionable. The problem is that EU courts have not specified whether “new 
                                                 
390 Magill, supra, n. 50, at para.30. IMS Health and Microsoft (EU) subsequently confirmed this. 
This stands in contrast to the Oscar Bronner test for non-IP matter, which does not require the 
offering of a “new product”. See supra, n.47. 
391 See Chapter I, Part II. Bellsouth, supra n.108. Magill, supra, n.50. See I Forrester, ‘EC 
Competition Law as a Limitation on the Use of IP Rights in Europe: Is there a Reason to Panic?’, 
Paper delivered at the Eighth Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, The Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 6-7 June 2003, at pp. 6-7. 
(“The order in which TV programmes are to be shown during the forthcoming week is not 
something with intrinsic artistic value, nor was it a secret.”)   
392 J Temple Lang, ‘Intellectual Propety and Competition Policy – Mandating Access: The 
Principles and the Problems’, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, May 2004, at 
p.5(“Competition law should not be used to correct what are said to be defects in intellectual 
property law.”) For an opposing view, see I Forrester, ‘EC Competition Law as a Limitation on the 
Use of IP Rights in Europe: Is there a Reason to Panic?’, Eighth Annual EU Competition Law and 
Policy Workshop, The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University 
Institute, 6-7 June 2003, at p.15. (“The Magill and IMS cases can be seen as remedies to 
aberrations in the application of national copyright law.”)    
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product” refers to something radically or merely incrementally different from 
what the copyright owner offers.393 It is simple enough to identify a specific “new 
product” the TV guide in Magill,394 which clearly could not be offered without 
access to the copyrighted listings owned by the defendants. However, in 
Microsoft(EU), both the Commission and CFI simply held that Microsoft’s refusal 
to disclose its APIs would prevent competitors from developing “new products” 
without specifying what they were.395 Indeed, it is difficult to see what additional 
value access to Sun Microsystems could have since it was in fact producing a 
functionally identically substitute to Microsoft’s work group server OS.  
 
 The danger here is that any copyright infringer can allege that the owner is 
the only source of materials required for the new product. It can then defend 
infringement proceedings with a countersuit under competition rules by pointing 
out that demand is not being met and justifying its infringement to meet that 
demand. If this ‘back door defence’ is allowed, IPRs will be eviscerated. In digital 
markets, niche markets spring up rapidly. Products may carve out speciality 
features, as portable MP3 players did from the existing audio entertainment 
market. Or else they may integrate separate features into a new product, as mobile 
phones with MP3 player features did. Given the rapidity of technological change, 
                                                 
393 The IMS Health Court does make clear that it must be more than mere duplication. IMS Health, 
supra, 97, at para. 49.  
394 This would be a weekly TV magazine comprising the programmes of all TV channels.  
395 Microsoft, Commission Decision, at supra, supra n.128, at para. 694 and 700; Court of First 
Instance at supra n.50. For avoidance of doubt, the CFI did not hold that Microsoft’s 
refusal to disclose APIs would prevent ‘new products’ for the purposes of demonstration 
of exceptional circumstances under Article 82. The proceedings before the CFI leading to 
the President’s order of 22 December 2004 were for interim relief. The only issues were 
(1) whether Microsoft established a prima facie case that the Commission was wrong on 
the law and its application to the facts (2) the harm to Microsoft of having to implement 
the Commission’s orders immediately gave cause to overrule them. On the issue of 
diminishing consumer choice as a result of non-interoperability, see Chapter III, Part IV.   
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these new markets may fail quickly, either because the product is functionally 
deficient, or as in the case of G3 mobile technology and multi-media messaging, 
prematurely ahead of consumer needs. In each case, the defendant may allege that 
the owner controls an essential resource, and is not providing new consumer 
demand in these markets, and gain easy access without showing real and lasting 
consumer harm.396 
   
 Ideally, innovation by one company spurs innovation or other pro-
competitive reactions by rivals in an attempt to maintain their competitive 
position. Allowing those rivals access to the innovator's IP simply by declaring 
themselves beaten runs the risk of short-circuiting that dynamic process. Indeed, 
where ownership of the allegedly essential facility is protected by IPRs, courts 
have been especially reluctant to order compulsory licensing for fear of 
undermining the incentives to innovate built into the IP system. They have 
distinguished between privileged and essential access. In David L. Aldridge Co. v. 
Microsoft Corp,397 it was alleged that the Windows 95 OS was an essential 
facility. However, the court rejected the argument, holding that the expectation to 
continue enjoying privileged access could not be justified since it was not 
available to the market as a whole to begin with.  
 
 The alternative is to require entrants to compensate developmental costs as 
well as rent reductions from increased ownership.398 However, this approach 
presents administrative difficulties. Someone will have to determine the terms of a 
                                                 
396 A Robertson, supra, n. 33, at 589.  
397 [1998] 995 F. Supp 728, 751-55 
398 For a discussion on the theoretical case of pricing access, see W J Baumol and J G Sidak, 
Toward Competition in Local Telephony (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1994). 
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compulsory licence. Courts must be concerned that the firm with the facility does 
not charge too high a price. The licence fee could be so prohibitive that access 
loses its practical significance. Simultaneously, courts need to be sensitive as there 
is no legal prohibition against firms to charge any price they like. If departure 
form this principle should be different just because the scarce resource is an input 
for its rival, then it must be debated and defended by those advocating it. 399   
 
 Patents and copyrights are not about absolute monopoly. Third parties 
prepared to spend sufficient money and effort can independently create around the 
protected subject matter. Despite short-term gain to consumers in terms of price, 
quality and choice terms, use of the EFD could harm competition in the long term. 
In such markets, a second firm can only thrive on an artificial habitat created by 
the application of the EFD. The effect of the doctrine is hence to serve as an 
instrument for indirect price regulation of markets that are ‘inevitable 
monopolies”. In particular, the doctrine cannot create or preserve a market 
structure that will in turn stimulate competition and efficiency.400 
 
(2)  Vertical Integration: A vertically integrated monopolist can merge two 
complementary markets into one by selling an integrated product that incorporates 
the functionality of both markets. In Microsoft (EU), product integration occurred 
where Windows XP and its media player were packaged together.401 Sales of the 
                                                 
399 D W Carlton and J M Perloff, supra, n. 26 at p. 668. 
400 M A Bergman, ‘The Bronner Case- A Turning Point for the Essential Facilities Doctrine.’ 
(2000) 21(2) ECLR 59 at p. 61.  
401 This is an example of tying as leveraging. In Microsoft (US), Windows 95 operating system 
integrated Internet browsers. When two different products are sold in a single package, the 
ordinary antitrust response is a tying claim, regardless of whether they were complementary or not. 
However, once the defendant claims that the combined package works better than the two products 
did alone, the court must decide how to assess those claims of technological improvement, and 
how to weigh them against the loss of competition in the goods market that has been integrated 
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media player rode on popularity of the OS platform. This form leveraging-tying 
strategy may potentially drive out rival media player companies without the 
market penetration in the upstream market.  These rivals may not be able to offer 
similar levels of interoperability even if they were willing to use the Windows OS, 
because Microsoft may use its copyright to block access to codes required for 
interoperability. The popularity of Windows may therefore move media player 
customers under the banner of Microsoft’s product, not because its functions were 
better, but because of its integration with Windows. Rivals would therefore either 
have to enter both markets to offer a substitute or develop niche secondary 
markets for non-integrated products.  
 
 Yet, such vertical integration is the product of a skilful combination of 
technologies, and drives technological development. Consumer-driven demand for 
feature integration has had a major impact on corporate exploitation of copyright. 
Products without the newest integrated features will not only fail to command a 
premium price, they will quickly disappear from the market.402 These features are 
time sensitive, and the copyright owner that can combine new features faster and 
better than its rivals will gain a substantial competitive edge and will often 
become dominant. It has been long accepted that copyright may be used as a 
business strategy to prolong the owner’s first mover advantage, as well as to move 
more quickly up the learning curve in integrating different features. By allowing 
                                                                                                                                      
into the defendant’s monopoly product market. In order to decide whether this technological 
change adversely affects competition, courts must undertake the difficult task of determining 
whether the change is a bona fide innovation, and if so what its effects are likely to be.   
402C M Christiansen, The Innovator’s Dilemma - When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to 
Fall (Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1997) at p.165.  
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rivals to share access to copyright content, this crucial lead time may be lost.403 
Further, the problem with the EFD is that since most high technology goods go 
through a number of separate processing stages, almost any product market could 
in principle become subject to this kind of dispute. This explains why the concept 
of essential facility obligations is so threatening to business, and underlines the 
need for some form of discipline to control its application.404 
 
 The facts of EFD cases sometimes overlap with leveraging, where courts 
have generally been more willing to intervene, an imprudent regulatory attitude 
may conflagrate the two. It is important to note that the EFD differs from 
leveraging in three respects. First, the source of the monopoly power is scrutinised 
much more carefully than a simple monopoly. Not only do courts ensure that there 
is some justification for keeping the monopoly intact, they must also satisfy 
themselves that there is no reasonable way for competition to be accommodated 
without access. As a counterbalance to the stricter first requirement, courts appear 
to relax the second requirement of abusive conduct. Second, in EFD disputes, 
business justifications appear to be limited to situations where access would 
disrupt the monopolist's own business. In contrast, leveraging situations 
accommodate broader business justifications. Third, the EFD departs from its 
leveraging cousin in terms of remedies. Leveraging remedies begin with 
                                                 
403 D L Rubinfeld, ‘Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network Industries’, (1998) 43 Antitrust 
Bull. 859 (observing that “a dominant firm will have a legitimate interest in innovating and 
entering into complementary product markets, since (among other things) this will enhance the 
value of (its) product” and that such integration may create real efficiencies). 
404 D Ridyard, ‘Essential Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors under the UK and EC 
Competition Law’ (1996) 17(8) ECLR 438, pp. 438-440. Indeed, some commentators have 
described the Windows API interface itself as an essential facility. See, M A O'Rourke, ‘Drawing 
the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Pre-emption of Software License 
Terms’, (1995) 45 Duke L.J. 479, at p. 547 (“By virtue of the operating system provider's 
monopoly power, its interface becomes an essential facility because access to it is necessary for 
others to compete.”). 
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identifying the unwarranted advantage in the secondary market to find the 
corollary remedy limited to specific conduct. In contrast, the EFD presumes the 
remedy: reasonable and non-discriminatory general obligation to access all 
requesting access, without regard to the specific injury incurred by the 
complaining party in the second market. This requires some form of judicial 
supervision over the terms of access, which makes it administratively unattractive. 
 
(3)  Defensive Leveraging: In both Microsoft cases, a common justification 
raised was Microsoft’s concern that its downstream rival might enter the primary 
OS market once its application protocol interfaces were disclosed. In Microsoft 
(US), Microsoft expressed concern about the ‘middleware’ threat posed by 
Netscape Internet Browsers riding on Java technology to run applications which 
Microsoft’s Windows OS provided a platform for. Similarly, in Microsoft (EU), 
Sun Microsystems requested interface information required for its downstream 
workgroup server OS to fully interact with Microsoft’s Windows OS. This may be 
seen in Fig. 11. Microsoft contended that this refusal was premised on its concern 
that Sun would then be able to use the interoperability it had provided to produce 
perfect substitutes to compete with its Windows OS. In neither case was this threat 
taken seriously. 
 
                                         















Fig. 11 ‘Defensive leveraging’ 
in Microsoft (EU) 
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 The problem with this view is that it ignores the fact that secondary 
market rivals may also be potential primary market rivals. After all, market 
definition is more a legal construct than a reflection of bright line distinctions on 
a production chain. Generally, mere exploitation of an industrial standard without 
regard for rivals has never been itself viewed as abusive under competition 
law.405 A firm that has achieved a market standard by virtue of its investment in 
R&D and IP protection is normally entitled to continue to compete by exercising 
its exclusionary rights even in “aftermarkets.” To find a refusal to licence 
abusive, something more must be shown by the competition authorities to allow 
the imputation of an abusive motive to the IP owner’s conduct other than a 
refusal to supply or licence as such. It is appropriate to note that while the EFD 
requires open access, nothing guarantees that new membership into the primary 
market will automatically pass benefits of access to consumers. Indeed, by 
requiring communication of proprietary information between competing 
undertakings, competition law may well be trading exclusionary abuse to 
anticompetitive collusion. 
 
3. Limiting the Epithet: Suggested Principles  
 
 Philip Areeda famously declared that the EFD is “an epithet in need of 
limiting principles,” 406  arguing that it should not be used to force owners to 
                                                 
405 R Myrick, ‘Will Intellectual Property on Technology still be viable in a Unitary Market?’ 
[1992] EIPR 298.  
406 P Areeda, supra, n. 105, at p. 850.  (Arguing that “the so-called essential facility doctrine is one 
of the most troublesome, incoherent and unmanageable of bases for Sherman §2 liability. The 
antitrust world would almost certainly be a better place if it were jettisoned.”) Perhaps because the 
essential facility doctrine is seen as a label to describe a factual situation, some commentators, 
especially in the U.S., have questioned whether this doctrine is necessary at all. This school of 
thought argues that refusals of access that increase or maintain market power are already subject to 
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surrender their investments simply because they resulted in a significant 
competitive advantage. Commentators like Areeda favour abolishing the doctrine 
outright.407 A more moderate view proposes to use the EFD as a useful label to 
describe the factual posture of cases than a method of analysing competition 
cases.408 Neither EU nor US law provides a legal definition of the EFD, and in 
both systems, its contours are still unclear. Both have often downplayed the use of 
EFD, to the extent of denying its existence except in the lower courts.409 EFD 
cases have not addressed whether situations where the controller of an essential 
facility might provide access to some but not to all competitors or where not all 
competitors necessarily require access in order to compete would amount to an 
‘abuse’. 410 If the EFD has a role in the interface in Singapore, it is submitted that 
two conditions must be satisfied.  
 
 First, the EFD should be confined to secondary market application. 
                                                                                                                                      
attack as a group boycott, monopolization, or attempt to monopolize. See J R Ratner, ‘Should 
There Be an Essential Facility Doctrine?’, (1988) 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 327, at p.382.  
407 P Areeda, supra, n. 105; H Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and 
Its Practice, 2nd edn, (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1999) §7.7. (“The so-called essential facilities 
doctrine is one of the most troublesome, incoherent and unmanageable of bases for Sherman §2 
liability. The antitrust world would almost certainly be a better place if it were jettisoned…”)  
408 J T Lang, supra, n. 119,  at p.483 (noting that “[e]ssential facility cases involve basic principles 
[and the] concept may be merely a useful label... rather than an analytical tool”); P E Areeda et al, 
Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Application, Vol IIA, ( Boston: Little 
Brown, 1995) at pp. 650-51 (stating that "[E]ssential facility' is just an epithet.... It is not an 
independent tool of analysis, but only a label-a label that beguiles some commentators and courts 
into pronouncing a duty to deal without analyzing the implications....”). 
409 Trinko, supra, n.6 (“The Court's conclusion would not change even if it considered to be 
established law; the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine crafted by some lower courts…. we have never 
recognized such a doctrine, and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here.”) In 
Aspen Skiing, the Court refused to explicitly consider the EFD even though it was a key part of the 
appellate court’s reasoning. US cases have not expressly held that the EFD applies to IPR cases. In 
Europe, the EFD has never been expressly applied. Rather, case law has evolved in the form of a 
justification test under Art. 82. European jurisprudence teaches that refusals per se do not amount 
to abuse. Abuse only occurs where this denial drives competitors out of business and eliminates 
competition in a related market.: Commercial Solvents v. Commission; United Brands v. 
Commission. See however, D Geradin, supra, n.21 at p. 3.  (Arguing that this is a “question of 
semantics”, citing cases where refusals by dominant firms to competitors were found to be 
violations of Article 82).     
410 J B Kobak, Jr., ‘Running the Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual Property Pitfalls on the Two 
Sides of the Atlantic’, (1996) 64 Antitrust L.J. 341,  at pp. 354-54.  
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Copyright justifies an exclusive protection in the primary market in order to 
prevent copying. Appropriability does not take the form of a lump sum payment, 
but rather as an opportunity to market their goods without interference by free 
riders. In contrast, when downstream markets are also affected, the contribution 
through the creation of the intellectual property does not justify its abusive use for 
other purposes on a secondary market. In digital goods, the level of intellectual 
creation involved is low and copyright protects primarily the investment in their 
creation.411 However, the role of copyright in ensuring returns on the owner’s 
investment should not justify preventing competitors from competing in a separate 
market. To take a more expansive interpretation would strike at the core of 
copyright and stifle the incentives to innovate that both it and the competition 
laws are meant to protect.412  
 
 Second, the EFD should be confined to specific sectors where regulations 
expressly provide for it. This permits across-the-board rules to determine what 
constitutes an essential facility and when it should be subject to mandatory access. 
EFD policies may vary according to differing industrial needs. To the extent that 
this is true, application of EFD under a generic competition law immediately 
becomes suspect. Where complex issues about the ‘reasonableness’ of the terms 
of access arise, they can be dealt with most efficiently by industry experts. Sector-
specific regulators have considerably more information and economic expertise 
than courts, and are better placed to determine the compensation to be paid for 
access to copyright content. Further, decisions on terms of access are so 
                                                 
411 W R Cornish and D Llwelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and 
Allied Rights (4th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), at 766-767. 
412 P D Marquardt, supra, n.133. 
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inextricably linked to price that they are best handled in the context of 
proceedings to determine rates rather than liability. Competition law litigation is 
expensive, and the large number of suits that might be needed to remedy a 
problem industry-wide would incur enormous costs. In the context of copyright 
right exploitation in Singapore, such a body would take the form of the 
Intellectual Property Office of Singapore (IPOS). Even if IPOS is not directly 
responsible for administering EFD cases, it should be closely consulted by the 




 Copyright is not a baseball bat, whose legitimate use in the pitch is clearly 
distinct from an illegal swing at someone’s head. While the existence of copyright 
may be clear enough, a neat categorisation of its effects as either harmful or 
beneficial are subtle. An open-textured Section 47 will be both boon and bane to 
courts seeking to apply it to digital copyright. While they will appreciate the 
flexibility it allows them, reconciling cases for present or future application may 
prove challenging. Opinion on whether sector-specific regulation precludes 
invoking of competition law remains mixed. However, it is submitted that 
duplicative analysis and the risk of inconsistent results under legal or economic 
theory militates against simultaneous application as an ideal. Endogenous checks 
such as copyright misuse are still too immature to provide a viable substitute to 
the detailed and well-established analysis offered by competition law. Until such a 
time that the scaffolding of competition law can be removed, copyright abuses 
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will still have to remain under its purview, even where this means upsetting the 
utilitarian balance which copyright seeks to preserve.      
 
 There is nothing objectionable to owners acquiring market power through 
copyright where it “renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers.”413 It 
has been observed that the measure of this market power must capture the 
dynamics of competition in digital markets. Price-cost measures and snapshots of 
market shares are inappropriate. Even measuring market power in dynamic 
analysis, network effects should not be treated as automatically raising 
anticompetitive alarm bells without convincing proof that it is also capable of 
reducing consumer welfare. The most influential companies may not necessarily 
be those that have made the initial technological breakthrough, but those currently 
steering its development. ‘Dominance’ should therefore be a finding made with 
great caution and circumspect.   
 
 The discussion on ‘abuse’ suggests that this will likely be a vexing area in 
the years ahead. Competition law generally allows firms to exercise their 
interdependent discretion to choose who they deal with. Indeed, it recognises that 
easy access to content may conflict with the raison d’etre of copyright, by 
lessening the incentives of the owner, or rival, or both to innovate. However, it is 
equally clear that refusals to license may be a precursor to leveraging, just as 
denying access where it is essential for viable competition may warrant antitrust 
attention. It is troubling that uncertainty persists over what constitutes an ‘abuse’ 
                                                 
413 Trinko, supra, n.6 at  879. 
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in digital markets. This undermines the rule of law and expose commerce to undue 
legal risks414 As a Member of Parliament put it:  
 
“The Competition Commission will administer the Act, and it is 
important that its rulings and decisions are precise, unambiguous and 
timely.  Because all this has an impact on the way businesses are run and 
the costs and uncertainties they have to bear.  Otherwise, the very 
objective of promoting Singapore as an attractive place to do business 
will be frustrated.”415  
  
 It is submitted that if competition law is to develop a framework capable 
of containing the burgeoning reach of copyright without either eviscerating or 
further inflating it, those steering its development – courts and regulators - need to 
be absolutely clear what to do. This means that first, there must be a consensus at 
least within the jurisdiction what the goals of competition law are, and second, 
what framework to use to reach those goals. The reason why law at the interface is 
so easy to state, but so difficult to apply lies in the blunderbuss approach courts 
have taken in repeating rhetoric without articulating clearly its thought process. 




                                                 
414 T W Bell, ‘The Common Law in Cyberspace’, (1999) 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1746, 1754-55  

































Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until  
We are able to give a firm answer to one question:  
What is the point of the law - what are its goals?  
Everything else follows from the answer we give. 
 
       Richard Bork416 
 
 
 Digital copyright and competition law exist in a dynamic relationship. Just 
as the goals of competition law shape the boundaries within which copyright may 
be legitimately exercised, the goals of copyright law in turn shape the permissible 
avenues of competition law. Any analysis focusing on the goals of one regime to 
the exclusion of the other will miss half the truth. It is therefore necessary, in 
considering refusals to license, to understand what the goals of competition law 
are. But equally, the analysis should take into account the strategic interests of 
copyright owners.417 Chapter III examines both perspectives.  
 
 There are at least three reasons for adopting competition law. Singapore 
has yet to indicate authoritatively which will guide the implementation of the 
Singapore Competition Act 2004.418 First, competition law may exist to ensure 
diversity in the marketplace, the goal of Harvard School regulators. As Part II 
shows, regulatory intervention may be premised on the belief that concentration of 
                                                 
416 R H Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, 2nd edn, (Basic Books: New 
York, 1993) at p.50.  
417 B F Fitzgerald, ‘Digital Property: The Ultimate Boundary?’, (2001) 7 Roger Williams U. L. 
Rev. 47. 
418 It has been observed that the EU and US are also divided between and within jurisdictions. In 
this regard, courts have not contributed much to resolving this difficult issue. Judgements 
frequently begin and end an assessment of anticompetitive abuse of IPR on mere recitations of 
principles: after restating the terms of the statutory grant, courts make a finding that the facts 
require one law to trump the other without careful analysis of the goals underlying competition 
law. See H Hovenkamp et al, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to 
Intellectual Property (New York: Aspen Law, 2003) at pp. 45-9. 
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market power results in inefficiency and waste.419 The solution is then to disperse 
market power through increasing the number of firms by growing the number of 
small or medium enterprises (SMEs) rather than allow an oligopolistic or 
monopolistic market structure. In endorsing the Harvard view, the Minister said: 
“It thus recommended that a generic competition law be enacted to create a level 
playing field for businesses, big and small, to compete on an equal footing. This 
will make for a more conducive business environment.”420 Dominant copyright 
owners may therefore be required to license its content if only to ensure rivals are 
given an opportunity to provide market competition as an ends in itself. 
 
 Competition law may be directed toward “efficient” conduct in the market. 
This takes two forms: static and dynamic efficiency. Part III considers the first 
under the Chicago School approach through the lens of price theory.421 The goal 
of competition law will then be efficient allocation of resources by the market or 
production of goods at lowest cost.422 Endorsing this view, the Minister stated, 
“Market competition spurs firms to be more efficient, innovative, and responsive 
                                                 
419 F M Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd edn, (Chicago: Rand 
McNally Co., 1980) at pp. 437-8. (“There is an abundant evidence from case studies to support the 
view that actual and potential new entrants play a crucial role in stimulating technical progress, 
both as direct sources of innovation and as spurs to existing industry members.”)  
420 V Balakrishnan, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 19 October 2004   
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/reports/public/hansard/title/20041019/20041019_S0004_T0006.htm
l, (emphasis added) 
421 W H Page, ‘The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterisation, Antitrust 
Injury and Evidentiary Sufficiency’, (1989) 75 Va. L. Rev 1221. 
422 In economic terms, this means maximising consumer welfare by promoting allocative 
efficiency (making goods consumers want in the quantities valued by society), and productive 
efficiency (producing goods at the lowest possible costs) at the expense of dynamic efficiency 
(stimulating innovation and technological change).  Consumer welfare is thus greatest when 
society’s economic resources are allocated so that consumers are able to satisfy their wants as fully 
as technological constraints permit. See R H Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with 
Itself , 2nd edn, (Basic Books: New York, 1993) at pp. 90-1. (“These two types of efficiency make 
up the overall efficiency that determines the level of our society’s wealth, or consumer welfare. 
The whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency 
without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in 
consumer welfare”)  
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to consumer needs.  Consumers would enjoy more choices, lower prices, and 
better products and services.  The economy as a whole benefits from greater 
productivity gains and more efficient resource allocation.”423 Under this 
approach, the copyright owner must justify its refusal to license in terms of price 
and output efficiency, something that runs counter to the grain of the copyright 
system.  
 
 The growing prominence of IP markets brought a third goal of competition 
law to the forefront on the interface.424 Part IV explores Joseph Schumpeter’s 
theory that it may sometimes be necessary to forego static efficiency for greater 
gains in dynamic efficiency.425 Schumpeter described the process of “creative 
destruction”426 and the dynamics of innovation as the prime drivers of the 
competitive process. Technical progress makes market power an inherently 
temporary phenomenon, more than compensating for static welfare losses. 
Further, without proper regard for incentives, the result of competition will be 
insufficient innovation. It follows that since innovation is the engine that powers 
competition and ensures consumer welfare, the goal of competition law should be 
to encourage broad IP protection to foster and support firms’ incentives to 
                                                 
423 V Balakrishnan,  supra, n.5. (emphasis added) 
424 For a discussion of the rise of IP markets, see Chapter I, Part III.  
425 Thus, static goals lead to a focus on short-run marginal cost, to the exclusion of long run 
efficient capital investments in R&D. J A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(New York: Perennial,1943).  
426 Schumpeter describes “creative destruction” this way: “Economists are at long last emerging 
from the stage at which price competition was all they saw. As soon as quality competition and 
sales effort are admitted into the sacred precincts of theory, the price variable is ousted from its 
dominant position. However, it is still competition within a rigid pattern of invariant conditions, 
methods of production and forms of industrial organisation in particular, that practically 
monopolises attention. But in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not 
that kind of competition which counts but competition from the new commodity, the new 
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organisation… competition which 
commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profit 
and outputs of existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives.”. Ibid, at p.84.  
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innovate.427 Supporting the Schumpeterian theory, the Minister noted that “in 
assessing whether an action is anti-competitive, we will also give due 
consideration to whether it promotes innovation, productivity or longer-term 
economic efficiency. This approach will ensure that we do not inadvertently 
constrain innovative and enterprising endeavours.” 428 The Schumpeterian view is 
clearly the most permissive of market power copyright owners may wield, and 
allows temporary stifling of competition to promote greater welfare gains in the 
long-run.  
 
 The three goals may be mutually exclusive. 429 Structuralists may achieve 
low market concentration by penalising large firms enjoying scale efficiencies. 
Similarly, regulators concerned with static inefficiency may penalise conduct that 
raises prices above marginal costs. This will erode the supernormal profit firms 
enjoy. The loss of excess funds leads to a fall in investment needed for R&D and 
therefore dynamic efficiency. Conversely, promoting dynamic efficiency may 
mean promoting high concentration and large price-cost differentials which ire 
Harvard structuralists and Chicago School regulators. This mutual exclusivity 
makes it important for courts and regulators to be conscious of the goals driving it, 
since as Richard Bork pointed out: “everything else follows” from that.430      
                                                 
427 P Beutel, ‘The Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Economics: A Schumpeterian 
View’, in L Wu (Editor), Economics of Antitrust: New Issues, Questions, and Insights, (NERA 
Economic Consultants: New York, 2004) at p.131 
428 V Balakrishnan, supra, n.5. (emphasis added).  
429 D Geradin, ‘Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the EC Treaty: What can the EU learn from the 
US Supreme Court’s Judgement in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, IMS and Deustche Telekom?’ 
(2005) Common Law Market Review:  
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=617263 at p.19. (“In the presence of non-
perfectly competitive markets, tradeoffs may have to be made between these different forms of 
efficiencies.”) 
430 R Bork, supra, n.1.  
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II. DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE STRUCTURALIST APPROACH 
 The structuralist view was popular in early US cases, 431 and has more 
recently been adopted in the EU.432 To the structuralist regulator, small is 
beautiful, and market concentration is bad. A large number of small firms 
approximate the ideal model of perfect competition. This ensures that competition 
between firms imposes market discipline to safeguard against ‘abuse’.433 Courts 
accepting this view assume that ‘normal’ competition occurs where no one has a 
dominant position. While the mere existence of a dominant undertaking is legal, it 
is inherently detrimental to a competitive market, and is under a ‘special 
responsibility’ not to commit acts that may further harm market competitiveness. 
Therefore, unobjectionable acts committed by a non-dominant undertaking would 
therefore be would therefore be illegal if committed by a dominant undertaking.434 
Competition policy must therefore not merely prevent SMEs from being driven 
out of the market; it must also buttress SMEs to compete with established 
powerful companies. 
                                                 
431 United States v. Alcoa, [1945] 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.) at 427. (Learned Hand J emphasized that 
monopoly power "deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; ... the spur of 
constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.") 
432 Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin N.V. v. EC Commission [1983] ECR 3461; Hoffman-
La Roche v. Commission, [1979] ECR. 461.  
433 G J Stigler, ‘The Origin of the Sherman Act’, (1985) 14 J. Legal Stud. 1, 1-8. 
434 As the ECJ in Hoffman La-Roche put it:  “The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating 
to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the 
structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the 
degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those 
which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of 
commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition 
still existing in the market or the growth of that competition” (emphasis mine) Hoffman-La Roche, 
supra, n.17 at para. 91. See also J Faull and A Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999) at para. 1.01-4. (“In the EU, admittedly … competition policy is 
an economic policy concerned with economic structures.”); B Sher, ‘The Last of Steam-Powered 
Trains: Modernising Article 82’, (2004) 5 ECLR 243-4. (“The Commission’s current approach has 
its roots in a structuralist concept of competition which … should has been abandoned in favour of 
a welfare economics approach in Art. 81 and merger control…Thus, while the control of market 
power is the most obvious goal of Art. 82, there are a number of other potential goals, in 
particular: ensuring “fairness” in the market place by protecting small and medium enterprises 
from arbitrary behaviour…”). 
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 It has been observed that empirical studies by Harvard economists 
generally come to two conclusions.435 First, innovation is more rapid in 
competitive markets than monopoly markets controlled by a well-ensconced 
content owner.436 Second, despite arguments made about larger firms having more 
R&D potential, most of the innovation came from SMEs rather than large firms, 
437 who have instead been observed to suppress innovation in order to protect their 
market share.438  
 
 They argue that large firms and the resulting high market concentration 
should not be necessary, since compared to traditional industries, digital copyright 
owners rely more on intellectual capital than physical capital. SMEs may attract 
venture capitalists willing to fund risky R&D protects, and can overcoming scale 
disadvantages that comes with their small size. Even where substantial capital 
                                                 
435 Under Harvard’s structure-conduct-performance (SCP) framework of industrial analysis, 
market structure determines the firm behaviour which in turn determines market performance. The 
private exercise of concentrated market power is therefore both a poor source of market 
performance, and the main source of anticompetitive behaviour. B J Rodger, ‘Competition Policy, 
Liberalism and Gloablisation: A European Perspective’, (2000) Columbia Journal of European 
Law, Vol. 6 No. 3 303. 
436 M A Lemley and L Lessig, ‘The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet 
in the Broadband Era’, (2001) 48 UCLA L. Rev. 925,at p. 961 (Citing a study that demonstrates 
that “innovations were deployed faster in competitive markets than in monopoly markets”); M 
Green, ‘Have the Antitrust Laws Promised Too Much and Accomplished Too Little? Answer 
Yes’, (1977) 46 Antitrust L.J. 752, at p.755 (“The best studies of size and innovation demonstrate 
that moderate sized firms are the most innovative - not our largest firms who like to coast with a 
comfortable status quo.”); D H Ginsburg, ‘Antitrust, Uncertainty, and Technological Innovation’, 
(1979) 24 Antitrust Bull. 635, at 649 (“Studies have indicated ... that small firms are more efficient 
than larger ones in conducting research.”) 
437 F M Scherer, Competition Policy: Domestic and International, (USA: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2001) at p.1012 (Concluding that “relatively small firms and 'outsiders' appear to 
originate a disproportionate fraction of the most radical innovations”); E Mansfield, Industrial 
Research and Technological Innovation: An Econometric Analysis, (USA, W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1968)  at p. 43 (“[E]xcept for the chemical industry, there is no evidence that the largest 
firms [in petroleum, drugs, steel, and glass] spent more on research and development... than did 
somewhat smaller firms.”); W M Cohen and R C Levin, ‘Empirical Studies of Innovation and 
Market Structure’, in R Schmalensee and R D Willig (eds,) 2 Handbook of Industrial 
Organization, at p. 1078 (Oxford: Elsevier Science Pub Co, 1989) (“[T]he effects of firm size and 
concentration on innovation, if they exist at all, do not appear to be important.”).   
438 M E Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, (Free Press: New York, 1998) at pp. 527- 
30, 577-89 (Showing that monopolists in mature markets have an incentive to suppress new 
technology so as to protect their sales revenue from existing products in markets they dominate.)  
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expenditure is needed, cross licensing facilitates innovation and experimentation 
necessary for innovation. In practice, this leads regulators to protect SMEs from 
elimination by dominant firms. Once market power is established, inquiries into 
conduct would merely be a formalistic gloss before finding ‘abuse’. 439   This goal 
therefore results in the lowest threshold of ‘abuse’ amongst the three. 
 
 Against this pro-SME view, three objections may be raised.  First, as 
Richard Posner argued, the idea that there is some special value to SMEs is 
“persistent but obscure”. 440  The problem with the Harvard view in digital markets 
is that a single copyright owner may likely dominate as increasing returns to scale 
allow rivals to capture whole markets rather than simply market shares. More 
importantly, there is a reasonable expectation that the winner will achieve its 
dominance by refusing to license for the specific purpose of building its own 
network to achieve absolute monopoly with an aim of raising prices to recoup its 
investments in the long-run. Otherwise, the firm could be supplanted by some 
other firm that also had the intent of wiping out its competitors. Under Section 
47(2)(a), this may be misconstrued as a ‘predatory’ abuse.441   
 
 Second, dominance is sometimes the most efficient way for a market to be 
structured. Indeed, dominance by the copyright owner may be inevitable in 
                                                 
439 H Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, 2nd edn, (St. 
Paul: West Publishing Co., 1999)at pp. 47-76 (Arguing this view is supported by more recent 
amendments to the Sherman Act and public choice theory of the role of interest groups in the 
legislative process).  
440 R A Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd edn, (University Of Chicago Press; Chicago, 2001) at p.25.   
441 As William Baumol and Januz Ordover aptly summed up: “Technological races that produce 
only one winner can lead to concentrated product markets. Such outcomes may be inevitable and if 
so, then should generally not be discouraged by antitrust policies.” W J Baumol and J A Ordover, 
‘Antitrust: Source of Dynamic and Static Inefficiencies?’ in Antitrust, Innovation and 
Competitiveness (Thomas M. Jorde and David Teece, eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1992) at p.94.  
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network markets. Individual firms usually achieve market power in high 
technology markets because they have won the race to develop the most efficient 
network standard. Empirical studies show that a very small number of large 
companies generate most of the revenue in the sector - over half the total revenues 
in the US software and IT services market are generated by little over 10% of the 
companies in the market.442 In these markets, one finds a pattern of progressive 
concentration, both at national and international level.443 Information goods are 
increasingly created and exploited by ever-larger groups on a market with a 
shrinking number of significant competitors.444 If dominance is inevitable, then 
the focus should be that the market anointed the wrong dominant undertaking, 
rather than penalising dominance per se.445 It would be unfair and inefficient to 
punish an owner that has done what society wants and thus achieved the goal that 
society sets before it.446 
 
 The better approach would be to recognise that all market economies 
require elimination of rivalry as corollary to specialisation of effort. Even in 
markets capable of supporting several firms, the hope of monopoly power is an 
incentive to be efficient and innovative. Supernormal profits help enforce the limit 
                                                 
442 J Lerner, ‘The Returns to Investment in Innovative Activities: An Overview and an Analysis of 
the Software Industry’, in D S Evans (ed.), Microsoft, Antitrust and the New Economy: Selected 
Essays, (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) at p. 471. 
443 Ibid.  
444 F Silva and G B Ramello, ‘Sound Recording Market: the Ambiguous Case of Copyright and 
Piracy’, (2000) 9 Industrial and Corporate Change at: 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=245314., 415-442. 
445 D J Teece and M Coleman, ‘The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in High-
Technology Industries’, (1998) 43 Antitrust Bull. 801 at 812. (Noting that studies relating 
measures of industry performance to concentration and barriers to entry across industries suffer 
from several conceptual problems. A statistically significant relationship between concentration 
and performance would not necessarily imply that concentration caused price to be above the 
competitive level. Firms become large, increasing concentration, because they are efficient.) 
446 United States v. Aluminium Co. of Am. [1945] 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir), at 430. (“The successful 
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”)See also 
Chapter I Part IV.   
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on monopoly power by encouraging others to capture the market through their 
own innovation and skill. The consumer is not interested in the abstract that there 
exists several equally competing undertakings in the marketplace, but rather that 
he can find the highest quality widgets at the lowest price. As will be seen, market 
power often persists because digital goods produced by dominant undertakings are 
superior in quality, cheaper or more readily interoperable compared to its rivals.447 
This makes the inherent suspicion of single firm markets to be suspect itself.  
 
 Third, empirical evidence relating size to innovation is at best, equivocal.  
Studies challenge structuralist conclusions, and posit that incumbent firms have 
greater incentive to engage in R&D, as they have more to lose from letting 
competition in than a potential entrant has from challenging the monopolist. 448 In 
fact, the weight of empirical evidence suggests that market structure, whether 
populated by SMEs or otherwise, has little impact on innovation.449 Measures of 
market performance may fail to measure economic profits or costs accurately, 
especially where long-lived capital assets such as those characteristic of digital 
markets are present. The measurement of barriers to entry is often subjective and 
                                                 
447 Chapter III, Part IV.  
448 R J Gilbert and D M G Newberry, ‘Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly 
Power’, (1982) 72 American Economic Review 514. (“The monopoly stands to lose more … than 
the rival (incumbent). The rival loses only its R&D expenditures, whereas the monopoly loses its 
R&D expenditures and some of its monopoly profits. The monopoly’s primary aim is not to lose. 
The monopoly can use the new invention to maintain its monopoly, whereas the rival can only use 
it to become a duopolist. Thus the monopoly has the incentive to innovate more than the potential 
rival up to a difference between monopoly and duopoly profits. … where a monopoly has to worry 
about a potential rival entering its market by inventing has an incentive to innovate to prevent 
entry. This competitive threat gives the monopoly a greater incentive to invent than a competitive 
firm.”)  
449 W M Cohen and R C Levin, supra, n.22. 
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typically fails to distinguish between long-run barriers to entry and the speed with 
which entry can occur.450  
 
 On an intuitive level, Harvard School reasoning is appealing because 
perceptible rivalry does seem to equate effective competition. 451  The appeal, 
however, does not withstand closer scrutiny. 452 Harvard regulators provide no 
benchmarks for how much rivalry is needed for competition to be ‘effective’, and 
invites the erroneous conclusion that the elimination of rivalry must always be 
deemed to be anticompetitive.453 More fundamentally, it makes rivalry an end in 
itself, regardless of whether the elimination of some rivalry had any negative 
impact on consumer welfare. By severely restricting the use of market power 
conferred by digital copyright so narrowly, it may end up equating dominance 
itself as ‘abuse’. 
 
 Indeed, the best competition policy for SMEs may be no competition 
policy. Interfering with the conduct of dominant firms to enable SMEs to survive 
even if their costs are higher than those of larger firms passes on the costs of 
inefficiency and need for continued supervision of dominant firms to taxpayers.454 
                                                 
450 D W Carlton and J M Perloff, Modern Industrial Organisation, 4th ed.,  (Pearson: Boston, 
2005)at p.281. 
451 In the Case of Monopolies, [1603] 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.), which involved the 
monopolization of the playing card market, Lord Coke concluded that the vices of monopoly were 
that the price of the same commodity will be raised, for he who has the sole selling of any 
commodity, may and will make the price as he pleases.... [And] the [quality of the] commodity is 
not so good and merchantable as it was before: for [he who has] the sole trade, regards only his 
private benefit, and not the common wealth. Ibid,. at 1263. 
452 G Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe, (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2000), at p. 829. 
(Arguing that the structuralist view should not guide competition policy.) 
453 Ibid, at p. 804. (“The difficulty about such an approach is that it often undermines certainty in 
cases concerning the application of the law. This has been highlighted in a number of cases 
concerning the application of Community law to intellectual property”)   
454 R A Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2001) at p.26. (Arguing that in relation in the context of price cartels that antitrust enforcement is 
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SMEs are usually helped rather than hurt by dominant firms, so unless 
competition law is stood completely on its head, it is inapt for assisting small 
businesses.455 It is therefore submitted competition law should be about protecting 
consumer interests rather than rivalry as an ends in itself. The goal is therefore one 
of market ‘contestability’, and is breached only when conduct is calculated to 
exclude an equally or more efficient firm. This view of ‘contestable markets’ was 
duly endorsed during the Parliamentary debates.456 The ECJ in Oscar Bronner 
too, had little trouble articulating its commitment to protecting competition and 
not competitors.457  
 
 The difficulty, however, lies not in recognising that market structure 
should not be the focus, but in resisting the temptation of a quick fix through it. 
This is evinced clearly from Microsoft(EU). The Commission therefore relied on a 
structuralist argument that technical development in the IT industry was best 
promoted by a number of different firms innovating rather than one.458 Singapore 
                                                                                                                                      
“not only an ineffectual, but perverse, instrument for trying to promote the interests of small 
businesses as a whole.”) 
455 Ibid, at p. 2. 
456 S Iswaran, supra, n.5 (“Competitiveness does not equate with competition. The key element 
here is in facilitating a competitive economy, the critical ingredient is what some have called 
"contestability". In other words, whether there is one, a few or many players in a given market, it is 
the potential and actual competition.  In other words, the competition from the existing players in 
the market and also the potential for new entrants to come in and lead really ensure a competitive 
framework.  And it is important that, in that regard when we look at any market-related issues and 
competition, this be borne in mind. Ultimately, the objective is fair competition and it is not to 
protect individual players or competitors in the market.”) (emphasis added) 
457 As Oscar Bronner noted, there is no duty to protect rivals. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v 
Mediaprint Zeitungs [1998] ECR I-07791 (“it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the 
primary purpose of Article 86 is to prevent distortion of competition - and in particular to 
safeguard the interests of consumers - rather than to protect the position of particular 
competitors.”) at para. 58.  
458 Microsoft Comp C-3/37.792 of 24 March 2004 at para. 694 (Holding that lack of access to 
interoperability data unjustifiably restrcits the inability of Microsoft’s rivals to develop new 
products. It concluded that on balance the possible negative impact of the order to supply on 
Microsoft’s incentives to innovate is outweighed by its positive impact on the level of innovation 
of the whole industry.)  
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would be complacent if it thinks this temptation can be easily avoided. Indonesia 
enacted a similar law in 1999. 459 Yet, a commentator noted:  
 
“Although the Commission only began its work in 2001, it is more 
concerned with (arguably misguided) equity considerations - 
specifically, protecting small business rather than protecting the 
competitive process. If this is the case, the law will not be able to 
achieve the objective of promoting free and open competition. 
Moreover, protecting small firms from the need to compete will actually 
have the perverse effect of holding back their development.”460 
 
 Courts have little competence to determine the structure of markets or the 
precise economic effects of agreements among competitors.461 Competition law 
should instead draw upon a conduct-based approach to draw upon the judicial 
strengths. Judges are adept at determining the purpose and motivation for 
defendants' conduct.462 It is a task they face every day in resolving legal disputes 
by concentrating on conduct, courts can distinguish more effectively between the 
competitive abuses that should be deterred and the innovative conduct that should 
be encouraged in high technology markets.463  
 
 In light of the foregoing, the Minister’s exhortations for a “level playing 
field” are better understood as being directed toward regulating Government 
Linked Companies (GLCs), rather than dominant undertakings generally. 464 This 
is consistent with responses by fellow Parliamentarians, welcoming the 
application of competition law on GLCs so that private firms may “compete 
                                                 
459 Law Banning Monopolistic Practices and Unhealthy Business Competition (Indonesia)  
460Thee K W, ‘Competition Policy in Indonesia and the New Anti-Monopoly and Fair Competition 
Law’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies (2002) Vol 38, No. 3 at 340.   
461 See Chapter IV, Part IV for a discussion on this.  
462 L A Sullivan, ‘Economic and More Humanistic Disciplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom 
for Antitrust?’, (1977) 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1214, at 1224. 
463 T A Piraino, Jr., ‘A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology Competition’ (2002) 
William and Mary Law Review 67 
464 V Balakrisnan, supra, n.3.  
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fairly”.465 It is also consistent with the tenor of the competition Chapter of the US-
Singapore FTA, singling out GLCs and detailing how they should be regulated 
under the Competition Act.466 In contrast, the broad mandate of the Competition 
Act was to “adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anticompetitive business 
conduct with the objective of promoting economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare”.467  
 
III. DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND CONSUMER WELFARE:  
STATIC EFFICIENCY 
 
 Unlike Harvard School regulators, Chicago School regulators are not 
concerned with monopolies, since the market mechanism prevents absolute 
control over price and quantity.468 Instead, they prefer immediate results in price 
and output to promises of improved welfare through policies directed toward 
dynamic efficiency. 469  Despite the trend US cases have taken toward favouring 
dynamic efficiency,470 some EU cases have chosen to fixate themselves on static 
                                                 
465 I Singh (“We needed to create a level-playing field so that no one company has an undue 
advantage, particularly the Government-owned companies”) (emphasis added) 
466 See in particular Article 12.3 outlining monopolies covered under Singapore’s obligations. The 
Article contains extensive provisions detailing obligations Singapore is under to prevent its GLCs 
from leveraging on its government links to compete unfairly.  For a view supporting this, see Minn 
N O, ‘Competition Policy’, in T Koh and Chang L L, The United States Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement: Highlights and Insights (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies and World Scientific 
Publishing, 2004) at p.119. 
467 Ibid, Article 12.1. (Emphasis mine.) 
468 M W Reader ‘Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change’ (1982) 20 1 Journal of Economic 
Literature 15, (Arguing that “When alleged monopolies are genuine, they are usually transitory, 
with freedom of entry working to eliminate their influence on prices and quantities within a fairly 
short time period.”) 
469 Views identified with this school include: H L Millar, ‘On the Chicago School of Economics’ 
(1962) Journal of Political Economy 70, G J Stigler, ‘The Goals of Economic Policy’, (1975), 
18(2) Journal of Law and Economics 283  and R A  Posner, (1980) ‘A Theory of Primitive 
Society, with Special Reference to Law’ (1979) 23(1) Journal of Law & Economics 1. 
470 E Elhauge, ‘Defining Better Monopolisation Standards’ (2003) 56 Stanford Law Review 253 at 
275, fn 66.  
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gains.471 In order for courts and regulators in Singapore to select appropriately, it 
is important to understand the rationale of these EU courts for doing so. 
 
 The first explanation, as Damien Geradin suggests, may be that static 
efficiency is both easier to measure and gives immediate results.472 Static 
efficiency gains from condemning refusals with leveraging effects or mandating 
access to an essential facility are generally more easily perceived than dynamic 
gains from refraining to intervene in hope that gains from technological progress 
outweigh static losses. Increased competitors, lower prices and higher quantity of 
products and services present themselves as attractive short-term benefits of 
intervention. As Geradin notes, competition authorities have a vested interest in 
producing results perceivable to the public. There is therefore a temptation to opt 
for static goals.    
 
 A second explanation may be that digital copyright owners have 
appropriated their dues from the first sale of their work. Regulators therefore 
reason that they should not be able to exercise continued control over its use. It is 
irrelevant whether this results in competition for products in downstream markets 
or whether the rival’s product is in direct competition with the original. This 
translates into lower thresholds for finding ‘abuse’ or leveraging or denying 
access to ‘essential facilities’.      
 
                                                 
471 D Geradin, supra, n. 14 at p.19. (Noting that “the Commission and the European Court of 
Justice have traditionally focused on the increased ‘allocative efficiency’ which would be gained 




A. Static Efficiency: A Safer Bet? 
 
 Chicago regulators generally believe that competition law and copyright 
law can harmoniously co-exist.473 However, where market discipline fails, 
competition law needs to intervene to protect consumer welfare by encouraging 
the efficient allocation of society’s resources and ensuring firms produce at the 
lowest efficient costs. Left to themselves, copyright owners will not efficiently 
license would-be improvers. Parties may not be able to agree on licensing terms, 
particularly where the potential licensee intends to use licensed content to 
compete with the owner. This is particularly so in digital markets where radical 
innovation commonly threatens to render the copyrighted work technologically 
obsolete.474 Further, there is no empirical evidence that when the copyright owner 
appropriates gains at the expense of static efficiency, these gains actually 
contribute to further innovation.475 As Josef Drexl asserts:  
 
“(A)n obligation to deal under competition law would make economic 
sense to promote allocative efficiency… the innovation argument should 
not help the dominant undertaking since there is not the slightest 
                                                 
473 W J Bowman Jr., Patent and Antitrust law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal (University of 
Chicago Press: Chicago, 1973). (“The goal of antitrust law and patent law is to maximise 
allocative efficiency and productive efficiency. In achieving this goal under either antitrust or 
patent law the detriment to be avoided is output restriction… an appraisal of alleged conflicts 
between antitrust law and patent law depends upon understanding the role of profits in providing 
the incentive for undertaking efficient production of those things consumers value”) 
474 R S Eisenberg, ‘Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use’, 
(1989) 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017, at 1072-73.  
475 F M Scherer, supra, n.22 at 1016-17 (Concluding that compulsory licensing decree imposed on 
Xerox did not stall its research and development, but instead facilitated innovation by enabling 
others to improve the technology developed by Xerox); Ibid. at 1018 (“[A] massive antitrust attack 
on business firms' use of patents to monopolize markets or enhance profit returns appears to have 
had negligible adverse consequences for the vigor of innovative activity in the United States.").W 
M Cohen and D A Levinthal, ‘Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D, (1989) 99 Econ. 
J. 569; Z Griliches, ‘The Search for R&D Spillovers’, (1992) 94 Scand. J. Econ. 29; R C Levin, 
‘Appropriability, R&D Spending, and Technological Performance’, (1988) 78 Am. Econ. Rev. 
424, at 427.  
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economic guarantee that excessive revenues for the dominant firm 
would be reinvested in innovation.”476 
 
 Digital copyright owners are thought to have a particular incentive to 
extend their monopoly power through such practices.477 Low marginal costs mean 
most of the incremental revenues go directly to the ‘bottom line’. Profits earned 
by extending its monopoly often exceed the costs of the exclusionary practices 
required to achieve the extension. 478  By limiting the leveraging effects of refusals 
to license, free competition allocates resources efficiently according to consumer 
preferences and forces firms to compete closer to cost. A competitive market 
environment is created for rivals to succeed through innovation and the relative 
merits of products and services. Further, the lure of potential supernormal profits 
attracts further discoveries and improvements that might be suppressed or 
deflected by these leveraging effects.479 
 
 This view is problematic for two reasons. First, it presumes that foregoing 
static efficiency necessarily foregoes the market discipline to promote innovation. 
The fact is that dynamic efficiency reconciles the apparent conflict between 
exclusive control by copyright and free competition. Just as ownership of goods 
restricts competition at the level of consumption in favour of competition at the 
level of production, copyright restricts competition at the level of production in 
                                                 
476 J Drexl, ‘IMS Health and Trinko- Antitrust Placebo for Consumers Instead of Sound 
Economics in Refusal-to-Deal Cases’ (2004) IIC Vol. 35 788 at 805 (arguing that the essential 
facilities doctrine should be applied to duplicate services in both Trinko and IMS Health.) 
477 R A Posner, supra, n. 39 at p. 935 (Calling the period during which a high technology 
monopoly is extended by exclusionary practices ‘the extension period’). 
478 C T Taylor and ZA Silbertson, The Economic Impact of the Patent System: A Study of the 
British Experience (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1973) (In the UK electronics 
industry, dependency on patent protection was found to be negligible.) 
479 L A Sullivan and A I Jones, ‘Monopoly Conduct, Especially Leveraging Power’ in D Teece and 
T Jorde eds., Antitrust, Innovation and Competitiveness (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1992) at 
p175. 
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favour of competition at the level of innovation. The ability to exercise property 
rights at one level ensures that the market and competition develop at the next 
higher level. Thus seen, copyright restricts competition at one level for the benefit 
of competition at another.480  Only by modifying the static framework to account 
for these differences will the competitiveness of copyright markets be accurately 
measured. 481  
 
 Indeed, the gains from dynamic efficiency may well outweigh any present 
losses in static efficiency. 482  As Frank Easterbrook noted, “an antitrust policy 
that reduces prices by 5% today at the cost of reducing 1% the annual rate which 
innovation lowers the cost of production would be a calamity. In the long run a 
continuous rate of change, compounded, swamps static losses”.483 Some theorists, 
such as Arnold Harberger argued that inefficiency resulting from monopoly is 
much smaller than what had been thought.484 For this reason, US antitrust law has 
increasingly incorporated the value of innovation and technological progress into 
its calculus of "economic efficiency" and consumer welfare.485 It is submitted that 
this is the right approach for Singapore to take. Where the promotion of static 
                                                 
480 T F Cotter, ‘Intellectual Property and the Essential Facilities Doctrine’, (1999) 44 Antitrust 
Bull. 211, 227-28. (“Whereas competition law seeks to achieve economic efficiency by promoting 
competition over monopoly, intellectual property law can be viewed as an effort to achieve this 
goal by stifling competition, at least in the short term.”)   
481 Thus, the antitrust authorities do not approach IP markets as an ‘exception’ under antitrust law; 
rather the authorities revise the economic lens through which IP markets are scrutinized in order to 
account for their differences from other markets. Hovenkamp et al, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis 
of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property (New York: Aspen Law, 2003), at p. 4.1c. 
482 O Granstrand, Economics of Technology (North-Holland: Amsterdam, 1994) 
483 F H Easterbrook, ‘Ignorance and Antitrust’, in T M Jorde and D Teece, (eds.), Antitrust, 
Innovation and Competitiveness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at pp. 122-3. 
484 A Harberger, ‘Monopoly and Resource Allocation’, (1954) 44 2 The American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings of the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Economic 
Association,  at pp. 77-87.  
485 R J Gilbert and W Tom, ‘Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The Intellectual 
Property Guidelines Five Years Later’, (2001) 69 Antitrust L.J. 43 at p.44 (Finding that 
innovation's "role has become increasingly important and has been decisive in several merger and 
non-merger enforcement actions that have potentially very significant impacts for consumer 
welfare"). 
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consumer welfare and innovation are in conflict, courts should favour future 
gains. This may make analysis less tractable, but at least it will focus on the 
correct issues.486 
 
 Second, even if market discipline fails in the static sense, technical 
progress and entry make market distortions from copyright a necessary but an 
inherently temporary phenomenon.487 It is necessary because the monopoly 
provides both the market inertia required for complementary applications to be 
written for the platform, as well as the profits required to attract investment and 
development of the network by the copyright owner. It is temporary because the 
rapid pace of technological change will act as a natural counterweight to a firm's 
monopoly power, even without antitrust intervention. 488  The bursting of the 
NASDAQ high technology stock ‘bubble’ in 2001-2 has been cited as an example 
of the “boom-and-bust” cycle typical of digital markets.489 These observers 
believe that high technology markets confer only brief ‘serial monopolies’ on 
                                                 
486 W J Baumol and J A Ordover, in W J Baumol and J A Ordover supra, n. 26 (“antitrust policies 
seem too much preoccupied with static market power and competition at the expense of dynamic 
considerations.”)   
487 R R Nelson and S G Winter, ‘The Schumpeterian Tradeoff Revisited’, (1982) 72 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 114 (Defining Schumpeterian hypothesis as positing that “[a] market structure involving 
large firms with a considerable degree of market power is the price that society must pay for rapid 
technological advance”); F M Scherer, ‘Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress’, (1987) 62 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 998, at p.1010 (noting that Schumpeter's hypothesis encompasses the points that (1) only 
large businesses can achieve sufficient scale to invest in research and development and bear the 
necessary risks, (2) the profits yielded by monopoly are an ideal fund to support research and 
development, and (3) a monopoly position is necessary to ensure that a business can appropriate 
the benefits of research and development expenditures). 
488 J Schwartz, ‘The Land of Monopolies’, N.Y. Times, 1 July, 2001, §  4 (Week in Review) 
(“Some commentators ... point to the fact that the technology market is so volatile that today's 
monopolist is tomorrow's loser-lessons learned by the makers of such products as Lotus 1-2-3 and 
Wordstar, which once dominated their worlds.”). 
489 D Wessel, ‘Steering the Economy Gets Harder’, Wall St. J., 18 July 2002, at A1 (“Rapid 
changes in technology can produce more booms and busts. Technological change increases 
uncertainty about the future, and with more uncertainty comes NASDAQ-like bubbles and busts. 
The promise of technology creates tidal waves of euphoria that are followed by tidal waves of 
despondency when profits prove disappointing.”). 
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firms which disappear when nimbler rivals appear.490 At the initial stage of a 
product cycle, the commercialisation of a new product generates high returns. 
Market leaders may price their products at a level that yields the highest short-run 
profit but encourages new entry on a long-term basis.491 Returns then decline 
precipitously as firms cut prices to the level of their costs.492 Schumpeter called 
this process, in which market power rises and falls, “creative destruction”,493 and 
digital markets are rife with examples of it.494 
 
It is not suggested that because dynamic efficiencies and copyright ensure an 
innovative and self-regulating economy, dynamic efficiency considerations are 
paramount or all consuming. Neither does this mean that competition law should 
stay away from regulation of monopolies Static and dynamic efficiencies are both 
important goals for healthy market economies. However, in the realm of 
intellectual property rights, more attention should be given to recognising and 
                                                 
490 T J Muris, ‘Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission: In a Word-Continuity’, 
Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Section Annual Meeting (Aug. 7, 2001), at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murisaba.htm (“The fierce competition for success in these [high 
technology] industries often results in the winner enjoying a (perhaps short-lived) monopoly.”). 
491 L A Sullivan, ‘Economic and More Humanistic Disciplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom 
for Antitrust?’, (1977) 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1214 at p.1225 (Describing the price that yields "the 
highest short run monopoly profit, but also does the most to attract entry") 
492 D J Teece and M Coleman, supra, n.30 at p.824 (Describing the high technology business 
cycle). 
493J A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Perennial,1943) at p. 83. In 
the 1980s and 1990s IBM lost much of its dominance in computers due to advances in microchip 
technology that allowed personal computers to do the work of mainframes at a fraction of the cost. 
See D L Rubinfeld, ‘Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network Industries’, (1998) 43 Antitrust 
Bull. 859, at p. 875. Some commentators argue that even the dominance of Microsoft's Windows 
operating system is now being eroded by the growth of the Internet. G S Becker and K M Murphy, 
‘Rethinking Antitrust’, Wall St. J., 26 February 2001, at A22. 
494 Henderson and Clark studied five generations in the semiconductor photolithographic 
alignment equipment industry, and they concluded that no firm that led in one generation figured 
prominently in the next R M Henderson and K B Clark, ‘Architectural Innovation: The 
Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms’, (1990) 35 
Admin. Sci. Q. 9; see also D J Teece and M Coleman, supra, n.30, at p.805 (Discussing Henderson 
and Clark's study). Xerox's control over the copier market, for example, evaporated in the 1970s. 
See K Dooley, ‘The Paradigms of Quality: Evolution and Revolution in the History of the 
Discipline’, at http://www.eas.asu/kdooley/papers/qualityparadigm.pdf  (referring to the decline in 
Xerox's share of the U.S. copier market from ninety-six to forty-six percent in the 1970s). 
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quantifying the gains that come from dynamic efficiency. This will aid 
stakeholders in making a little less esoteric, and thereby a little less difficult, this 
balancing process that inevitably arises from any dispute at the Interface.   
 
B. The Dues of Copyright 
 
 Advocates of static efficiency offer a second reason for disfavouring 
dynamic efficiency - the first-sale doctrine.495 The first-sale doctrine is generic to 
patent, copyright and trademarks.496 In the digital copyright context, the copyright 
owner may have successfully competed and established itself as the industry 
standard, as Microsoft did, and has already been rewarded through being the ‘first 
mover’, benefiting from network effects, reputation and its conquered pool of 
users. 497 Even if access is granted, owners should already have been able to 
recoup their investments because of their first-mover advantage. 498 In fact, to 
allow the owner to continue to appropriate rewards, even if the rival does not 
                                                 
495 While the Singapore Copyright Act does not expressly provide for the first-sale doctrine, a 
reading of Section 33 and 25 gives the same result. Section 33 provides, inter alia, that selling 
imported goods without the owner’s consent would infringe its copyright. Section 25 provides that 
who the “copyright owner” is depends on the context. This suggests that a person who has bought 
the goods legitimately from the owner for re-sale cannot be deemed to have contravened Section 
33, since Section 25 states that the buyer is entitled to the copyright for that purpose. See G Wei, 
The Law of Copyright in Singapore, (SNP Editions: Singapore, 2000) at pp.634-55, giving a 
comprehensive history of the development of the first-sale doctrine.       
496 W R Cornish and D Llewellyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and 
Allied Rights (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Edition, 2003) at pp.739-70. 
497 This sufficiency of the first mover advantage to innovate is stressed by S G Breyer J:  “Even if 
subsequent users of the information can obtain it free post generation, there may still be adequate 
incentive to provide it without IPR protection. Much depends on the extent of lead that its 
production will give him over his competitors. The advantage is particularly strong when the IPR 
protects time sensitive information.” in S Ricketson, Intellectual Property- Cases, Materials and 
Commentary, (Australia: Butterworth’s, 2005) at p.73.  
498 As Boudin J. in Lotus v. Borland explained: “But if a better spreadsheet comes along, it is hard 
to see why customers who have learned the Lotus menu and devised macros for it should remain 
captives of Lotus because of an investment in learning made by the users and not by Lotus. Lotus 
has already reaped a substantial reward for being first; assuming that the Borland program is now 
better, good reasons exist for freeing it to attract old Lotus customers: to enable the old customers 
to take advantage of a new advance, and to reward Borland in turn for making a better product.” 
Lotus Development Corp v. Borland International Inc, [1995] 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.) at 821  
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attempt to offer a new product, would amount to overcompensation.499 This is 
particularly so if the copyright owner leveraged its power between markets.  
 
 The inference is that competition is being restricted in the second market 
and the owner by increasing its profits through exploiting consumers and 
distorting static efficiency to a degree that cannot be justified by innovation. 
Therefore, any rewards on grounds of copyright exercise should be carefully 
circumscribed.500 Thus, if Microsoft’s rivals or customers find it difficult to 
compete because of lack of access to its APIs, they should be entitled to allege 
that refusing to license those APIs amount to an abuse of dominance. This was 
precisely what happened in both Microsoft cases.501  
 
 Competition law accords little sympathy to the copyright owner pleading 
that its proprietary information should not be shared because of interests in 
subsequent commercial exploitation. In the Dior v. Evora, the ECJ held that once 
a trademark owner had placed its good on the market, it had no right to further 
commercialisation.502 In response to IMS Health’s sanction of the owner’s refusal, 
it was argued that once the standard had been marketed to the pharmaceutical 
                                                 
499 J Drexl, supra, n. 61 at 802 (Arguing that competition by imitation is acceptable if competition 
by substitution is not, in order to protect consumer welfare. However, while copyright has 
traditionally allowed access to ideas to produce original substitutes, it has never allowed access to 
produce pirated imitations. Thus makes Drexl’s suggestion untenable in the face of sound 
copyright policy.) 
500 M E Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, (Free Press: New York, 1998)  at p.788 
(Explaining how first mover advantages can bring considerable rents to a firm, even where 
competitors soon enter a market).  
501 EC Commission v. Microsoft [2004] Case T-201/04; United States v. Microsoft [2000] 253 F.3d 
34, 346 U.S.App.D.C. 330 
502 Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV, C-337 [1997] ECR I-6013. While this is 
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industry, a rival should be allowed to reproduce its standard, even if it does not 
itself offer a new product.503  
 
 Digital networks give rise to an additional buttress for the first-sale 
doctrine to apply. The Commission in IMS Health argued the owner should no 
longer be able to control access, since its success in establishing the copyrighted 
standard was really due to consumer participation.504 These consumers may have 
become dependent in some way on the copyright owner because they have 
become conditioned to accept only products that comply with those features or 
characteristics that are protected by copyright. In these circumstances, some sort 
of ‘market necessity’ argument could be used to support the view that copyright 
law ought to recognise that the competitors in the market occupied by the 
copyright owner have some sort of entitlement to use that industry standard.505 If 
rivals could provide better products, consumers should be able to move freely 
between products, and not be ‘locked–in’ simply because they were more familiar 
with the incumbent’s product.506  
 
                                                 
503 A Kur, “The Presentation Right- Time to create a new limitation in copyright law?’ (2000) 3 
IIC 308, at 314-8 (suggesting the limitation be ‘internalised’ into copyright law.) 
504 B Ong, ‘Anti Competitive Refusals to Grant Copyright Licences: Reflections on the IMS Saga’ 
(2004) 26 EIPR. 26(11) 505 at 507. (“What drew the attention of the competition authorities to the 
IMS case was the fact that the copyrighted subject-matter was something which had been 
developed in collaboration with IMS's customers, to the point where it had become a de facto 
industry standard which all customers in the market insisted having incorporated into the products 
they purchased.”)  
505 Ibid, at pp. 505-514, noting however that the Commission erred, in deciding that compulsory 
licensing is appropriate simply because IMS developed the 1860 brick structure with significant 
input from end users. (“It is precisely the value of intellectual property to the ultimate user that 
renders it worthy of protection, and creators routinely gather information through market research 
or other methods in order to devise the most effective product possible. For example, beta testing 
of computer software is a common practice. Indeed, the very purpose of the intellectual property 
system is to stimulate innovation that will satisfy the demands of the market.”) 
506 See Chapter III, Part IV for a discussion of ‘lock ins’.  
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 The main problem with this view is that it misunderstands the first-sale 
doctrine. The doctrine represents an endogenous balance between the owner’s 
rights and the public’s rights under copyright law. While the owner should not be 
able to control the resale and distribution of its work, it nonetheless retains control 
over, inter alia, its adaptation, translation, performance, and reproduction. This 
suggests that copyright law recognises the owner’s right over the access to its 
work required for such acts. An attempt to use what is in effect a limited 
exhaustion of the copyright owner’s rights as a reason for mandatory access under 
competition law once the first sale is made overlooks the crucial distinction 
between the physical copy of the work, and the copyright residing within. Only 
the right to distribute the physical copy may be exhausted. The copyright cannot. 
Access to copyrighted content undermines the owner’s right to control derivate 
uses as well as its ability to charge for every non-infringing use of their work, as 
is their prerogative under copyright law.  
 
 Indeed, the fact that the focus is on digital content can only strengthen the 
copyright owner’s case against this ‘backdoor approach’ to mandating access 
through the first-sale doctrine. Digital goods make it easier for free-riders to 
misappropriate the owner’s rent. Copyright owners need continued monopoly 
profits beyond its first mover advantage to be sufficiently profitable to sustain 
investment in the company and recover its fixed costs. 507 These costs are higher 
than merely the costs reflected on the accounts for the product for which access 
may be mandated under competition law. The figure is significantly higher due to 
                                                 
507 R A Posner, supra, n.25 at p.250. (“It is not a violation of antirust law to charge a monopoly 
price to maximise profits.”) 
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the need to reflect ‘commercial risks’.508 Recognition for internalising risk was 
given by an enlightened CFI judgment in European Night Services v. Commission, 
where it held that “when Community law intervenes to require access, full 
compensation should be obtainable, not only for the capital invested but also for a 
normal return having regard to the risk of the investment.”509 Further, all digital 
standards require the participation of consumers. On this view, an opposite, but 
equally perverse result would occur: that the owner would never be able to refuse 
access, since the standard does not belong to it, regardless of the investment and 
IPRs legitimately granted precisely to block such attempts to access. 
 
 Ultimately, any competition policy advocating a static focus in digital 
markets is unrealistic because it assumes that the consumer benefits of 
technological change are illusory.  Dynamic efficiency confers social benefits far 
in excess of the social costs of the short-lived monopoly prices that the process 
also gives rise to, particularly in software, where quality competition tends to 
dominate price competition.510 As Robert Lind and Paul Muysert warned: “It is 
generally agreed that IP laws should not be systematically eroded by competition 
authorities on an ad hoc basis in their pursuit of short term competition objectives 
of power prices and profits”.511 This does not mean that the static focus is 
irrelevant. It may continue to be relevant in traditional agricultural or industrial 
settings where resource limits change slowly. In digital markets, resource limits 
rapidly recede due to technological changes. For example, silicon in sand, one of 
                                                 
508 R Gilbert and W Tom, supra, n. 70 at 45-46. 
509 T-374, 375, 384 & 388/94, [1998] E.C.R. II-3141, [1998] 5 C.M.L.R. 718. 
510 R A Posner, supra, n.25, at p.250. (Noting that the quality adjusted price of software has fallen 
simply because quality improvements have vastly outrun price increases.)  
511 R C Lind and P Muysert, ‘The European Commission’s Draft Technology Transfer Block 
Exemption Regulation and Guidelines: A Significant Departure form Accepted Competition Policy 
Principles’, (2004) 4 ECLR 181 at p.183.   
 148
the earth’s most common substances has through a series of innovations, provided 
us with information-processing capabilities inconceivable only a few decades 
before. Similarly, the previously unexploited electromagnetic frequency spectrum 
provides land mobile, broadcasting, and satellite communications catering to 
human needs in a way inconceivable during the late 19th century. These examples 
suggest that focusing on current limits as static efficiency does is normally 
misleading.512  
 
 Further, there is a need to take into account the variability of human needs 
and the allocation of current resources for the future generation and 
transformation of resources under uncertainty. 513 This is something that only a 
dynamic focus can provide. While this goal is arguably the right one for courts 
and regulators in Singapore to take when dealing with digital copyright markets, it 
is submitted that this does not end the discussion. Rather, the correct focus is only 
the first step in the analysis. It is increasingly clear that digital products whose 
primary value lies in copyright are fundamentally different from staples of the 
industrial economy or service economy products.514 Competition laws were 
designed to regulate competition in traditional industrial markets, where the 
effects of technological changes are relatively measured and predictable. In digital 
markets, this inquiry takes place within the matrix of network effects, where the 
law has struggled to decide the threshold where Schumpeterian efficiency must 
                                                 
512 S Schiesel, ‘Bringing Competition into the Age of the Internet’, New York Times, 25 
December, 2000, at C1 (“Many of the analytical and intellectual tools that competition authorities 
use these days were developed for slow-changing industries like manufacturing. But these methods 
may not be up to the task of dealing equitably with technology sectors where the competitive 
landscape can change significantly from year to year.”).  
513 O Granstrand, supra, n. 66.  
514 United States v. Microsoft Corp., [2001] 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.) at para. 49.(“We decide this 
case against a backdrop of significant debate amongst academics and practitioners over the extent 
to which 'old economy' ... [antitrust] doctrines should apply to firms competing in dynamic 
technological markets ....”)  
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give way to the immediate, visible goals proposed by the Harvard and Chicago 
schools. 515 For decades, US antitrust law has approached the Interface with a 
dynamic focus to competition. Yet, it is still some way to developing a framework 
that marries this focus with legal rules to juxtapose usefully upon a given set of 
facts. Richard Posner has suggested the reason for why competition rules in digital 
markets has proven more difficult to craft than other complex technical areas 
which the law regulates: digital markets are characterised by network effects 
which do not operate on the same plane of certainty as engineering, 
biotechnological or commercial concepts do.516 If Singapore is to hold its place in 
the global economy, it must do better.  
 
IV. DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND CONSUMER WELFARE:  
DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY 
  
 Having adopted a dynamic focus to regulating digital copyright, 
competition law becomes concerned with the extent to that copyright owners 
become entrenched and use their copyright to block entry to those able to provide 
new or better products. This is the idea of ‘contestable markets’. In this regard, the 
view competition policy takes of network effects is crucial in determining where 
thresholds of ‘dominance’ and ‘abuse’ lie.  
 
 A critical issue in the Microsoft cases was whether Microsoft been able to 
perpetuate its market power by taking advantage of its “applications barrier to 
                                                 
515 D. I. Bainbridge, Intellectual Property, (5th edn.) (Essex: Longman, 2002) at 13. (“There is no 
doubt that new technology stretches the law which is sometimes slow to react, and one problem 
has been the manner in which it has attempted to adapt existing legal paradigms to deal with the 
problems posed by technological developments.”) 
516 R A Posner, supra, n. 25.  
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entry”.517 With over 90% of the OS market,518 Microsoft had an installed base, 
encouraging software vendors to write compatible programs for its Windows OS. 
This installed base made it difficult for rival OS software providers to enter. Few 
programmers would invest time and money developing applications for OS that 
do not have a large installed base, because demand for such applications is low, 
making rival OS unattractive. Simultaneously, Windows OS users are unlikely to 
switch to other systems, because Windows allows them to choose from among a 
much larger number of compatible applications.519 Consumers are also reluctant 
to switch to new networks because of investments in hardware and time spent 
learning a system. Brand name recognition and the consumer confidence it 
inspires may be even more powerful barriers preventing entry in information 
platform industries where consumers rely heavily on suppliers for continuing 
support. The result is a ‘positive feedback’ process in which more and more 
applications are written for Windows.  
 
 As Fig 12 shows, once network saturation occurs, consumers are likely to 
remain with an established network because of the costs they have incurred in 
adapting to the network, and costs involved in switching to another one.520 These 
‘switching costs’ thus create substantial barriers to entry in digital markets. 
Because the “switching costs” for consumers in network markets are so high, they 
become “locked in” to Microsoft’s network.521 
                                                 
517 United States v. Microsoft Corp. Findings of Fact, [ 1999] 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C.)  
518 Ibid. at para.19 (finding that Microsoft's share of the market for  "Intel-compatible PC operating 
systems" is at ninety percent). 
519 D J Teece and M Coleman, supra, n.30 at 814 (“[T]he more users of a given [computer 
operating] platform, the more complementary products that will likely be supplied to that platform. 
This will lower the cost or increase the value of the platform.”). 
520 These include the compatible software foregone, the interoperability with users of that network 
and time involved in learning that platform in the first place.  
521 J E Lopatka and W H Page, ‘Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and the Law and Economics 
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  Simultaneously, consumers' demand for one compatible technical 
standard leads network markets move from the joint existence of two or more 
incompatible products to coalesce around a single standard.522 Hence, once 
copyrighted the digital content gains enough acceptance to be perceived by most 
consumers as the ultimate technological winner, the market “tips” and consumers 
migrate to that standard en masse.523 Early users of a particular network often join 
                                                                                                                                      
of Exclusion’, (1999) 7 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 157 at p.170 (“Software vendors tend to write 
applications for the most popular operating system. The greater availability of applications in turn 
induces new users to choose that operating system. The market thus tips in favor of a single 
standard, to which the industry is locked in.”). 
522 D A Balto and R Pitofsky, ‘Antitrust and High-Tech Industries: The New Challenge’, (1998) 43 
Antitrust Bull. 583, at p.604 (“In industries characterized by networks even monopoly is seen by 
some observers as inevitable and merely an accommodation to consumer demand for a compatible 
technical standard.”); D Rubinfeld, supra n.78, at p.876 ("With consumer preferences for 
uniformity in products and compatibility in complementary products, dominant firms operating 
with a single standard are likely to develop in dynamic network industries."); S Lohr, ‘Open 
Windows: The New Math of Monopoly’, N.Y. Times, 9 April 2000, §  4 (Week in Review), at 1 
(“[Network markets] tend to naturally evolve toward one or two dominant companies (think Cisco 
in routers for Internet data or eBay in online auctions). They control the technology standards in 
their markets.”) 
523 M A Lemley and D McGowan, ‘Could Java Change Everything? The Competitive Propriety of 
a Proprietary Standard’, (1998) 43 Antitrust Bull. 715, at p.721 (“[O]nce consumers perceive that a 
de facto standard has been established, tipping will occur very quickly.”). 
Fig. 12 Positive feedback systems follow adoption of new technologies in 
three phases: (1) flat during launch (2) a steep rise during takeoff as 
positive feedback kicks in (3) leveling off as saturation is reached.  
Source: Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, Information Rules, (Boston, MIT 








in anticipation of other users hopping on the bandwagon later.524 This is seen in 




Tipping can occur rapidly because of network effects.525 Consumers 
become ‘locked in’ to the product because of switching costs associated with 
moving from one network to another. The net result is that the product technology 
standard that is adopted can mean, that inferior products continue to dominate 
production decisions and consumer purchases.526 Even if a new entrant promises a 
less expensive or technically superior product, users of the current network may 
                                                 
524 Controversial examples of tipping include VHS versus Beta videocassette formats and 
QWERTY and Dvorak keyboard layouts. See P Lewin (ed), The Economics of QWERTY, 
(Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002). 
525 K Kelly, New Rules for the New Economy, 10 Radical Strategies for a Connected World (USA: 
Viking, 1998) at p.34, (Suggesting that in new network economies, the tipping point is 
significantly lower than in traditional ones because of low fixed costs, insignificant marginal costs 
and rapid distribution.) 
526 W A Sheremata, ‘Barriers to Innovation: A Monopoly, Network Externalities, and the Speed of 
Innovation’, (1997) 42 Antitrust Bull. 937 at p.958 (Describing how "consumers will get 'locked 











Fig 13 Positive feedback leading to market tipping; Source: Carl 
Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, Information Rules, (Boston, MIT Press, 
1999), at p. 177 
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not be willing to run the risk of losing their investments in that network. This 
consequence is sometimes referred to as path dependency.527  
 
 Courts and competition authorities adopting dynamic efficiency goals 
strive to provide the means for alternative products to be offered through 
mandating access to digital standards protected by copyright in order to ensure 
that the dynamic welfare gains promised by sacrificing static efficiencies are 
obtained.528 There is no guarantee that the superior digital platform would win, 
given the incumbent’s first mover advantages and its likelihood for aggressive 
competitiveness. Once the market has tipped it may be difficult or even 
undesirable to undo any anticompetitive effects that have arisen. 
 
 Digital copyright may persist beyond its useful economic life, and digital 
copyright monopolies possess inherent natural advantages that make them 
difficult to dislodge.529 When the copyright owner is well entrenched, it may not 
feel compelled to continue to pursue efficiencies,530 and is more likely to engage 
in harmful monopolistic conduct, including raising prices, impeding innovation, 
and reducing output. Tipping increases the leverage power of the winning 
technology, and may encourage exploitation of locked-in consumers, or fail to 
                                                 
527 R A Posner, supra, n. 39, at p.930 (Explaining "the issue of 'path dependence': an industry may 
be stuck with an inferior technology because of the cost advantage of the existing network"). 
528 I Rahnasto, Intellectual Property Rights, External Effects and Anti-trust Law, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003).  
529 Federal Trade Commission, ‘Entering the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the World of 
B2B Electronic Marketplaces, Executive Summary’, at 2, at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/0s/2000/10/b26report.pdf  (Oct. 2000). Part 3, at 29 ("[O]nce a marketplace 
monopoly is attained, it may be very difficult to dislodge."). See Chapter III, Part III.  
530 United States v. VISA USA., Inc. 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, at 342  (“The higher the barriers to entry, 
and the longer the lags before new entry, the less likely it is that potential entrants would be able to 
enter the market in a timely, likely, and sufficient scale to deter or counteract any anticompetitive 
restraints.... Where barriers to entry are high, ... a monopolist would find it easier to raise prices 
because it would be unlikely that a competitor would, or could, enter the market.)  see also 
Beltway on Top, Wall St. J., June 9, 2000, at A18 ("The only incentive to produce anything is the 
possession of temporary monopoly power."). 
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innovate and yet stifle future innovation by preventing switching to better 
alternative technologies. Even if the industry structure ultimately relies on a single 
digital standard, competition policy should still allow rival standards to battle it 
out in the marketplace. Even if it were true that successful copyright owners are 
often aggressive in price and innovation, competition is still necessary, if only 
because it is likely that consumers would be better off with several aggressive 
companies, rather than a single dominant firm.531 Moreover, in addition to 
maintaining the possibility of competition on quality, rival standards also hedge 
against the risk that the owner’s standard proves fundamentally flawed. While this 
approach bears similar shades to Harvard School theory, the focus here is not on 
market structure, but consumer welfare.    
 
 Ex post, courts and regulators act to prevent consumers from being ‘locked 
in’. The feasibility of challenging an existing network monopolist therefore 
becomes critical. Rivals have to duplicate the network to enter the market, 
significantly increasing entry costs. Competition law therefore prevents the 
copyright owner from exploiting this bottleneck through mandating access to 
interface information. The outcome of Magill was therefore attributed to EU law 
subordinating market efficiency to ensuring ex post competition by imposing 
upon dominant firms a general duty to share as well as a duty to supply.532 
Similarly, competition law may also intervene ex ante to prevent premature 
                                                 
531 K J Arrow, ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’, J Eatwell (ed.), 
Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971), at pp. 156-60. In 
terms of challenging the perspective at a theoretical level, Kenneth Arrow famously countered that 
competition provides the best spur to innovation. 
532 S B Opi, ‘The Application Of The Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property 
Licensing in the European Union and The United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Still 
Sacrosanct?’ (2001) 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 409; E P Mastromanolis, Insights 
from U.S. Antitrust Law on Exclusive and Restricted Territorial Distribution: The Creation of a 
New Legal Standard for European Union Competition Law, 15 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 559, 562 
(1995) 
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tipping to a possibly inefficient standard.533 Given the seemingly awesome market 
power at the copyright owner’s disposal, there seems little reason why 
competition, ex ante tipping, or ex post, should not be promoted by requiring 
access to the owner’s copyrighted works.  
 
 It is then perhaps surprising to discover, as will be evident from the 
following discussion, that there has been a strong and growing movement arguing 
against third party access, even in the face of a ‘tipped’ market. Essentially, two 
arguments have been advanced. The first view develops the Schumpeterian 
argument that monopolies in digital markets are inherently fragile, and that ‘lock-
ins’ if they occur, happen only because consumers voluntarily remain with the 
copyright owner’s standard because they are better off doing so. Second, 
economic theory on path dependency leading to inferior products dominating 
digital markets is flawed because it may not be reasonable to expect competition 
law to know when it should intervene. After all, the competition law is only 
effective as the ability of those who implement it, and they may be constrained by 
bounded rationality.534    
  
A. Understanding the Dynamics of Digital Copyright Markets 
 
 Dominant copyright owners would not engage in exclusionary conduct by 
refusing royalties from granting licenses to rivals and downstream customers, 
unless its market is fragile to new entry. An example of the owner’s response is 
                                                 
533 I Rahnasto, supra, n. 113 at p.190. 
534 The inability to fully understand and predict all future possibilities because courts and 
regulators are not omniscient.   
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‘defensive leveraging, discussed earlier in the context of Microsoft (EU).535 
Digital markets are highly dynamic and entry is easier relative to traditional 
markets. The extraordinary rate of innovation in digital markets may be due to the 
plentiful investment capital available worldwide for new technological start-ups, 
and the rapidity with which these start-ups can create new digital networks which 
can be quickly put into service due to instant scalability. The easier it is to create a 
substitute network, the less secure will be the network monopolist’s monopoly 
against competition.536 Significantly, William Baumol and Janusz Ordover note 
that:  
 
 “In high technology industries, the upstream markets are likely to be of 
greater consequence for competition in the longer run. These are likely 
to be international in scope and less protected by entry barriers, and are 
apt to be characterised by greater fluidity in market share. Accordingly, 
less weight should be assigned to the current status of an undertaking in 
technologically evolving industries when analysing unilateral 
conduct.”537 
 
 Market power is likely to be short-lived as new entrants with new and 
better products and technologies leap frog the current dominant players and ‘steal’ 
the market. To the extent that tipping maximises the size of the network, it 
immediately benefits existing consumers. Entrants may or may not succeed in 
convincing the incumbent’s customers to switch to its product or standard.538 
Even if firms fail and are quickly eliminated, this ‘hit and run’ dynamism creates 
pressure on the incumbent comfortable with existing competition to look behind 
                                                 
535 See Chapter II, at Part IV.B.2(3).  
536 R A Posner, supra, n. 25, at p. 253.  
537 W J Baumol and J A Ordover, supra, n. 25 at 93.  
538 Microsoft succeeded in causing WordPerfect users to switch to Word, but failed to convince 
Netscape Internet browser users to switch to Internet Explorer. See D S Evans et al, ‘The Rise and 
Fall of Leaders in Personal Computer Software’ in Microsoft, Antitrust and the New Economy: 
Selected Essays, (Kluwer: Boston, 2002) at p.265.   
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its shoulder frequently enough to remain competitive. This creates an environment 
approximating contestable markets, which a Member of Parliament had argued to 
be the main goal of competition policy.539 As Richard Posner observed: 
 
 “Network effect tugs a market toward monopolisation. Yet oddly, also 
toward competition. The paradox is dissolved by understanding that 
competition to obtain a monopoly is an important form of competition. 
The more protection from competition the firm that succeeds in 
obtaining a monopoly will enjoy, the more competition will be to 
become that monopolist. A firm that will have the protection of both 
intellectual property law and economies of scale in consumption if it is 
the first to come up an essential component of a new economy product 
will have a lucrative monopoly, and this prospect should accelerate the 
rate of innovation.”540 
 
 Copyright monopoly is rarely a barrier to radical innovation, since this 
tends to emerge from outside an established industry.541 Access to the 
infrastructure provided by incumbent firms is therefore rarely important for 
ultimate success. Incremental innovation is not much affected by market structure 
either. This begs the question then of what innovation requires. The evidence is 
sketchy, but there seems to be a consensus that adequate protection of copyright or 
at least mechanisms for innovating firms to appropriate returns from their 
investment is crucial.542 The ability of firms to exclude others as a business 
strategy therefore raises competition issues that turn on the proper assessment of 
market power. In high technology markets, monopolies can be particularly 
beneficial to consumers.543 
                                                 
539 S Iswaran, supra, n.5.  
540 R A Posner, supra, n.25.  
541 See Chapter I, Part II.D.2 (Describing how digital market innovation, in addition to be 
simultaneous, is also radical, rather than incremental.)  
542 T M Jorde and D J Teece, supra, n. 25 at 6.  
543 For example, some observers believe that the monopoly Microsoft acquired during the 1990s in 
operating systems for personal computers has been responsible for "the rapid evolution of the PC 
from a glorified typewriter and adding machine to a multimedia communication device. See J M 
Jacobson, ‘Do We Need a "New Economy" Exception for Antitrust?’, (2001) 15 Antitrust L.J 89, 
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 In light of this self-correcting potential and importance of copyright in 
ensuring consumer welfare, some commentators have argued that competition law 
is too blunt a tool to apply rigorously to the digital markets,544 while others have 
questioned whether network markets are especially prone to anti-competitive 
behaviour.545 Efforts to hobble the winner in one round of innovation will be seen 
as diminishing the returns available from competing in such high-risk 
environments, thereby diverting resources to other sectors of the economy 
displaying less risk and affording less innovation.546 It is submitted therefore that 
intervention ex ante tipping is rarely warranted.  
 
 Ex post tipping, dynamic efficiency losses must turn upon some 
perceptible form of loss in consumer welfare caused by ‘lock-ins’. Interventionists 
argue ‘lock-ins’ lead to monopoly prices and inferior products.547 The concept of 
lock-in rests on the belief that the free market competition does not allow the best 
quality standard to win.  Products succeed in spite of inferior quality because 
consumers purchase it only because everyone else is using it, while in fact, each 
consumer would have preferred to use a different product. As, the European 
Commission argued:  
 
                                                                                                                                      
at p.92. By establishing a consistent worldwide standard for operating systems, Windows has 
allowed independent firms to write a nearly unlimited number of programs for word processing, 
spreadsheets, databases, games, electronic mail, instant messaging, Internet browsers, and other 
applications. See P Krugman, ‘Making Windows Transparent’, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 2001, §  4 
(Week in Review), at 13. 
544 D B Kopel, Antitrust After Microsoft: The Obsolescence of Antitrust In The Digital Era (USA: 
Heartland Inst, 2001) 
545 S Liebowitz and S E. Margolis, ‘Network Effects and the Microsoft Case’, in Jerry Ellig, ed., 
Dynamic Competition and Public Policy, (2001) at pp.190-91 (arguing that network markets, such 
as software products and operating systems, are highly competitive even though some  
firms have large market shares) 
546 D J Teece and M Coleman, supra, n. 30.  
547 P A David, ‘Understanding the Economics of QWERTY: The Necessity of History’, in W.N 
Parker ed., Economic History and the Modern Economist, (Basil Blackwell: New York, 1986). 
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“Due to the lack of interoperability … an increasing number of 
consumers are locked into a homogenous Windows solution … this 
impairs the ability of consumers to benefit from innovative work group 
server operating system features brought to the market by Microsoft’s 
competitors. In addition, this limits the prospect for such competitors to 
successfully market their innovation and thereby discourages them from 
developing new products … (and will be) confined to niche existences or 
not be viable at all. There will be little scope for innovation – except for 
innovation from Microsoft.”548 
 
 It is important to recognise a distinction between the ability of the 
copyright owner to exploit the inelasticity of its short-run demand for greater 
profits and the incentive to do so, given the much higher elasticity of its long-run 
demand under which the network effects can build – and unravel.549 A firm 
producing a network good must fear that an increase in the current price might 
lead to greater current profits, but also to an unravelling of the network in the long 
run, causing the firm to gain short-run profits at the expense of profits later on. 
The net effect of the firm seeking to exploit its current ability to raise its price 
could be a reduction in the market value of its stock. Indeed, there is evidence that 
network markets remain highly competitive despite domination by a single 
standard owner.550 For example, market dominance could enhance market 
efficiency because the market is actually larger than it would otherwise be. More 
applications will be offered by software developers who are confident of the 
standard’s durability. The average price charged to consumers could be lower than 
it otherwise would be due to the increased elasticity from network effects. 551 
                                                 
548 Microsoft, Comp C-3/37.792 of 24 March 2004 at para. 694 and 700. (emphasis mine) 
549 In common parlance, this means that the owner stands to gain much from not raising prices, and 
stands to lose as much from raising them.  
550 R Prentice, ‘Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a Post-
Chicago World’, (1996) 57 Ohio St. L.J., 1163, at p.1229. (“There are many examples of network 
markets that started out as competitive but ultimately came to be dominated by one or a few firms. 
In the video recording market, the VHS format achieved such an advantage over the Beta format, 
and in computer operating systems, Microsoft prevailed over IBM, Apple Computer, and Novell.”) 
551 R B McKenzie, Digital Economics: How Information Technology has Transformed Business 
Thinking (USA: Praeger, 2003) 
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Monopolies in network industries could also establish uniform standards that 
make it easier for consumers to connect to the network and interact with other 
users.552 The competitive process inevitably results in the elimination of some, 
perhaps all competitors. By being the most innovative, efficient and responsive to 
customers’ wishes, copyright owner may well be the last one standing. As Richard 
Whish warned, it would be strange and indeed harmful if such efficient market 
outcomes were penalised.553 
 
 Two US economists, Stan Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis drew 
important correlations between market shares and product quality, as indicated by 
computer magazine reviews.554 A significant outcome was seen in the markets for 
personal finance software (PFS) and software for spreadsheets. Three software 
brands competed in the PFS market: Quicken by Intuit, Microsoft Money and 
Managing Your Money (MYM) by Meca. In the late 1980s, MYM was initially 
considered the best and most powerful product in the category. When Quicken 
was introduced, it received less positive reviews as it was not as powerful as 
MYM.555 Over time Intuit improved Quicken, adding more sophisticated features. 
As the first two graphs in Fig.13 show, by the early 1990s, it was considered at 
                                                 
552 S Labaton, ‘Airlines and Antitrust: A New World. Or Not’, N.Y. Times, 18 November, 2001, at 
§  3. (“The old antitrust principles do not apply easily because there are countervailing benefits to 
consumers-like lower prices, standardization or more frequent service-when control of the industry 
is in the hands of a few companies.”). The benefits of uniform technological standards are evident 
in the contrast between wireless phone performance in the U.S. and most of the rest of the world. 
The United States never was able to settle on a single standard for wireless phone technology “and 
that blunder has resulted in a patch-work of multiple, incompatible technologies.” W S Mossberg, 
‘A Guide to the Lingo You'll Want to Learn for Wireless Technology’, Wall St. J., 28 March, 
2002, at B1. By contrast, Europe and most other countries settled on a single standard thus have 
"better and more innovative wireless phones and wireless services."  
553 R Whish, Competition Law, 4th ed,  (UK: LexisNexis, 2003) at p. 11. 
554 S E Margolis and S Liebowitz, Winners, Losers & Microsoft: Competition and Antitrust in 
High Technology (Oakland: The Independent Institute, 2000). (Giving a detailed account on how 
standardisation of measurements were resolved in each case.)   
555 S E Margolis and S Liebowitz, ‘Network Effects and the Microsoft Case’, The Economics of 
QWERTY, P Lewin, ed., (New York: Palgrave, 2002) at p.225.  
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least the equal of MYM, and by the mid-1990s, Quicken was clearly considered 
the best product. In 1991, Microsoft introduced its Money program for Windows. 
Quicken’s retention of its market leadership was unsurprising given its high 
quality as indicated in successful reviews. According to Microsoft’s critics, 
however, Microsoft should have been able to leverage on its ownership of the 
Windows OS to achieve a dominant position, independent of the quality of its 
software. Microsoft produced a relatively inferior product, and failed to tip that 
market.  Indeed, the PFS market share graph shows one dominant firm followed 
by another dominant firm, or what is known serial monopoly. Market shares 
changed so rapidly that the concept of lock-in and tipping seems out of place.  
 
 The second two graphs in Fig. 14 show Borland’s Quattro, Lotus’s 1-2-3 
and Microsoft’s Excel competing in the spreadsheet market. This time, Excel’s 
consistently high ratings tipped consumers into using Microsoft’s product, and 
allowed it to maintain high market shares. In contrast, former market leader Lotus 
saw its market share fall with its ratings relative to Microsoft.   In every case, 
there was a positive correlation between the review ratings given to the product 
and its market share. Thus the intuition is that where the incumbent was replaced, 

























































Fig. 14: Graphs illustrating studies by Margolis and Liebowitz on 
market leadership in software industries.  
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 It is unsound policy to base regulatory action simply on possibilities, 
particularly where those presenting them acknowledge no obligation to subject 
them to rigorous empirical tests. The theory of harmful ‘lock-ins’ simply asserts 
that under certain assumptions, the possibility exists. If competition law is to 
intervene based on anticompetitive network effects, courts and regulators ought to 
find at least one clear instance of it. However, the study above shown the 
opposite: in the real world, good products have won. Prevailing software 
standards at each time period were regarded by software consumers and reviewers 
as the best, regardless of the whether the undertaking also owned the OS. Despite 
Microsoft’s market power due to Windows, its products won when they were 
good, and lost when they were not. Confirmation of ‘lock-ins’ require evidence of 
non-adoption of existing better products. Testing for inertia requires comparing 
the rate of change in actual market shares with the ideal rate of change, which is 
considerably more detailed than empirical data offers. 
 
 Further, the belief that inferior products will follow lock-ins wrongly 
assumes that programmers hired by the incumbent lack or lose creativity. 















eager for large firm stocks to perform well as they are for small firm stocks. A 
lazy board of directors will quickly see their stocks acquired and the board 
replaced by infuriated shareholders. Software markets require producers to 
continually add new functions to their products. Unlike consumers who want the 
same Big Macs they had the day before, software does not vanish or suffer in 
quality on consumption. Consumers have little incentive to purchase new software 
from the dominant vendor unless new and significant improvements are added. In 
addition to speed and intuitiveness, software requires added functionality. Just as 
speed may come with faster processor chips, practice overcomes inherent design 
imperfections. The natural inclination of consumers is therefore to stick to a 
familiar version of a program unless the new one performs tasks not available in 
the old version. The added consumer benefit from this is savings: later versions 
usually cost less than the sum of the prices that individual components command. 
Otherwise, consumers would not purchase new generations of software products 
as a whole.556 When good products win, consumer welfare wins. The policy 
implication of this is that courts and regulators can help ensure that consumers get 
the best products by keeping regulatory impediments out of entrepreneurial 
competition to establish their mousetraps in the marketplace.  
 
B. Third Degree Path Dependence and More Antitrust Speculation 
  
 Where refusals to license seem anticompetitive at first blush due to 
concerns over path dependency, it is possible the regulators and courts have been 
misled. There is a view that there are three possible efficiency outcomes where a 
                                                 
556 S J Liebowitz and S E Margolis, ‘Networks, Antitrust Economics, and the Case against 
Microsoft’, in Winners, Losers & Microsoft, (Oakland: The Independent Institute, 2000) at p. 259. 
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dynamic process exhibits path dependency.557 First-degree path dependency 
occurs where the future impact of initial actions are fully appreciated and taken 
into account. There is no error or inefficiency in those decisions, despite the sub-
optimality of the situation in a given period, and no remedy is required.558 
Second-degree path dependency recognises that information is never perfect. 
Efficient decisions may not be efficient in retrospect. However, the inferiority of a 
choice cannot be known at the point where the choice was made. In this situation, 
outcomes though inefficient are unavoidable and again should not warrant 
remedy.559 Third degree path dependency occurs where initial conditions lead to 
an inefficient outcome, but it was possible to recognise and avoid the inferior 
outcome at the point where the decision is made.560  
 
 Different constructions of the Microsoft cases lead to different claims of 
path dependence. This consequently determines whether competition law should 
have intervened. First-degree path dependence assumes that Microsoft’s products 
and other rivals were essentially the same and eventual market choices of 
Microsoft was arbitrary and lead to a significant and durable outcome. Courts and 
                                                 
557 S J Liebowitz and S E Margolis, ‘Theories of Path Dependence’, in Winners, Losers & 
Microsoft, (Oakland: The Independent Institute, 2000) at p. 49. 
558 An example of this would be someone buying a house, having properly taken into account 
future prices, incomes and family size developments. Thus the house may have been too big at first 
when moving in as newlyweds, then just right with children, then too small with grandchildren, 
then too big later on when children and grandchildren move out. All this may have been predicted 
fairly well.  
559 An example of this would be someone buying a house without possibly being able to know that 
five year down the road a sewage treatment plant will be built nearby, drastically lowering 
property prices and the neighbourhood amenities nearby. Here, there is dependence on past 
conditions which lead to regrettable outcomes, and the person may not have bought the house had 
he known in advance what was going to happen. But because of limited knowledge, the path 
dependence is not inefficient in any meaningful sense.  
560 An example of this would be where someone bought a house, knowing that a sewage plant 
would be built, but allowing the purchase to go through anyway because his friends were all 
buying houses there, and he values being part of that neighborhood. He would rather have bought a 
house away from a sewage plant, and so would his friends, but they were somehow unable to 
coordinate their actions.    
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regulators cannot use static or dynamic efficiency models to predict which of 
several equally efficient possibilities will be chosen and the outcome is 
completely random. If the argument is taken a step further to second-degree path 
dependence, regulators may assert that Microsoft’s products are notably inferior. 
However, during the time Microsoft dominated the standard, it might not have 
been known that some other standard would be better in the future. Ex post, it may 
appear that the market’s choice of Microsoft was a mistake, although it was not a 
mistake given the information when the market tipped.  
 
 The argument can go further, and indeed, as the Microsoft cases show, 
they do. Regulators may claim that at the beginning, sufficient information existed 
to determine that other platforms were superior, thus making a case for third 
degree path dependence. This may occur if at the time that Microsoft introduced 
its products, most consumers preferred rival products, but were unaware that 
others had similar preferences. In that case, a slim lead for the ‘inferior’ Microsoft 
standard might have propagated into eventual market dominance. Refusals to 
grant license to interface information therefore impedes technological 
development, and translates into an anticompetitive abuse. Alternatively, if it were 
widely understood that switching to the rival platform would confer greater 
benefits than the switching cost of doing so, but are forced to remain with 
Microsoft, this would be another instance of third degree path dependence. This 
has yet to occur because each consumer prefers Microsoft’s platform, given that 
all other users and developers use it. 
  
 There is neither convincing theory nor empirical support for this 
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proposition. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that third-degree path 
dependence, if it exists, is so rare that it should not be the basis for regulatory 
intervention.561 Although markets do not always choose the best technology, there 
are good reasons to expect it to be very unusual for consumers to choose the 
wrong technology. Pernicious ‘lock-ins’ may exist, but it hardly follows that 
consumers are thereby locked into inferior products. While Microsoft, by blocking 
access to its APIs through its copyright may have increased its market share, it is 
no indication of abuse. Such outcomes hurt competitors, not consumers. There is a 
difference between proving the existence of inefficiency and proving its absence. 
If regulators assert that they have identified a remediable inefficiency, the onus is 
on them to prove it. In the same way that the law presumes an accused person 
innocent unless proven guilty, it seeks to minimise the costs of incorrectly 
identifying inefficiency by erring on presumption that the market outcome is 
efficient unless proven otherwise. It would therefore be wrong for regulators to 
assert that without evidence of inefficiency, one may presume to have proven the 
outcome is efficient.562 It would be surprising to learn of an anatomist examining 
a human eye and declaring that its design was inefficient and that he could have 
done better. The line between conviction and paranoia is a fine one. Unless there 
is clear proof of consumer harm in tipped digital markets flowing from refusals to 
license, competition law has no reason to intervene. 
 
                                                 
561 S J Liebowitz and S E Margolis, ‘Dismal Science Fictions: Network Effects, Microsoft and 
Antitrust Speculation’ in Peter Lewin (ed), The Economics of QWERTY, (Hampshire: Palgrave, 
2002) at 239-40. (Also arguing that policy makers shouldn’t go about correcting markets until they 
have concrete proof that markets have failed.) 
562 P A David, ‘Path Dependence and the Quest for Historical Economics: One More chorus of 
Ballad of QWERTY’ (1997) Discussion Papers 020, Oxford University, Economic and Social 




 Competition policy focusing on dynamic efficiency seems to sit most 
comfortably with the utilitarian justification of copyright. It recognises that digital 
markets are often highly concentrated, but a lack of rivals does not indicate a lack 
of competition. More SMEs will not necessarily mean better quality competition. 
Indeed, monopolistic or oligopolistic markets are often the most efficient market 
structure. Courts evaluating claims under Section 47 should therefore look not for 
a causal link to harm to individual competitors, but harm to the competitive 
process. This means that a dominant copyright owner may compete, whether 
against the competitive fringe in its primary market or against potential 
competitors, as vigorously as a firm in an ordinary competitive market would be, 
provided it refrains from employing tactics calculated to drive an equally or more 
efficient firm from the market.  
 
  A focus on dynamic efficiency also recognises that static efficiencies do 
not adequately take into account both the interests of the public as well as the 
copyright owner. Consumers are likely to be better off in the end if owners were 
allowed to enjoy the full extent of their market power, particularly in primary 
markets. In digital markets, this power is likely to be temporary due to the 
Schumpeterian gale of ‘creative destruction’. Further, dynamic rather than static 
efficiency properly reflects the owner’s continued right to control access to its 
work following the first sale.   
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 Finally, the fact that the dominant copyright owner is buttressed by 
network externalities and may be hard to dislodge even by firms with seemingly 
superior technology has no significance in competition law itself.563 Even in 
network markets, monopolies are fragile, and owners who have the ability to 
exploit consumers prudently refrain from doing so in order to prevent their 
networks from unravelling. As a Member of Parliament aptly illustrates:  
 
“Will the public suffer higher cost?   This is inevitable especially in the 
short term.  However, like the COE,564 I believe that the market will 
adjust itself.  Copyright owners cannot demand too high a price for their 
work without the risk of pricing themselves out of the market.”565 
 
 Empirical studies have shown that good products win the standards battle, 
and consumers choose to be ‘locked-in’ to these good products. There is therefore 
no loss in consumer welfare simply because the market has tipped. Courts and 
regulators in Singapore should also be aware of the different degrees of path 
dependency, and intervene only if the inefficiency can be meaningfully prevented 
ex post. 
 
                                                 
563 Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig. CSU, [2000] 203 F.3d 1322, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 
(Fed. Cir.) at 1328. United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property at § 2.2 (“If a patent or other form of 
intellectual property does confer market power, that market power does not by itself offend the 
antitrust laws. As with any other tangible or intangible asset that enables its owner to obtain 
significant supracompetitive profits, market power (or even a monopoly) that is solely "a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident" does not violate the 
antitrust laws. Nor does such market power impose on the intellectual property owner an 
obligation to license the use of that property to others. As in other antitrust contexts, however, 
market power could be illegally acquired or maintained, or, even if lawfully acquired and 
maintained, would be relevant to the ability of an intellectual property owner to harm competition 
through unreasonable conduct in connection with such property.”) 
564 This refers to the Certificate of Entitlement that vehicle buyers in Singapore must purchase.  




 However, it is difficult to be more specific than that. Aggressive 
competitive conduct beneficial to consumers and aggressive exclusionary conduct 
deleterious to consumers may look strikingly similar.566 Commentators like 
Ronald Cass and Keith Hilton admit: “Ultimately, we do not know whether 
network markets have sufficiently distinctive characteristics from other markets to 
merit different treatment under the law.”567 What is clear is that to the extent that 
efficiency is the goal of competition policy, it should not be enforced where 
competition would be less efficient than it would be under the refusals to license. 
Costs to static efficiency are outweighed by the economies of centralising 
production in a dominant copyright owner. There would not be justification for 
using competition laws to attain goals unrelated or antithetical to efficiency. 
Perhaps this cautious approach does not give the “best of all possible” market 
outcomes. Perhaps it is the only possible one. Possible worlds can mean only 
‘worlds that could have occurred, but did not’. As C S Lewis explained, the idea 
of ‘could haves’ involves too anthropomorphic a conception that should dispel the 
need for further prediction.568 
 
 The final Chapter aims to articulate the legal approaches courts have taken 
to refusals to license cases. An awareness of the possible approaches, coupled 
with a sound understanding of the goals of competition policy allows competition 
rules to develop in a coherent and predicable fashion. At the same time, those 
applying it need to be flexible and astute enough to recognise that indicators of 
                                                 
566 R D Blair and A K Esquibel, ‘Some Remarks on Monopoly Leveraging’, (1995) 40 Antitrust 
Bull. 371, at p.372. 
567 R A Cass and K A Hylton, ‘Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and 
Microsoft’ in David S. Evans (ed.), Microsoft, Antitrust and the New Economy: Selected Essays, 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) at 449. (Emphasis mine) 
568C S Lewis, The Problem of Pain (San Francisco: Touchstone Books, 1940)  at p.17.  
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whether those goals are achieved or not may vary from one industry to the next. 
When courts and regulators understand this, they can condemn or approve conduct 
with relative confidence.569 
 
                                                 
569 F H Easterbrook, ‘Does Antitrust Have a Competitive Advantage?’, (2000) 23 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol'y 5, at p.8 (stating that regulators can "condemn or approve [conduct with clear 

































Wisdom denotes the pursuing of the best ends by the best means. 
     Frances Hutcheson570 
 
    A final piece remains to developing the competition law framework for 
regulating access to digital copyright content under the Singapore Competition 
Act 2004. It is important to know why competition law applies, the form these 
rules take at the interface, and the goals directing competition policy. Yet, if there 
were no understanding of how these come together in the actual analytical 
process, everything that has gone before would come to naught. It would be like a 
footballer knowing why he was in the middle of a pitch, knowing the rules, seeing 
the goal but not knowing quite how to dribble through the opposition and shoot to 
score. Chapter IV therefore concludes the analysis by examining the means used 
to pursue the ends of competition policy. This is the quest for the immutable core 
of digital copyright.   
 
 Cases in the EU and US have generally taken three approaches. The first 
approach considered in Part II springs from the law of property. Under this 
property rights approach (PRA), immutability turns upon whether digital 
copyright should be treated like a species of real property. If so, rules governing 
access over real property, such as easements over land would apply by analogy to 
copyright. There is both convenience and certainty in extending established rules 
rather than inventing new ones. However, if reason compels a conclusion that 
                                                 
570 E Knowles ed., The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999) at p.396.   
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copyright should not be treated like real property, competition law must then 
decide whether the threshold for finding abuse should be more stringent, or less.  
 
 Part III presents an approach more aligned with traditional copyright 
doctrine. Liability under the specific subject matter approach (SSMA) turns on 
whether the refusal falls within the ‘scope’ of the owner’s copyright. If it does, the 
alleged abuse is unimpeachable. Conversely, should the courts find the conduct to 
be outside the copyright grant, competition law will apply with its full rigour. 
While the PRA focuses on the extent exclusionary rights may be exercised ex ante 
grant, the SSMA looks at it from an ex post perspective. Neither, however, 
explicitly considers the economic effects of the refusal. Since competition law is 
very much rooted in economic theory, a compelling argument may be made that 
the means chosen at the Interface should be consistent.  
 
 Perhaps recognising the need to align the two regimes through economic 
analysis, some courts have applied the cost-benefit approach (CBA) considered in 
Part IV. Judges here attempt to weigh the socio-economic costs of refusals to 
license against the benefits of doing so. In doing so, they must first adopt one or 
more of the goals discussed in Chapter III. Next, they need to apply this analysis 
to make an economic assessment of the impact of a refusal to license. This 
rigorous cross-disciplinary analysis makes this the most demanding approach. 
However, it may also be the one that would allow courts to come closest to getting 
the calibration right. Part V evaluates the three approaches and concludes by 
presenting a novel, unified approach, which may bring the law closest to getting 
the ‘right’ result.     
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II. THE PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH 
 
 While many cases on both sides of the Atlantic have used the PRA,571 
none have authoritatively analysed proprietary nature of copyright.572 The first 
stage in the analysis determines if copyright is really a species of real property 
rights. If so, refusals to license will simply be governed by the same competition 
rules that apply to other tangible property. However, as the discussion on dynamic 
efficiency in Chapter III suggests, the answer is likely to be ‘no’. This then 
requires a second step to determine whether copyright should be subject to (a) no 
regulation (b) more regulation (c) less regulation than tangible property.    
 
A. Copyright as Real Property  
 
 Individuals exploiting resources in the pursuit of their self-interest create 
negative externalities on public welfare.573 Where they incur no cost from creating 
these externalities, they will seek to maximise their personal satisfaction, even at 
an inordinate cost to society.574 Further, without requiring uses to pay for use, 
there would be overexploitation over the resource. This has been termed the 
                                                 
571 See for example, Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig. CSU, [2000] 203 F.3d 1322, 53 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Fed. Cir.) (‘Xerox’); United States v. Microsoft [2000] 253 F.3d 34, 346 
U.S.App.D.C. 330, 2001-1 Trade Cases P 73,321; EC Commission v. Microsoft [2004] Case T-
201/04. G Tritton, Intellectual Property in Europe, (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2000), p. 836. 
(“(O)wners of intellectual property in a dominant position are not necessarily allowed to 
appropriate the full inherent value of that property but must economically justify any exercise of 
their rights and show that such does not adversely affect the consumer or  residual competition … 
this school of though that appears to have been adopted by the ECJ and CFI.”) 
572 M A Lemley et al, Software and Internet Law (Gaithersburg: Aspen Law & Business, 2000), at 
p.543. (Noting that there “is substantial disagreement as to whether intellectual property rights are 
“property” in the ordinary sense of the term.) 
573 Externalities are spillover effects on the welfare of others caused by individuals in the pursuit of 
their self-interest. An example are fumes from a factory’s production process. H M Spector, 
‘Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights’ (1989) 8 EIPR 270, at p.271. 
574 Ibid.  
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‘tragedy of the commons’.575 Harold Demsetz argued that these externalities were 
best contained through property rights so individuals would internalise the costs of 
these externalities, thereby having an incentive to produce more efficiently.576 
Giving a property rights in itself does not guarantee that property owners may not 
invest sufficiently in their property if others can free ride on their investment. 
Efficiency under the PRA therefore requires the elimination of free riding through 
the ability of excluding others using their property rights.577 The rationale for 
copyright therefore lies in its role in allowing the owner to grant licenses to those 
it deems able to exploit those rights for its own gain.578  In theory, once copyright 
law settles on clear property rules, parties will be in a better position to assess 
prospectively foreseeable economic costs and agree on a reasonable license 
agreement to the digital standard. Given the obvious benefits in avoiding 
litigation, it is perhaps unsurprising that various stakeholders have called for their 
equivalence.579  
                                                 
575 M Perelman, Steal This Idea: Intellectual Property Rights and the Corporate Confiscation of 
Creativity (New York: Palgrave, 2002) 
576 Thus the factory should be given the right over its land and be subject to pollution levies H 
Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) American Economic Review LVII.  (“A 
primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization 
of externalities.”). In a world without transactions costs, Demsetz argued, the creation of a clear 
property right will internalize the costs and benefits of an activity in the owner, and permit the sale 
of that right to others who may value it more. Once transactions costs are taken into account, 
Demsetz believed that the creation or alteration of property rights could be explained by asking 
whether the social gains from internalizing an externality exceeded the costs of doing so.; Harold 
Demsetz’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ has found support in Ronald Coase. The Coase Theorem 
suggests that an efficient allocation is always the result of any initial distribution of property rights, 
so long as these rights can be exchanged without transaction costs. R Coase, ‘The Problem of 
Social Cost’, (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics, 1-44; see also G Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of 
the Commons’, (1968) 162 Sci. 1243, at p.1244. 
577 This is nothing more than the theory underlying copyright in Chapter I. See Chapter I, Part III. 
578 M L Katz, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust Policy: Four Principles for a Complex 
World’, (2002) 1 J. Telecomms. & High Tech. L. 325, at pp.328-29 (Explaining the importance of 
the Coase theorem in grappling with complexities of intellectual property and antitrust law).  
579 F H Easterbrook, ‘Intellectual Property is Still Property’ (1990) 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 108. 
(“Intellectual property is intangible, but the right to exclude is no different in principle from 
General Motors’ right to exclude Ford from using its assembly line  ... a right to exclude in 
intellectual property is no different in principle from the right to exclude in physical property. . . . 
Except in the rarest case, we should treat intellectual and physical property identically in the law 
which is where the broader currents are taking us.” )  (Emphasis mine); United States Department 
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 The first problem with this is that the compulsory licensing remedy in 
competition or IP law finds no parallel in the law of licences.580 The closest 
approximation lies in the law of easements. Common law recognized easements in 
roads and waterways served to enable access to surrounding private property, 
allowing the land to be more efficiently exploited.581 By analogy, it has been 
suggested that compulsory copyright licenses should be ordered when the 
collective interest of society to access content overrides the interest of owner.582  
 
 However, arguing for access based on the existence of a ‘tragedy of 
information commons’ displays a lack of appreciation for the nature of 
information. While a ‘tragedy of the commons’ may occur when a finite natural 
resource is depleted by overuse, it cannot apply to non-rivalrous ideas. Copyright 
does not prevent congestion, interference or strife as real property might.583 
Instead, it artificially interferes with the market mechanism for resource allocation 
to give owners a supernormal profit.584 This economic cost can be justified only to 
                                                                                                                                      
of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property §2.2 (1995) (“For the purpose of antitrust analysis, the Agencies regard intellectual 
property as being essentially comparable to any other form of property”.) (Emphasis mine); 
OECD, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, (DAFFE/CLP(98)18, 1992) at 11. 
(Noting that “if not granted property rights in their work, widespread copying could be expected to 
occur, diminishing the returns to the innovator and the incentive to innovate and recoup for his 
investment and to induce others to strive to innovate in the future.” (Emphasis mine)  
580 As a rule, property law governing licensing in Singapore has never compelled access to the 
owner’s land. An exception arises where the owner had acted inequitably. In such a case, the court 
will imply an equitable license under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. This invocation of this 
doctrine depends on the owner making a representation which the other party has relied upon to its 
detriment. While refusals to license cases at the interface have sometimes involved discontinuance 
of access, none have ever turned on the issue of representation and principles of equity. See Tan S 
Y, Principles of Singapore Land Law, (Singapore: Butterworths, 2001) at p.521.  
581 Ibid. 
582 L Lessig, ‘The Architecture of Innovation’, (2002) 51 Duke L.J. 1783, at p.1789; Likewise, 
Judge Kirby's approach challenges us to conceptualise a more principled construct of intellectual 
property in accordance with the notion that "no right is absolute." 
583 R P Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age, 3rd edn, (New York: 
Aspen, (2003) at pp.15-16. 
584 See Chapter I, Part II.B.   
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the extent necessary to provide incentives to create, and does not map to the 
justification for real property.  
 
 Real property rights may be conferred to contain negative externalities 
caused by free riding. It focuses on whether the free rider benefited from using the 
property, and if so whether it paid for that benefit. “Free riding” encompasses 
conduct that captures uncompensated positive externalities as well as conduct that 
reduces the return to the copyright owner to such an extent that it cannot cover its 
costs. Only the latter is of concern, and free riding as a concept will not help us to 
distinguish the two. Copyright actually reduces positive externalities. Once the 
copyright content has been produced, every access multiplies available resources 
by spreading the content, permits others to enjoy it without suffering form 
depletion or pollution in the same way real property might.585 The proper focus is 
therefore on the copyright owner, not the free rider. Again, this shows that 
equating copyright with real property rights is inappropriate. As Canadian 
Supreme Court recognised,  
 
“(C)opyright law is neither tort law nor property law in classification, 
but is statutory law. It neither cuts across existing rights in property or 
conduct nor falls in between rights and obligations heretofore existing in 
the common law. Copyright legislation simply creates rights and 
obligations upon the terms and in the circumstances set out in the 
statute.”586  
 
 The more orthodox view then is that while copyright may be transacted 
broadly by analogy to property rights in tangible property, they are not real 
                                                 
585 H S Reeves, Property in Cyberspace, (1996) 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761, at p.785. 
586 Compo Co. Ltd. v. Blue Crest Music Inc., [1979] 45 C.P.R. (2d) 1, 13 (Sup. Ct. Canada). 
(Emphasis mine).  
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property rights, and should not be so treated under competition law.587 This view 
is clearly aligned with the intent of the Singapore Copyright Act, as seen by 
Section 194, which provides that “(s)ubject to this section, copyright shall be 
transmissible by assignment, by testamentary disposition, or by operation of law 
as personal or movable property”.588 Therefore, rather than seeking legitimacy 
through analogy with real property, commentators have sensibly argued that a 
independent regime be devised. 589   
 
B. Three Alternatives 
 
 If competition rules governing copyright based on equivalence to real 
property are inappropriate, three alternatives emerge. The first is the formalistic 
view taken by the Xerox Court: competition law will never interfere with the 
owner’s prerogative in refusing to license as long as its copyright had been legally 
obtained.590 Of the three thresholds for ‘abuse’, this is the highest. The second, 
diametric view gives the lowest threshold: competition law must scrutinize 
refusals. Copyright owners exert greater control over their work post-sale, and 
network effects buttressing their market power create a real likelihood of 
consumer harm. Holdings by the district court in Microsoft (US), and Kodak are 
consistent with this approach. The final view seeks a middle ground. Refusals are 
                                                 
587 W R Cornish and D Llewellyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and 
Allied Rights (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Edition, (2003) at p.5. (Arguing that intellectual 
property rights … are dealt with by broad analogy to property rights in tangible property”) 
(Emphasis mine) 
588 Emphasis mine. Similarly, Section 41(3) of the Singapore Patent Act (Cap 221, 2002 Rev. 
Edn.) provides: “Any patent or any such application or right shall vest by operation of law in the 
same way as any other personal property and may be vested by an assent of personal 
representatives.” (emphasis mine)  
589 M A Lemley, ‘Property, IP and Free Riding’, (2004) John M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics, Working Paper No. 291, at p. 56, available at: 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=582602 
590 Xerox, supra, n.2. See discussion in Chapter II, Part IV.A.2. 
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prima facie unobjectionable unless there is clear evidence of anticompetitive 
abuse unjustified by the copyright grant. This view is characterised by IMS Health 
and Microsoft (EU), seen from their requirement that complainants offer a ‘new 
product’ for which the owner has failed to meet consumer demand.    
 
1. Copyright Formalism 
 
 It has been argued that market power enjoyed by the dominant copyright 
owner stems from national copyright laws, rather than a manifestation of market 
superiority.591  This view finds some support in TRIPS, which acknowledges that 
compulsory licensing in the context of patents is a form of inference with property 
rights, and should be strictly limited.592 It follows that since copyright law 
expressly sanctions the owner’s refusal to license, any market distortions resulting 
from this exercise of copyright cannot then amount to an “abuse” under 
competition law as long as the copyright itself was properly obtained.593 
Advocates of copyright formalism argue that competition law interference 
threatens dynamic efficiency. Competition should be promoted through tweaking 
copyright law.594  
 
                                                 
591 J C Burling, et al, ‘The Antitrust Duty to Deal and Intellectual Property Rights’, (1999) 24 J. 
Corp. L. 527 at p.533;  
592 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Annex 1C. 33 ILM 81 40 
(1994). Article 31 lists 12 conditions for compulsory licensing of patents. Essentially, where the 
license is granted as relief to anticompetitive practices, a license may be granted on non-exclusive 
or non-assignable basis based on its factual merits. “Adequate remuneration” must be given, and 
both the sum and the licence’s validity are subject to judicial review. The owner is entitled to 
terminate the license “if circumstances change”.   
593 This is a more extreme view The traditional misuse doctrine would provide the only exception 
to this competition immunity for refusals to license IPRs. 
594 See discussion in Chapter I, Part III. Indeed, some have identified competition laws as being 
one of the 'culprits' behind deterioration in national competitiveness, and have called for its 
abolition.  L Thurow, ‘Let's Abolish the Antitrust Laws’, N.Y. Times, 19 October 1980, Section 
III, at 2, col. 3. 
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 Some of the most careful scholars have even suggested that in addition to 
being inviolable, copyrights should be perpetual.595 This view is pariah even 
under the broad and diverse goals of competition policy. Structuralist regulators 
will intervene as long as market power and concentration are higher than 
‘accepted levels’. The source or reason for this deviation is irrelevant.596 
Regulators concerned with static and dynamic efficiency also see no reason why 
copyright law itself should be sufficient to immunise its owner from allegations of 
abuse without any consideration of the harm caused to efficiency.597  
 
 Copyright formalism fails to make a real attempt to determine the proper 
balance between the social benefits that stem from the creation of copyright 
content and the social cost of monopoly. 598 In overlooking this, it fails to keep a 
proper utilitarian balance between stakeholder interests, and is inconsistent with 
the theoretical justification for copyright law.599 The right to recover investments 
and appropriate rewards should not be boundless, particularly in light of near 
negligible requirements for copyright grant under Singapore law.  
 
                                                 
595 W M Landes and R A Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, (2003) 70 U. Chi. L.Rev. 471, 
at p.475. (“All valuable resources, including copyrightable works, should be owned, in order to 
create incentives for their efficient exploitation and to avoid overuse.”) 
596 See discussion in Chapter III, Part II.  
597 See discussion in Chapter III, Parts III and IV respectively. 
598 See Chapter I, Part II; See F M Scherer and D Ross, Industrial Market Structure & Economic 
Performance, 3rd ed., (USA Rand Mcnally, 1990) at p.660 (Discussing how misallocation of 
resources is a social harm of monopoly power). 
599 W W Fisher III, ‘Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine’, (1988) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1659, at 
p.1687  (“[T]he elaborate combination of grants and reservations that comprise the Copyright Act 
is designed to advance the public welfare by rewarding creative intellectual effort sufficiently to 
encourage talented people to engage in it, while at the same time making the fruits of their genius 
accessible to as many people as possible as quickly and as cheaply as possible.”). 
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2. Copyright Altruism 
 
 Commentators like Fredrich Hayek have taken an opposite view. They 
would argue that there is a greater need to prevent abuses of market power in 
digital copyright than real property:    
 
“It seems to be beyond doubt that in these fields a slavish application of 
the concept of property as it has been developed for material things has 
done a great deal to foster the growth of monopoly and that here drastic 
reforms may be required if competition is to be made to work.”600 
 
  Taken together, the literature essentially advances two arguments. First, 
copyright owners will likely innovate even with lower access thresholds to their 
content. Hence, competitive markets may be achieved without sacrificing 
incentives inimical to the copyright grant. Second, copyright abuses harm 
consumers more than abuses of real property rights, and should therefore receive 
greater scrutiny.  
 
(1) No Link to Innovation 
 
 There is some consensus that a direct positive correlation exists between 
profits, R&D and innovation.601  The key question is how much reward is 
necessary to bring forward ‘enough’ innovation. According to Jessica Litman, the 
link between production and dissemination of copyright content and the degree of 
available copyright protection is equivocal. Citing Yahoo!, the second most 
popular Internet search engine as an example, she argued that the service 
                                                 
600 F A Hayek, ‘‘Free’ Enterprise and Competitive Order,’ in F A Hayek, Individualism and 
Economic Order (eds.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)  
601 OECD, supra, n.10, at p.1. 
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originated with a directory created by two Stanford graduate students who posted 
it on the University’s Web server without any primary goal for commercial 
domination.602 Indeed, she goes on to note that whenever an exception in 
copyright is discovered, a new technology grows up from it:  
 
“Conventional wisdom tells us that without incentives provided by 
copyright, entrepreneurs will refuse to invest in new technologies. 
History tells us that they do invest without paying attention to 
conventional wisdom. A variety of new technology flourished and 
became remunerative when people invested in producing and 
distributing them first, and sorted out how they were going to protect 
their intellectual property rights only after they had found their 
markets. By freeing content providers from well-established rules, a 
copyright shelter allows new players to enter the game. These entrants 
have no vested interest yet, and are therefore willing to take more risks 
in the hope of procuring one. They end up exploring different ways of 
charging for value.”603  
  
 Mark Lemley builds on this argument from the perspective of positive 
externalities. He argues that the idea that the law should find a way to compensate 
for these positive externalities seems “faintly preposterous”, since positive 
externalities are everywhere.604 If the marginal cost of benefiting from a use is 
zero, prohibiting that use imposes unnecessary social costs. In a market economy, 
the law only require producers to make enough to cover their costs, including a 
                                                 
602 J Litman, Digital Copyright, (New York: Prometheus Books, 2001), at p. 175. (Also arguing 
that “player piano rolls became ubiquitous after courts rules that they did not infringe the copyright 
in underlying musical compositions. The videotape rental business swept the nation shielded from 
copyright liability by the first sale doctrine.”)   
603 Ibid. 
604 M A Lemley, supra, n.20. Philip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp offer numerous examples of 
uncompensated positive externalities. They conclude that “free riding on the positive externalities 
created by others is everywhere, and society does little to eliminate it. P E Areeda et al, Antitrust 
Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Application, Vol IIA, ( Boston: Little Brown, 
1995) ¶1613b, at 153. See also W Gordon, ‘On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse’, (1992) 78 Va. L. Rev. 149, 167 (“A culture could not exist if all free 
riding were prohibited within it.”). 
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reasonable profit.605 Competition law should therefore preserve consumer surplus 
by favouring competition over copyright monopoly.606 
 
 These arguments, however, confuse information with innovation. 
Information is plentiful, and copyright laws are not directed towards increasing 
the quantity of information available. Instead, they are directed specifically toward 
developing new works based on information that would not be produced in the 
absence of exclusionary rights.607 Rare and valuable intangible works of 
expression accorded property rights are likely to be most efficiently allocated 
through free market mechanisms provided by copyright. The fact that copyright 
content, once created, is capable of being produced cheaply is not in itself 
evidence of the general incompatibility of markets with copyright. Rather, it is 
precisely because of market failure due to the ease of free riding that digital 
copyright is designed to correct. Pioneering innovators in digital markets will 
emerge only if there are sufficient incentives for them to invent. By undermining 
ex ante incentives to innovate, this paradoxically results in less useful information 
than compared to an outcome respecting copyright monopolies. In sum, a low 
threshold of compulsory access to inherently scarce copyright content would 
destroy the utilitarian balance upon which the market system is based.  
 
                                                 
605 D D Friedman, Law’s Order: What Economics Has to Do with Law and Why It Matters,   
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) at p.115 (“You will make something only if its value 
. . . is at least as great as the cost of making it.”). 
606 R H Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself , 2nd edn, (Basic Books: New 
York, 1993) (Describing consumer welfare as the only proper goal of antitrust law). Richard 
Posner, by contrast, argues that total welfare is the right measure for antitrust. R A Posner, 
Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective, 2nd  ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 
Posner’s approach seems right, but his total surplus measure is still consistent with the idea that 
consumer surplus is a good and not an evil to be rooted out. 
607 J Dratler, Jr., Intellectual Property Law: Commercial, Creative, and Industrial Property § 1.08 
(New York: Law Journal Press, 2003). 
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(2) Negative Interference 
 
 When a car is sold, property rights are transferred absolutely. In contrast, 
copyright owners retain certain rights in transacted property that interferes with 
the freedom of those wishing to ‘build on’ the copyrighted work even after the 
owner has been duly paid its asking price.608 A low threshold to copyright content 
is therefore necessary to counterbalance the owner’s residual control. 609 This is 
more so in digital markets. Technological progress is a multi-phased, interactive 
process, often involving lead innovations with the follow-on innovator making its 
own, cumulative contribution.610  
 
 These objections suggest that there is a structural problem within copyright 
law, rather than that competition law should set a ‘right’ threshold. In this case, 
the argument should be for endogenous reform within copyright law, rather than a 
harsher application of competition law. To interfere with copyright exploitation on 
a frequent basis may fundamentally undermine the certainty integral to promoting 
creativity.611 This means that the exercise of calibrating access should start at the 
                                                 
608 L Bently and B Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 
p.2. (“‘A’ purchases a book, thereby becoming the owner of the book and possesses legal title over 
it. She owns the paper, the cover and the printer’s ink which are physical embodiments of the 
book. However, the text is protected by copyright as a literary work, and remains with the 
publisher or author of the book. ‘A’ can do certain things, such as reading the book, selling it, or 
even destroying it. Yet she cannot make a copy of the book or translate it into a foreign language 
because these acts are controlled by copyright.”) 
609 S C Salop and R C Romaine, ‘Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and 
Microsoft’, (1999) 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 617 at p.664. (“[A] market is driven more by innovation 
than price competition, then entrants also must have an open environment to challenge the 
monopoly. An overly permissive antitrust regime may reduce aggregate innovation, as innovation 
by entrants by potential new entrants and small competitors is reduced by more than innovation by 
the monopolist increases.”) 
610 See discussion in Chapter I, Part II.D.2.  
611 A Narciso, ‘IMS Health or the Question Whether Intellectual Property Still Deserves a Specific 
Approach in a Free Market Economy’ (2003) IPQ., 4, 445-468 
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real property rights, and adjusted upwards due to the ease of misappropriation by 
free riders without reaching the level under copyright formalism.  
 
3. Copyright Compromise 
 
 The final view of copyright seeks a compromise between the polar 
extremes of formalism and altruism. On one hand, it recognises that copyright 
deserves more deference from competition law because unlike real property, it is 
only available if eligibility requirements are overcome, and they are only 
available for a limited time.612 To apply competition rules requiring reasonable 
access during this period may likely erode the strength of the monopoly right that 
induced the owner to provide its content in the first place.613 It recognises that a 
low threshold will make it easier and less costly for rivals and other complainants 
to accuse the owner of abusing its copyright. This will in turn reduce the owner’s 
incentive to risk often enormous investments in time and R&D capital to offer 
and develop their products.  Consequently, access to copyright content should be 
granted on much narrower grounds than the granting of access to tangible goods. 
However, where exploitation causes negative externalities or harms competition 
in markets where no protection is warranted, courts may be infer that the 
copyright was used for an ulterior motive. This view is predominant in the US. 614   
 
                                                 
612 Although with the continued extension of copyright duration, the latter justification seems 
weak.  
613 C Stothers, ‘The End of Exclusivity? Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights in the E.U.’, (2002) 
24 EIPR 86 at p.91. 
614 According to Robert Pitofsky, “A cautious approach is called [for the application of antitrust 
laws to high-tech industries]. But abandoning antitrust principles in this growing and increasingly 
important sector of the economy seems like the wrong direction to go.” R Pitofsky, ‘Challenges of 
the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property’, available at 
http:// www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/000615speech.htm; Image Tech. Services, Inc v. Eastman 
Kodak Co. [1997] 125 F.3d 1195, 2 Trade Cases P 71,908 (Kodak III), supra, n.2 at 1211. 
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 A copyright compromise offers the most principled approach under the 
PRA, and provides a critical understanding of the proprietary nature of copyright. 
However, in its present state, the PRA only offers vague range of a ‘correct’ 
balance that lies between the chasm of formalism and altruism. Neither case law 
nor independent economic analysis has articulated workable quantitative or 
qualitative criteria to calibrate correctly the incentives to induce an optimal 
amount of innovation. What the PRA has done, however, is to provide a 
foundation for those adopting the SSMA to attempt to calibrate the scope of 
copyright, and for those applying the CBA to attempt to measure the socio-
economic costs and benefits of the owner’s refusal.  
 
III. THE SPECIFIC SUBJECT MATTER APPROACH 
 
 The SSMA is perhaps most famously attributed to Volvo v. Veng, where 
ECJ held “the right of a proprietor of a protected design to prevent third parties 
from manufacturing and selling or importing, without its consent, products 
incorporating the design constitutes the very subject-matter of his exclusive 
right.”615 Similarly, in the US case of Townshend v. Rockwell, it was held that: 
 
“Any party who has secured proprietary rights to such technology 
possesses the legal right to exclude others from practicing technology 
which has been protected. The adoption of an industry standard 
incorporating such proprietary technology does not confer any power 
to exclude that exceeds the exclusionary power to which a patent 
holder is otherwise logically … entitled.”616    
                                                 
615 [1988] ECR 6211, at 6235. (Emphasis mine) 
616 Townshend v. Rockwell, [2001] Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,890, at para.12. (Emphasis mine) The 
earliest application of theories emphasising the scope of protection in IP is found in US patent 
misuse cases: e.g. International Salt Co. v. US [1947] 332 US 392 (“the possession of a valid 
patent does not give the patentee any exemption from the provisions of the Sherman Act beyond 
the limits of the patent monopoly.’). (Emphasis mine) 
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 Developing on the PRA, the SSMA rests on the concept that copyright 
grant includes certain rights within its scope similar to a fee simple grant. Under 
the SSMA, when anticompetitive abuse is alleged, courts will refer to the statutory 
scope of the particular IPR according to its scope, length, and subject matter to 
determine its permissible impact on the competitive process. In doing so, it 
recognises that the complex rules balancing access and incentives cannot be 
satisfactorily fashioned from the vagaries of competition litigation alone.617 There 
are two primary strengths to the SSMA. First, by calibrating access based on pre-
existing copyright rules, it provides a principled approach easily understood by 
practitioners. Second, the SSMA gives explicit recognition to national obligations 
under IP conventions and treaties.618   
 
A. Calibrating Competition Remedies under Copyright Rules 
 
 The SSMA calibrates access to copyright content under competition law 
according to specific potential for copyright abuse to harm consumer welfare. 
Competition law is circumscribed because copyright limits the duration of 
protection and allows non-literal infringements to balance the potential conflict 
between imitation and innovation. While owners can use their copyright to oppose 
                                                 
617 W R Cornish and D Llewellyn, supra, n.18 at p.18. (Arguing that “judges cannot, or should not 
work out the implications of statutory directives for themselves.”) 
618 The most important international influence on the development of copyright has been the Berne 
Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Signatory states are obligated to 
provide minimum standards of protection to copyright owners and authors. Of these, the right to 
reproduce the work (Article 9) and the moral rights (Article 6bis) of attribution and integrity are 
most important to refusals to license. In recognition of the public need to be able to use works 
without payment, there is limited scope for Member States to create exceptions. In relation to the 
reproduction right, these exceptions must satisfy the ‘three-step test’: (1) all exceptions must be 
limited to special cases (2) not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work (3) not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. (Article 13) Compulsory licenses are 
allowed, but these must be de minimis. (Article 10.2) (use by way of illustration in publications for 
teaching) and Article 10bis (use for reporting current events). 
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imitations, it is illegal to extend that exclusive right outside its pre-defined scope. 
This provides a principled approach, since each type of IPR calls for a different 
balance of public and private interests. 619 It accepts that the extent competition 
law may intervene depends on the nature of the IPR. For example, in Microsoft 
(EU), the CFI recognised that the EFD affects IPRs to different degrees. In the 
case of patents and copyrights, they expedite the process of being able to replicate 
the IP in the time and effort required respectively. However, because the value of 
trade secrets lies in its secrecy, the EFD has the potential for great harm in 
requiring even parts to be disclosed and be used.620 Accordingly, the threshold for 
access was higher in the latter case. 
 
 The SSMA also goes some way to reconciling seemingly inconsistent 
approaches. It will be remembered in Kodak and Xerox arrived at diametric 
outcomes on similar facts.621 Under SSMA, it could be explained by the fact that 
in Xerox, unlike in Kodak, the defendant was competing with the complainant in 
the primary market, and were infringing its IPRs. Since primary market rivals 
threaten the utilitarian dues of the owner, refusals to license are justified even 
where the owner is unable to meet market demand fully.622 Consequently the 
‘pretextual’ inquiry is irrelevant, since the need to protect innovations covering 
those parts fell within the owner’s SSM and were justified the per se refusal.  
 
                                                 
619 W A W Neilson, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law and Policy: Attempts in 
Canada and Japan to Achieve Reconciliation’, (2002) Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review Vol 1 405. 
620 Microsoft (EU), supra, n.1 
621 Chapter II, Part IV.  
622 P Samuelson et al, ‘A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs’ 
(1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 2308, at p.2418.  
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 Similarly, in Volvo, the complaint concerned design rights over spare 
parts. Refusing the license independent dealers was justified in order to protect the 
subject matter of the owner’s rights, since Volvo’s ability to exploit the spare parts 
market was the only practical manifestation of its design rights.623 In contrast, in 
Magill, an extended form of copyright not similarly found in other Member States 
protected information in the form of television listings.624 Commentators have 
noted that there was a general reticence to upset the idea-expression dichotomy, 
allowing later creators to build on the ideas of those who had shared and been 
duly rewarded for their contribution to society’s intellectual storehouse.625 In 
response, the European courts at each level held that refusal to grant access to the 
listings was an abuse of the dominance gained through ownership of copyright in 
the listings. Thus, the subject matter immune to the interference of competition 
law is a fluid concept whose scope shrinks proportionate to the amount of 
mischief it may cause to rivals in the same market or some later point of 
production. Yet, there are good reasons counselling against liberal application of 
the SSMA.  
   
 First, closer scrutiny reveals that the conceptual certainty offered by the 
SSMA may be a thin one. The law’s ability to calibrate copyright may have 
improved since the seminal case of Donaldson v. Beckett nearly 300 years ago.626 
However, it has yet to indicate conclusively where the line between private and 
                                                 
623 Volvo, supra, n.46.  ([A]n obligation imposed upon the proprietor of a protected design to grant 
to third parties, even in return for a reasonable royalty, a licence for the supply of products 
incorporating the design would lead to the proprietor thereof being deprived of the substance of his 
exclusive right, and . . . refusal to grant such a licence cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position.") at  6235. 
624 RTE v. Commission (Magill) [1995] ECR I-743.   
625 I Forrester, ‘EC Competition Law as a Limitation on the Use of IP Rights in Europe: Is there a 
Reason to Panic?’, Eighth Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, The Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 6-7 June 2003 
626 [1774] 2 Bro. PC 129, 4 Burr. 2408 
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public rights should be drawn. Rather, cases seem to suggest that there is no single 
correct answer.627 In the network economy, it is often difficult to identify primary 
and secondary markets due to the interdependency of companies and the tendency 
to for simultaneous competition in several markets. Market segmentation should 
therefore be less of an issue. Instead, the key question is whether the owner 
controls an asset that unjustifiably prevents rivals from making the same 
integrative function. A further distinction should be made between copyright that 
protects the core of the technology and those ancillary to it. Clearly, the owner’s 
right to exclude others is greater in the former than the latter. This factor was 
considered relevant by the appeals court in Microsoft (US), when it considered the 
quality of the combined functionality compared to individual sale of the parts.628   
 
 Even if each relevant market consistent to the scope of the subject matter 
could be accurately delineated, the intrigue only develops further. Competition 
law has never exempted primary market exercise of copyright from competition 
law scrutiny.629 In Volvo, the Court held that a refusal to license could under 
certain circumstances, constitute an abuse of a dominant position, although such 
conditions were not present in the instant action. 630 Thus understood, the SSMA 
does not guarantee immunity even within the protected subject matter of 
copyright, but merely functions as a starting point for the analysis.  
 
 Second, if copyright over digital interfaces is less worthy of protection 
than patents over similar subject matter, it is not clear what rules of identification 
                                                 
627 Chapter I, Part III.   
628 Microsoft, supra, n. 1 at para 348. 
629 C Bellamy and G Child, European Community Law of Competition, PM Roth ed, 5th edn  
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) at p.644.  
630 Volvo, supra, n.46. at 136. 
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operate to distinguish them. The problem is further complicated by the fact that 
the SSMA needs to take into account other means by which copyright owners 
enforce their rights. The stronger the ability to prevent access, thus preserving 
market power, the lower the threshold for access should be. Shrink-wrap 
contractual agreements and technological protection measures discussed in 
Chapter I all become relevant in this calibration, and act to lower access 
thresholds. However, awareness of their relevance is wholly different from being 
able to weigh to their significance. Ultimately, the concept of “scope of copyright” 
is an arbitrary one. While using copyright’s scope is conceptually certain, the 
point at which the line is drawn within or between markets remains uncertain.631 
Even within the supposedly immutable scope, courts in the EU and US have been 
unwilling to grant owners a carte blanche. This missing step in the SSMA makes 
it hard – perhaps even impossible – to ever calibrate access properly.632 
 
B. The International Dimension of the Interface 
 
 Digital copyright is sanctioned under national law and international 
treaties. Under the SSMA, competition law would be only allowed to interfere in 
the limited circumstances set out in them. Indeed, defendants in EU cases have 
pleaded compulsory licensing under Article 82 would breach the EU’s obligations 
under the Berne Convention and TRIPS.  
                                                 
631 J B Kobak, Jr., ‘Antitrust Treatment of Refusals to License Intellectual Property’, (1999) 566 
PLI/Pat 517 at 534; (Arguing that the specific subject matter approach does not respond 
satisfactorily where the practice is within the scope of the intellectual property right but also has an 
impact on secondary markets. This may happen where compatibility is denied, or fragmentation of 
a standard results.); W J Bowman Jr., Patent and Antitrust law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal 
(University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1973), at pp.8-9. (Discussing the problem of distinguishing 
lawful output restrictions from unlawful restrictions merely on the basis of the patent grant.)  
632 M J Radin, ‘Regime Change in Intellectual Property: Superseding the Law of the State With the 
“Law” of the Firm’  Working paper 2004 (On file with author). 
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 In Magill, the defendants argued that copyright went beyond the right to 
attribution and appropriability. The compulsory licensing order would eviscerate 
the owner’s right of exclusive reproduction and moral rights, thereby conflicting 
with the normal exploitation of copyright in the programme listings and seriously 
prejudice its legitimate interests required under Berne.633 In Microsoft (EU), 
Microsoft raised Berne as a shield, this time under three heads. 634 First, Microsoft 
argued that compulsory licensing deprived it of exclusive control over access to its 
communication protocols.635 Second, access would result in parasitic and 
therefore infringing work.636 Regrettably, these arguments were never directly 
dealt with. Neither the CFI nor the ECJ bothered to address the effect of Berne in 
Magill, simply stating the EU was not a party to Berne, and therefore was not 
bound by it in applying Article 82.637 The CFI in Microsoft (EU) held the plea was 
not “expanded in such a way that the President can make a proper ruling on it”.638  
 
 However, the issue remains a live one, particularly for Singapore. Concern 
for international comity is evinced by Section 48 of the Singapore Competition 
Act 2004, which exempts conduct falling within the Third Schedule from being 
                                                 
633 Magill, supra, n.55 at paras. 41 and 72.  
634 Microsoft(EU), supra n.2. Specifically, the European Court of First Instance had to consider 
whether granting compulsory licenses of Microsoft’s communication protocols in its operating 
system would violate the EU’s obligations under Articles 13, 31 and 39 of TRIPS (ibid, at 
paragraph 160), its obligations under the Berne Convention, as well as the preamble and Article 
1(1) of the EC Directive on Computer Programs 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 (OJ 1991 L 122, p. 
42).   
635 Ibid, at 119. (“The Commission cannot therefore recognise that the specifications for 
Microsoft's communications protocols are protected by copyright and at the same time maintain 
that the requirement imposed on Microsoft by the Decision to license those specifications does not 
infringe the very substance of that right.”) 
636 Microsoft(EU), ibid, at 120. (“That exclusive right to authorise the creation of derivative works 
is infringed, since the implementation of the specifications for Microsoft's communications 
protocols by its competitors would almost certainly be an adaptation, or a translation, of those 
specifications which would fall within the ambit of copyright and could therefore not be regarded 
as a work developed independently.”) 
637 Magill, supra, n.55 at 73. 
638 Microsoft(EU), supra, n.2 at 210.   
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subject to scrutiny under Section 47. Of particular interest are Sections 3(4)639 and 
4(4)640 that allow the Minister to exercise his discretion to exempt where conflicts 
with international obligations and public policy arise. Further, given the 
permeability of international trade, national courts will be anxious not to order 
compulsory access where this clearly derogates from national obligations, 
knowing that a quid pro quo may lie in the not too distant future for its own 
undertakings doing business abroad. Even if both undertakings are local, the fact 
that they are dominant and in the very portable business of digital rights means 
that disgruntled undertakings can easily seek friendlier shores elsewhere to the 
detriment of the local economy.   
 
 The difficulty lies in determining the boundaries of ‘fair’ competition and 
the qualifications necessary to balance the rights and interest of copyright owners 
on one hand, and users and the public on the other hand.641 This is consistent with 
the utilitarian justifications for copyright. While Berne is largely silent on the 
issue of anticompetitive abuse, TRIPS merely acknowledges the problem of 
balancing IP with competition policy and avoids setting specific standards to 
govern the Interface.642 The general principle underlying TRIPS is that members 
may adopt measures necessary to promote the “public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological development”, including 
                                                 
639 See Annex A. It is also worth noting that Sections 3(5) and 4(5) allows the Minister to 
immunise conduct otherwise falling under section 47 ab initio, though the reasons for this and its 
implications are not immediately clear. 
640 See Annex A.  
641 Article 7 expresses this need: “The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.” 
642 For example, the preamble of TRIPS recognises “the need to promote effective and adequate 
protection of IP rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce IP rights do not 
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.” H Ullrich, ‘TRIPS: Adequate Competition, 
Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition Policy’, (1995) 4 Pac. Rim. L & Poly. J. 153 at 155.    
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those needed to “prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders.” 643 This is consistent with the dynamic efficiency goals of competition 
policy. Significantly, these measures must be “consistent with the provisions” of 
TRIPS. Exceptions or limitations are allowed only in “certain cases which do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the right holder.”644   
 
 There is no worldwide consensus on the parameters of what constitutes an 
‘abuse’ under national law.645 TRIPS contains more specific provisions that flesh 
out the concept of “abuse”.646 Members may adopt legislation to “prevent or 
control” licensing practices “which constitute an abuse of intellectual property 
rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.”647  In the 
context of patents, this may include “limited exceptions to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent” that “do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties”.648  
The detailed nature of these “exceptions” establishes a dual regime for assessing 
compulsory patent licensing practices. On one hand, it distinguishes between 
compulsory licenses granted to remedy anticompetitive practices, and all other 
practices on the other.649 These exceptions suggest that instances where IPR 
                                                 
643 Ibid, Article 8.  
644 Ibid, Article 13.  
645 H Hovenkamp et al, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual 
Property (New York: Aspen Law, 2003) at §40.2c2. 
646 It may be suggested that consistent with the principle of harmonious interpretation, Article 8 
should be understood as “essentially a policy statement that explains the rationales taken under 
Articles 30, 31 and 40” rather than a basis of broad exceptions from the TRIPS minimum 
substantive standards. Prima facie, it is clear that tension between the broad language of Article 8 
and the focused language of Article 40(2) should be resolved in favour of the former.   
647 Supra, n.23.  
648 Ibid, Article 30.  
649 Thus, in Singapore, the Patents Act provides for licences of right where demand for a patented 
product are not met; the working or efficient working of another patented product which makes a 
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owners are found to abuse their rights should be specific, well-defined and 
exceptional. While it provides for several conditions that apply to grant of 
compulsory patent licenses, it does not assist in establishing any useful 
understanding of when such licenses should be granted. The fluid language in 
TRIPS thus establishes a relatively unconstrained regime that would allow WTO 
members to enact broad abuse measures and claim substantial compliance with 
TRIPS obligations.650 
  
 Recognition of international obligations makes the SSMA conceptually 
desirable. However, it provides little real benefit to parties in terms of certainty or 
applicability. Assuming that some clear direction could be teased out of the 
ambiguous wording in TRIPS or Berne, competition law will not excuse the 
defendant’s conduct because of a possible, even likely breach of international 
obligations. Private parties have no locus standi to enforce international 
obligations. 651 As contract law teaches, only the parties to the agreement may 
complain of breach of its terms.652 Just as the proper charge is failure for the 
signatory state to give effect to its obligations under the instrument, the proper 
complainant is another signatory state to the relevant international tribunal. As the 
                                                                                                                                      
substantial contribution to the art is prevented or hindered; the establishment or development of 
commercial or industrial commercial activities prejudiced or by reason of conditions imposed by 
the proprietor of the patent on the grant of license under the patent or the use or disposal of the 
product; or where industrial activities in Singapore are unfairly prejudiced. See supra, n.11. 
650 In particular, Article 8(2) explicitly provides for restricting abuse of IP rights that “restrain or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology. Ibid.  R H Marschall, ‘Note, Patents, 
Antitrust, and the WTO/ GATT: Using TRIPS as a vehicle for Antitrust Harmonisation’, (1997) 28 
Law & Poly. Intl. Bus. 1165. (Arguing that Article 8(2) leaves so much room for departure from 
more specific provisions like Article 31’s limitations on compulsory licensing as to be 
unworkable); J H Reichmann, (1997) 29 NYU J. Intl. L. & Pol. 11 at 52-58. (Discussing ways in 
which TRIPS leaves “wiggle room” for aggressive national approaches to antitrust regulation of IP 
rights) 
651 Lenzing AG’s European Patent (UK) [1997] RPC 245. W R Cornish and D Llewellyn, supra, 
n.18 at 11-37. (“(TRIPS) does not furnish grounds which can be raised in the course of private 
litigation… judges, in other words, are not to be furnished with any general tool for criticising the 
scope of legislation.”) 
652 G H Treitel, Treitel on the Law of Contract, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003). 
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US-Singapore FTA clearly shows, the trend is on for TRIPS-plus rights, 
particularly as collateral for other trade concessions. Strong copyright promote 
market confidence and attract direct foreign investments.653  Further emphasis on 
the SSMA alone would only serve to put competition law further at odds with 
copyright law in member states.  
 
 Perhaps more fundamentally, the SSMA does not accurately reflect 
commercial reality. By giving due regard to the full scope of the statutory rights 
granted by copyright law, it may overcompensate owners, since they receive more 
than required to induce innovation under the utilitarian balance. Few copyright 
owners calculate more than a few years in planning the exploitation of their 
rights.654 Certainly, there can be no justification for perpetual market power, 
however great the innovation, if only because time distant returns have relatively 
little effect on present investment incentives. The quest for a ‘specific subject 
matter’ has therefore been criticised as being inconsistent with the competition 
law framework of analysis. 655 The SSMA differs from an analysis under 
Singapore competition law, which turns exclusively on consumer welfare-driven 
goals.656 Indeed, while some commentators argue for stronger regulation and 
others for little or no regulation by competition authorities, they all agree that a 
more thorough economic treatment of the interface is needed.657 If competition 
                                                 
653 See Chapter I, p. XX.  
654 J Litman, supra, n. 33 at p.19. 
655 I Govaere, The Use and Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights in EC Law (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell. 1996)  
656 V Balakrishnan, Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 19 October 2004   
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/reports/public/hansard/title/20041019/20041019_S0004_T0006.htm
l (“Market competition spurs firms to be more efficient, innovative, and responsive to consumer 
needs.  Consumers would enjoy more choices, lower prices, and better products and services.”)   
657 D Ravicher and S Dilldoff, ‘Antitrust Scrutiny of Intellectual Property Exploitation: It Just 
Don't Make No Kind of Sense’ (2003) 8 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 83, S Semeraro, ‘Regulating 
Information Platforms: The Convergence To Antitrust’ (2002) 1 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 
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law is to promote commercial certainty, then it needs to move beyond the SSMA 
towards justifying non-interference, and explicitly take into account economic 
analysis inimical to competition law.  
 
IV. THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS APPROACH 
 
 The CBA offers perhaps the most sophisticated means of determining 
whether compulsory licensing is appropriate under competition law. Firmly rooted 
in economic theory, it eschews the simplistic PRA and vagueness of the SSMA. 
On one hand, it balances the cost and benefits of copyright exploitation. On the 
other, it takes into account the utilitarian bargain in copyright policy and dynamic 
efficiency considerations of competition policy.658 The Guidelines hint that the 
CBA will be the approach Singapore will embrace:   
 
“While there is no provision for exemptions under the section 47 
prohibition, the CCS will adopt an approach known as objective 
justification. The CCS will take into account both the anticompetitive 
and any countervailing benefits when assessing the effects of a 
particular conduct. When the dominant undertaking can show that the 
conduct leads to improvements in economic efficiency and the benefits 
could not be achieved without producing such anti-competitive effects, 
the CCS will not find abuse. However, any restriction of competition 
would need to be proportionate to the benefits produced.”659  
  
                                                                                                                                      
143; Michael A. Carrier, ‘Resolving the patent-antitrust paradox through tripartite innovation’, 
[2003] 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1047, E Beister III, ‘Ground rules and hot topics in antitrust and 
intellectual property’ (2004) JUN N.J. Law. 18, A M Wolman and D Balto, ‘Intellectual Property 
and Antitrust: General principles’ (2003) 43 IDEA 395 
658 In economic terms, the private value of information goods is the difference between the revenue 
generated and the costs incurred. This is weighed against the costs and benefits to competitors and 
consumers F Machlup, ‘An Economic Review of the Patent System’, Study No. 15 Subcommittee 
of the Judiciary of the US Senate  (Washington, 1958) at 57-58.  
659 Competition Commission of Singapore (CCS) Draft Guidelines on the Section 47 Prohibition 




 Similar approaches are taken under in US under the label of a ‘rule of 
reason’ approach,660 while in the EU it is considered as an objective 
justification.661 The CBA has gained popularity amongst courts and regulators. It 
is increasingly used to support the claim that policymakers have established the 
utilitarian balance.662 Essentially, within the limits of the scope and duration of 
rights granted, the copyright owner should be able to maximise its profits 
unrestricted in order to make the most efficient use of right to achieve the greatest 
social benefit. At the core of the CBA, lie two elements. First, developing on the 
PRA and SSMA, the court essentially attempts to measure the externalities of 
exercising the copyright beyond its subject matter. Second, it applies economic 
analysis to select practices that it believes best balance copyright and competition 
goals.      
       
A. Balancing the Figures: Missing the Point? 
 
 CBA approves refusals to license as long as the benefit of doing so 
exceeds the costs incurred. The intuition is that it is in society’s interest to 
maximise any incentive or creative output, as long as it exceeds its social value.663 
This is appealing from the perspective of copyright policy. The analysis is 
identical: whether the proprietary rights conferred to the private creator over 
                                                 
660 Kodak III, supra, n. 48.   
661 R C Lind and Paul Muysert, ‘The European Commission’s Draft Technology Transfer Block 
Exemption Regulation and Guidelines: A Significant Departure form Accepted Competition Policy 
Principles’, [2004] 4 ECLR 181 at 185.  (“The Commission’s staff made it very clear that their 
preferred method of applying EU competition law … would be to weigh the competitive gains that 
would weaken or eliminate IP protection … against the potential costs that this weakening of the 
IP rights would engender by reducing  investment incentives”) (Emphasis mine) 
662 Standard Oil v. United States, [1911] 221 US 1; United States v. Aluminium Co. of America, 
[1945] 148 F 2d 416 (2 Cir) 
663 Social costs are typically identified as losses imposed through higher prices, reduced output and 
slowing down of innovation F M Scherer, supra, n.29, at pp.450-454.   
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information achieves greater socio-economic benefits when considered against the 
wider public interest.664 However, placing normative weights on the cost and 
benefits of copyright exploitation has three critical drawbacks.  
 
 First, the only requirement for access is that costs to society are greater 
than the benefit to the owner. This eschews the notion of ‘copyright immutability’ 
based on the SSMA, and in doing so, may unwittingly sanction a form of 
‘copyright communism’. Thus under the CBA, judges may order compulsory 
licensing even where rivals seek only competition by imitation, and even where 
the product is already being provided for by the copyright owner, since no there is 
no obligation to consider these factors decisive in themselves. It is an extreme 
view; but not an improbable one - and is of very contemporary vintage.665 Of 
course, the corollary is true: if the benefits exceed the costs, then even if the 
copyright owner exercises its rights in a way that exceeds the statutory grant under 
copyright law, or if copyright law continues its untrammelled conferment of 
strong rights so that the extent exercise nonetheless remains within its scope, the 
refusal will be inviolable. Danger of either is particularly real in digital markets 
where product design and copyrights are interwoven in a complex net of costs and 
                                                 
664 S Ricketson, ‘New Wine into Old Bottle: Technological Change and Intellectual Property 
Rights’, [1992] Prometheus Vol. 10 No. 1, at p.61. This approach also prohibits practices that 
distort resource allocation in areas not covered by copyright, and it has also gained currency with 
classical Chicago theorists. N. Gallini and M. Trebilcock, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and 
Competition Policy: A Framework for the Analysis of Economic and Legal Issues’, in R Anderson 
and N Gallini (eds), Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based 
Economy (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1998) 
665 J Drexl, ‘IMS Health and Trinko- Antitrust Placebo for Consumers Instead of Sound 
Economics in Refusal-to-Deal Cases’ (2004) IIC Vol. 35 788 at p.797 (Advocating access to IMS 
Health’s database because “being aware of the lock-in effect, does not have to fear that a superior 
method of collecting data will enter the market” (at p. 804) and Verizon’s telecommunications 
facilities because “no one would seriously expect high quality telecommunications service from 
such a monopolistic structure.”)  
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benefits, and judicial deference is most likely.666  
 
 Second, have courts been largely unsuccessful in developing a workable 
mechanism to determine if the refusal was justified. In cases involving leveraging 
allegation, this failure is particularly pronounced. 667Given that the court has 
successfully identified monopoly power in the upstream market, and diminution 
of competition downstream, it is faced with the difficult task of proving a causal 
link between the two findings. Economic theory is clear that there is no reason 
why a monopolist of one product would want to monopolise its own 
complementary product, since it cannot benefit from a monopoly profit. Consumer 
exploitation is unlikely, since the copyright owner only has captive customers in 
the short run. The owner who exploits its monopoly over the downstream market 
will find himself without many customers of his upstream equipment in the next 
period. Costs to the owner’s reputation would likely deter exploitative behaviour, 
since it would be unlikely to have any customers, and would make new entry 
attractive. There is also no need to worry about the loss of efficiency from 
destruction of more efficient secondary market sellers. If they were more efficient, 
the owner would simply contract with them rather than replace them. Even if the 
owner may succeed in locking consumers into the downstream market, if it does 
not also offer a competitive upstream market product, it will lose market share at 
both levels. Apple was recently reported to refuse rivals of downstream portable 
                                                 
666 In Microsoft (US),supra n.2,  the District of Columbia Circuit Court declined to find Microsoft 
liable for tying its Internet browser to its Windows operating system, pointing out that since courts 
have limited competence in evaluating high technology product designs, they should be “wary of 
second-guessing the claimed benefits of a particular design decision”. 
667 R C. Lind and P Muysert, supra, n 92 at p. 185. (“However, what became clear in our 
discussion with the Commission was that, in assessing the incentive effects, the Commission have 
already succumbed to the aforementioned bias and were giving little or no weight in their analysis 
to the long-run incentive effects upon future new product development and commercialisation.”) 
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media players access to interface information needed to download music from its 
upstream music server. However, alternative music formats such as .MP3 and 
.WMA were quickly made available and music devices have begun to be 
developed for such formats.668 Self-correcting and durable monopolies must 
therefore be distinguished from inefficient ones, and competition regulation 
confined to the latter.  
 
 Third, the CBA focuses on promoting ex ante competition at the expense 
of ex post competition. In Aspen Skiing, the dispute was over the division of 
monopoly profits.669 Jointly, rivals and the owner monopolised skiing in Aspen, 
and whether the defendant, who needed the sharing agreement less because it 
could offer more variety to skiers than the plaintiffs got two-third, or nine-tenths 
of the profits the agreement was irrelevant so far as the price and output of skiing 
were concerned.670 Thus compulsory access to essential facilities merely allows 
rivals to share the dominant position enjoyed by the owner rather than protecting 
the public, and amounts to little more than a duty to divide monopoly profits. It is 
simple enough to state that the EFD should not be invoked in situations where 
mandating access would not address a competitive problem or would produce 
harmful results. If the essential facility is a unique input, the economic effects of 
mandated access may be positive but are extremely difficult to determine, and 
such a determination certainly is beyond the capability of the courts. 
 
                                                 
668T Smith, ‘Digital music download coin-op to offer 'all formats, all DRMs’, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/19/inspired_music_vending     
669 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., [1985] 472 U.S. 585, 605 n. 32, 105 S.Ct. 
2847, 86 L.Ed.2d 467 
670 D W Carlton, ‘A General Analysis of Refusal to Deal- Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided’ 
NBER Working Paper No. W8105 available at:   
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=258504 
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B. Regulating Abuse or Picking Winners? 
 
 The CBA provides a useful guide for courts to choose the permutation of 
refusals to license which least restrict competition. Competition law responds to 
fears that private ordering might unduly encroach on intellectual commons for 
independent innovation or that it might transform the process of appropriating 
knowledge into actual control of markets.671 The major goal here is to safeguard 
the incentive and reward rationales of copyright protection while at the same time 
controlling the risks of an undue extension of legal monopoly. 672  As a theory, the 
CBA is unassailable on this point; the problem lies in its useful dissection by 
economists, and application by judges.  
 
1.  The Problem with Economic Theory 
  
 Judges need a theory to help decipher the facts, yet the law cannot settle on 
one. They may rely on neoclassical microeconomics to explain common practices 
such as cartels and mergers, but this is not where the action is in interface 
litigation. Forces that induce litigants to settle ensure that cases that are more 
problematic dominate litigation, and usually come to court before there is any 
clear economic theory. This lacuna is exacerbated for three reasons.  
 
                                                 
671 M D Janis, 'Minimal Standards for the Patent/Antitrust Interface under TRIPS, in International 
Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004) 
672 In the economic behaviour of parties other than the rights holder- the hall mark of the utilitarian 
justification in IP law. W F Baxter, ‘Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: 
An Economic Analysis’ (1996) 76 Yale Law Journal 267, at p.355.  
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 First, information needed to apply competition rules are given by self-
interested parties. There are few competent experts, and almost all of them are 
employed by, or have other financial ties to firms involved in, or will be 
potentially affected by the litigation. Few competition regulators employ computer 
scientists or info-communications experts, and most are wholly dependent on 
economic and legal consultants. It is difficult to find a consultant who is both 
competent and disinterested. The more technical the area of litigation, the fewer 
disinterested experts there will be. It is therefore less likely to work. To learn 
anything valuable about digital markets, economists must collect facts, formulate 
hypothesis about the effects that are likely if the conduct is abusive, use data to 
search for these effects and present the results to the scholarly community for 
critique and refinement or disproof.673 Any competent economist can construct a 
model showing refusals to license harms consumer welfare under limited 
assumptions. Whether this holds is an empirical question that must be proved by 
data, if such data is available at all.674 Parties do not collect data to test conflicting 
hypotheses about the conduct. Even assuming this data exists, the results are not 
‘truth’ but merely possibilities that refusals are harmful or otherwise.675 The 
consequences of awarding damages whenever bad decisions hurt investors would 
be frightening. Businesses often rely on financial incentives to encourage 
managers to make the best use of knowledge and weed out those who, despite 
their best efforts, cannot do as well as others. Because judges do not profit from 
making astute business decisions, and are not fired for making bad ones, it is hard 
                                                 
673 F H. Easterbrook, ‘Ignorance and Antitrust’, in Antitrust, Innovation and Competitiveness 
(Thomas M. Jorde and David Teece, eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at p.122. 
674 R H Coase, How should Economics choose? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) 
(Observing that theories often run ahead of data.) 
675 F H Easterbrook, supra, n. 103 at pp. 119-120. 
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to see why they should be allowed to make them under the guise of competition 
law.  
 
 Second, economics may often not be able to give a clear and definite 
answer on what will happen in a market, much less what it should. To the extent 
judges make economic decisions in antitrust cases; they are predicting the 
tomorrow’s effects of today’s practices. This is problematic under the best of 
circumstances. Economists start from existing practices and try to explain why 
refusals are anticompetitive. Even if they all agree with the effects, they may 
disagree about the impending effects under changed circumstances. Competition 
law theories are built on assumptions that do not cover all real world situations. 
When assumptions change, the outcomes of the models may look strikingly 
different. Social scientists use their models to improve the state of human 
understanding. Judges acting on these models impose fines and forbid conduct 
that may well be beneficial. The two are different businesses, not so easy to justify 
based on arguments made in litigation, however plausible they may seem. For 
example, different copyright markets require different levels of appropriability. 
This complicates the economic models set forth. The more sophisticated theories 
require courts to make distinctions among business practices that are difficult to 
make in a consistent manner and with a high degree of accuracy.676 Whatever the 
arbitrary scope of rights conferred, there may be insufficient inducements to 
investment in R&D. Just as weak rights deter innovators of primary inventions, 
too strong rights penalise the incentives to derivative R&D. The copyright owner 
of digital standard may not be under competitive pressure to improve the 
                                                 
676 K N Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) at p. 189.  
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technology. One possible solution conclusion is to grant wide copyright for a very 
short time, or narrow copyright forever.677 However, this raises the empirical 
difficulty of determining what ‘long’ or ‘short’ mean. Another example is the 
theory on foreclosure in digital markets. Recent work refutes claims that 
innovation in digital markets will be stifled if third parties are not allowed to build 
on owner’s content.678 These studies suggest that whatever market power most 
IPRs provide is often eliminated by subsequent innovations or imitations. As 
Schumpeter suggested, innovations that develop the next generation of products 
represents the most important dimension of competition.679 Economic theories 
positing the costs of refusals to license may therefore overestimate its impact. 
Digital copyright markets may be far more resilient than this view believes.680 
 
 However these effects may balance out, a legal standard that attempts to 
identify cases where the inducement of monopoly reward is necessary to stimulate 
innovation appears highly problematic. It is difficult to prove the link between 
monopolistic returns justified by copyright from eliminating rivals as an essential 
                                                 
677 Much of the literature is cited and summarized in N Gallini and M Trebilcock, supra, n. 95.   
678 In one study covering the electrical and chemical industries, Edwin Mansfield found that 
competitors managed to imitate 60% of all patented inventions within four years of their 
introduction. Another recent study of the former West German patent system found that 65 -95 % 
of patent owners did not file for renewals for the maximum number of years. In fact, the study 
found that most innovations became obsolete fairly quickly, within two to seven years. E 
Mansfield et al, ‘Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study’, (1981) Economic Journal Vol. 
91 No. 364 pp.18-28. 
679 P Beutel, ‘The Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Economics: A Schumpeterian 
View’, in L Wu, ed, Economics of Antitrust: New Issues, Questions, and Insights, (New York: 
NERA Economic Consultants, 2004) 
680 Salop and Romaine have argued that liability standards should not be more permissive in high-
technology industries. These economists state that when: “[A] market is driven more by innovation 
than price competition, then entrants also must have an open environment to challenge the 
monopoly. An overly permissive competition regime may reduce aggregate innovation, as 
innovation by entrants by potential new entrants and small competitors is reduced by more than 
innovation by the monopolist increases.” R. C Romaine and S C Salop, ‘Slap Their Wrist? Tie 
their Hands? Slice Them Into Pieces? Alternative Remedies for Monopolization in the Microsoft 
Case’, (1999) 13 Antitrust 15, at pp.17-18  
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inducement for innovation.681 Even if so justified, it may be asked how much 
market power is justified and over what time period. Finally, at what point, if ever, 
are rivals to have access such that competition can allow consumers to share more 
fully in the gain? Translation from economic theory to legal rules must reduce the 
costs of error and information, balancing the welfare losses from inefficient 
business conduct on one hand with the welfare losses from efficient business 
conduct condemned by legal rules and overall costs of operating the legal system 
for such inquiries. To be useful, economic analysis must do more than establish 
possibilities. It must establish the probability that the refusal subverts market 
competition. 682 
  
2.  Judicial Limitations  
 
 Judges often deal with technical questions through technical experts 
presenting evidence, which the judge is then expected to assimilate into his legal 
analysis. In this regard, Richard Posner, a leading figure in the law and economics 
movement makes a significant admission: digital markets involve computer 
science and info-communications technology, and are considerably more difficult 
for judges to understand than the average body of scientific or engineering 
knowledge. 683 Similarly, the concern over limited judicial competence in 
                                                 
681 J F Brodley, ‘Post-Chicago Economics and Workable Legal Policy’ (1995) 63 Antitrust LJ 683 
682 R A Cass and K A Hylton, ‘Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and 
Microsoft’ in D S Evans (ed.), Microsoft, Antitrust and the New Economy: Selected Essays, 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) at p.433. 
683 R A Posner, “Antitrust in the New Economy” (2003) John M. Olin Law & Economics Working 
Paper No. 106. 
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assimilating economic theory necessary in competition analysis was echoed 
during the Parliamentary debate.684 
 
 Generally, courts prefer rules instead of complicated balancing tests. 
Judges do not hesitate to create rules of general application, but quail at the 
though of examining business decisions. For example, courts hearing professional 
negligence suits adopt custom rules shielding defendants from liability as long as 
he has complied with the custom of his profession.685 Similarly, in regulating the 
relationships within and outside the company, company law has generally 
preferred to leave shareholders and directors to decide the proper boundaries of 
their own activity.686 If a director breaches his duties towards the company, 
statutory action brought to remedy the breach based “unfair prejudice” is judged 
based on the company’s constitution, and not what the judge may think is “unfair” 
generally. Similarly, courts look to breaches of procedure in fixing errant directors 
with liability, rather than questioning the business sensibility of a decision that 
results in harm to the company. These rules represent a recognition that erroneous 
decisions would result more frequently if judges defined the appropriate balance 
of conduct in each case. 
                                                 
684   Sin B A , Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 19 October 2004   
http://www.parliament.gov.sg/reports/public/hansard/title/20041019/20041019_S0004_T0006.htm
l (“This raises a fundamental question as to whether the courts are indeed best qualified to 
undertake such determinations.  Judges are essentially lawyers who are trained in the analysis and 
application of the law.  They are neither economists nor financial experts who would readily 
comprehend the intricacies of the market place operations.  Questions on the meaning of a word 
within the Bill on competition would require a thorough analysis on not only the plain import of 
the word, but also the impact that the decision would have against the wider economy and society.  
Are judges, therefore, technically trained to undertake such technical analysis and review?  Of 
course, it may be said that to overcome this limitation, judges may have the services of an amicus 
curiae or Friend of the Court in coming to a decision.  This does not however, leave one with the 
ideal position of having the best qualified person for the job.”) (Emphasis mine) 
685 W V H Roger, Winfield and Jolowicz on Torts,( London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002)  
686 P Davis, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law, 6th Edn, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2003)  
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 Similarly in digital markets, Courts should not second guess market results 
which could be examples of the incumbent’s superior skill, foresight and industry. 
Institutional error and error costs are closely related.  In cases involving refusals to 
license, the competitive superiority of a rival product may be difficult to ascertain 
during proceedings.687 Balancing the costs and benefits of an exclusionary 
conduct that also has efficiency considerations may well go beyond the capacity 
of the courts.688 If the practice is employed widely in industries that resemble the 
copyright owner’s but are competitive, there should be a presumption that the 
owner is entitled to use it as well. Its widespread use implies that it has significant 
economising properties, which implies that to forbid the owner to use it will drive 
up his costs and optimum monopoly price. The burden should be on the 
complainant to show that forbidding the use of the practice will, by increasing the 
rate of new entry, completely offset the effect of prohibiting the owner’s 
conduct.689  Just as Parliament did not intend judges to review business records to 
determine the reasonableness of prices, they surely do not intend for courts to 
interfere with output decisions as to whether or not to license.690 As the Supreme 
Court in Trinko noted, to do otherwise would force courts to emulate public utility 
                                                 
687 J A Ordover, ‘Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting Industrial and 
Intellectual Property’ (1985) 53 Antitrust L.J. 503. 
688 D Geradin, ‘Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the EC Treaty: What can the EU learn from the 
US Supreme Court’s Judgement in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, IMS and Deustche Telekom?’ 
(2005) SSRN, at 3. (“While granting access to ‘essential facilities’ will stimulate competition in a 
secondary market (thereby contributing to allocative efficiency), it risks reducing the incentives for 
essential facility holders to invest. This issue also raises questions about the proper role of 
competition authorities and courts. Mandatory access involves complex price-related questions for 
which these institutions seem poorly equipped.”) 
689 R A Posner, Antitrust Law , 2nd Edn, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), at p.254.  
690 B Sher, ‘The Last of Steam-Powered Trains: Modernising Article 82, [2004] 5 ECLR 243 at 
246. (“An overly intrusive approach to refusal to supply can require the Commission, the national 
competition authority and the national courts to assume a price regulatory role for which they are 
neither trained nor equipped.”) 
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regulators, which push judges beyond their areas of competence and the 
boundaries of authority under the competition laws.691 
 
 Error is nothing new to courts, and a realistic view must accept that it will 
occur. However, recognition of the potential for error requires a consideration of 
the relative costs of false convictions and false acquittals. When the conduct 
underlying refusals to license is procompetitive, lowering costs and prices in the 
long-run, the costs of false convictions can be large.692 Over-deterrence in a 
particular case may have a spillover effect in the whole industry so that potential 
entrants or competitors also may be discouraged from committing resources to 
innovation. If those rewards are taken away, innovation will likely decline, and in 
the long-run consumers will suffer.693 Regulatory actions that affect the returns of 
investors in a few successful companies can have a dramatic impact on the 
willingness of investors to fund similar companies in future.694 The theory of 
                                                 
691 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Cutris V. Trinko, [2004] LLP 540 US 682. at p. 
879. (Declining to adopt the role of “central planners” in deciding access pricing issues since “ 
[e]ffective remediation of violations of regulatory sharing requirements will ordinarily require 
continuing supervision of a highly detailed decree.”.) See also R A Cass and K A Hylton, 
‘Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft’ in D S Evans (ed.), 
Microsoft, Antitrust and the New Economy: Selected Essays, (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2002) at p.445. (“Generally, antitrust courts have been reluctant to conduct … cost 
benefit balancing… because it pushes judges beyond their area of competence and requires courts 
to take on some of the functions of public utility regulators.”) 
692 S C Salop and R C Romaine, ‘Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and 
Microsoft’, (1999) 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 617 (Stating that Microsoft "may determine the course of 
computer software industry for the next ten or twenty years"); A F Pérez, ‘DOJ's 'New' 
Competition Paradigm Resurrects Outdated Economics’, (WLF Legal Backgrounder, Feb. 4, 
2000). (Arguing that given that the cost for the computer industry of a wrong decision by the 
judiciary in the Microsoft case is likely to be high, the DOJ should have never brought the 
Microsoft case without additional policy guidance from the legislative branch.). 
693 F H Easterbrook, ‘Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies’, (1981) 48 U.Chi.L.Rev.268. 
(Arguing that judicial scrutiny of new products for their possible predatory consequences may, 
according to some antitrust experts, stifle incentives for R&D investments in new and improved 
products and processes.) 
694 J Lerner, ‘The Returns to Investment in Innovative Activities: An Overview and an Analysis of 
the Software Industry’, in David S. Evans (ed.), Microsoft, Antitrust and the New Economy: 
Selected Essays, (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) at p. 479. (Citing the example of 
Comsat, whose stock prices fell by half in the year of antitrust intervention, leading to little new 
private investment in space-related industries.).  
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selecting winners provides no answers to this dilemma, only recognising that the 
connection between reward and incentive is complicated.695 Because economists 
and courts do not fully understand the innovation process, they are unlikely to be 




 A unified approach to regulating refusals to license should build on the 
evolutionary trend from the PRA to the SSMA and finally on the CBA. A starting 
point to developing this approach would be to refine the CBA by more explicitly 
taking into account the proprietary nature of digital copyright and the scope of 
those rights conferred by copyright law. This would give courts a better idea how 
to calibrate the normative weights in defining costs and benefits. Once this is 
done, adopting an economic analysis in competition law is inevitable, given its 
goals in dynamic efficiency.  
 
 Here, courts can draw on the accumulated wisdom of the economic 
profession. Judges can examine theories, models, arguments, and studies 
subjected to through the years to professional testing by other economists. They 
should be mindful that even when built on this base, rules might be flawed. The 
danger is that courts may take an over-simplistic view of digital markets, where 
the environment is too unpredictable for this kind of presumption. If the size of 
                                                 
695 D F Turner, ‘The Patent System and Competitive Policy” (1969) 44 New York University Law 
Review, 450, at 459 (“One can rarely, if ever, calculate with any degree of precision the ultimate 
commercial value that will be gained.”)  
696 M M Burtis and B H Kobayashi, ‘Why an Original Can Be Better than a Copy: Intellectual 
Property, the Antitrust Refusal to Deal, and ISO Antitrust Litigation’, (2001) 9 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 
143 at p.158. 
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the potential future market is big enough, there would be no real limitation of 
output and the only outcome would be that some participants would get bigger 
rewards than others would. However, getting a ‘right’ outcome from economic 
theory is much more likely than if courts start from scratch and attempt to 
determine this under the vacuous open-ended standards of Section 47.  
 
 












I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS   
 
 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time 
 
      T S Eliot697 
 
 
 A significant proportion of attempts to formulate a theory at the interface 
between IP and competition law have been misdirected or incomplete due to a 
misunderstanding of legal or economic issues.698 It might, be unfair, however, to 
hold those involved responsible, as if they were somehow lackadaisical or 
incompetent. The fault may lie with the Interface itself for demanding the 
acquisition of an unusually high standard of cross-disciplinary competence with 
the speed with which digital copyright markets have evolved. Few judges and 
regulators have the time or opportunity to do this. The central purpose of this 
dissertation was therefore to highlight key errors at the Interface while acquainting 
readers with sufficient expertise in unfamiliar areas to rectify them.  
 
 The extent of protection given by copyright law to digital works varies 
across the jurisdictions studied. However, all the jurisdictions share two 
characteristics. First, there is a singular upward trend toward stronger rights at the 
expense of copyright’s utilitarian justification. Second, no measure at present 
seems capable of addressing anticompetitive abuses by copyright owners 
endogenously within the copyright regime. This may have caused copyright 
abuses to fall within the purview of competition law.  
                                                 
697 Little Gidding. These last four lines of Eliot’s verse spell the way to try an antitrust case, 
according to Joe Klein, Chief of the US Department of Justice during the Microsoft case. See J 
Heilemann, Pride Before the Fall: The Trials of Bill Gates and the End of the Microsoft Era, 
(Harper Collins: New York, 2001) at p. 191.  
698 See generally, discussion in Chapters II, III and IV.  
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 ‘Anticompetitive abuse’ is an arbitrary concept made more uncertain by 
broad textured legislation. The flexibility offered to those interpreting key terms 
that determine liability, have sometimes caused a divergence in approaches based 
on the particular economic goal and legal analytical framework chosen. From a 
legal perspective, judicial and regulatory decisions may fail to appreciate the 
nature of the grant under copyright law and tend to over or under-compensate the 
owner at the expense of encouraging further creative works. From an economic 
perspective, they may give insufficient attention to gains from dynamic efficiency. 
When they do, they may apply economic theory without appreciating its 
limitations, particularly with regard to network effects.      
 
 Fig.15 illustrates a simplified model showing the balancing process courts 
and regulators adopt in determining whether refusals to license amount to an 
anticompetitive abuse. The vertical and horizontal axes represent the owner’s and 
public’s interests699 respectively. The 100% point on the thicker downward 
sloping line indicates the interest of the owner to exploit its copyright. It may be 
observed that the corollary to the owner’s 100% interest is that the public’s 
interest is 0%. There is no justification for requiring the owner to license. The line 
representing the owner’s interest slopes downwards as its right to exploitation 
decreases until the 0% market where it hits the horizontal axis. Here, public 
interest is 100%, and is supreme. Here, the owner is prima facie obliged to 
license, since he has no defensible interest.  Between these polar extremes is an 
arbitrary point, X, where the two graphs intersect. At X, competition law is 
indifferent between requiring the owner to license and allowing the owner to 
                                                 
699 ‘Public interest’ collectively represents the multifarious goals of competition law, which have 
been discussed in detail in Chapter III. These include the interest to protect competition, 
competitors and consumers.   
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refuse to license. Non-economists will doubtlessly object to this obvious fiction, 
since in reality courts must decide one way or the other. However, economic 
theory recognises the importance of such ‘pivot points’ to determine which way a 
given case should be decided.  
 
  
Fig.16 tabulates every relevant factor discussed in this dissertation that influences 
the relative position of X when an owner refuses to license. Some factors support 
the owner’s interests at the expense of the public’s interest. These factors may 
cause the relative position of X to shift to the right, as illustrated in Fig.17. In this 
situation, it is unlikely that courts will be justified in finding the copyright owner 
liable for anticompetitive abuse. Conversely, other facts support the public’s 
interests to access rather than the owner’s interests in refusing to license. X 
















Fig. 15 This is a graphical representation of how cases involving refusals to deal are 
decided. It may be seen that at any point between the graphs to the left of ‘X’, the owner’s 
interest is normatively higher the public’s interest, as shown by the relative position of the 
two curves. Therefore it may be argued that there should be no ‘abuse’ under competition 
law for refusing to license its copyright. The opposite is true of any point to the right of 
‘X,’ since here the public’s interest exceeds the owner’s. The challenge for those 
administering competition law is to base a finding that ‘X’ has been crossed on sound legal 




therefore shifts to the left. As Fig.18 shows, the copyright owner will be unlikely 




Chapter  Factor 
 
Effect on 
“Owner’s Interest”  
Effect on  
“Public’s Interest” 
Net Effect on  
Position of ‘X’ 
Remarks 
I Theoretical Justifications for 
Copyright  
NA700 NA NA  
 Labour Theory Justification + - Right  Need to reward labour; minimal 
intervention as long as sufficient 
unprotected material for later 
authors  
 Utilitarian Justification Indeterminate Indeterminate Indeterminate Depends on extent court feels that 
balance has been upset  
 Right and Rise of Copyright 
(Trade/ Piracy) 
- +  Left Need to correct utilitarian balance  
 The Price of Copyright 
(Patent rights via copyright/ 
Retarding innovation) 
- +  Left Need to correct utilitarian balance 
 Insufficiency of Internal 
Regulation  
NA NA NA  
 Idea-Expression Dichotomy  Indeterminate Indeterminate Indeterminate Depends on how fair dealing, 
anticircumvention and reverse 
engineering provisions are 
interpreted  
 Copyright Misuse  NA NA NA Not adopted into Singapore law, 
but holds potentially the best 
means of endogenous regulation 
 Compulsory Licensing  - + Left Narrowly circumscribed situations 
make it an ineffectual remedy 
                                                 
700 The effect is indicated as “NA” or “not applicable” as the factor plays no role by itself.  
 217 
 
II Dominance   NA NA NA  
 Primacy of Static Indicators - + Left  Moderate to severe intervention 
 Primacy of Dynamic Indicators + - Right  Generally, minimal intervention, 
but depends on view of network 
effects 
 Abuse     
 Leveraging (Kodak rules) Indeterminate Indeterminate Indeterminate Depends on view of business 
justification and owner’s subjective 
intent  
 Leveraging (Xerox rules) + - Right  Minimal intervention post grant 
 Essential Facilities Doctrine 
(Horizontal Access) 
+ - Left Minimal intervention within 
primary market  
 Essential Facilities Doctrine 
(Vertical Access) 
- + Left  Moderate to severe intervention 
within secondary market 
III Structuralist Approach  - + Left  Severe intervention  
 Static Efficiency Approach  - +  Left Moderate intervention  
 Dynamic Efficiency 
Approach  
+ - Right  Generally, minimal intervention, 
but depends on view of network 
effects  
IV Property Rights Approach NA NA NA  
 Copyright Formalism + -  Right  Minimal intervention post grant  
 Copyright Altruism  -  + Left  Moderate to severe intervention 
post grant  
 Copyright Compromise Likely + Likely - Likely Right Intervention depends on criteria  
 Specific Subject Matter 
Approach 
Likely + Likely - Likely Right Intervention depends on ‘scope’ of 
right determined  
 Cost Benefit Approach  Indeterminate Indeterminate Indeterminate Intervention depends on 
competition chosen policy goal/s  
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Fig. 17: This graph illustrates the situation where the owner is likely to be justified in 
refusing to license. The area showing ‘no abuse’ is significantly larger than the area 





















Fig. 18: This graph illustrates the situation where the owner is unlikely to be justified in 
refusing to license. This time, the area showing ‘no abuse’ is significantly smaller than the 





   II. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 The complex rules governing refusals to license may reflect insufficient 
attention given to developing clear and sound first principles. There is a need to 
focus on simple rules rather than a complicated and cumbersome attempt to 
balance sector specific economics, copyright and competition policy from scratch 
in every case. A new approach that gives clearer guidance on high technology 
competition is urgently needed. In a world where IP serves as one of the sources 
of greatest value, a finely tuned competition policy is more important than ever 
before. This dissertation therefore makes four key recommendations in the digital 
context.  
 
 First, a conscious effort should be made to exploit the open-textured 
wording of Section 47 to develop Interface rules that reflect sector-specific 
characteristics that are responsive to changes in the economic theory underpinning 
them. Open-ended legal standards have the virtue of flexibility, but at the expense 
of quixotic results.701 Competition policy proceeding on highly stylised, static, 
and inaccurate views of competition creates a high risk of policy error. Digital 
markets differ markedly from traditional ones involving the production and 
distribution of physical goods. Traditional industries are characterised by limited 
economies of scale at plant and firm level, stable markets, heavy capital 
investment, modest rates of innovation and infrequent entry and exit. In contrast, 
digital markets are characterised by falling average costs, relatively modest capital 
requirements, high rates of innovation, frequent entry and exit, and network 
externalities. Authorities need to be conscious that the standard of ‘healthy’ 
                                                 
701 Chapter II, Part II.A.   
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competition used to determine ‘dominance’ and ‘abuse’ under Section 47 reflect 
these realities. ‘Dominance’ should reflect dynamic entry conditions rather than 
static price margins or market shares.702 Allegations of ‘abuse’ from leveraging 
effects turning upon unrealistic market definitions or formalistic conditions not 
reflecting the utilitarian copyright bargain should be avoided.703 ‘Essential 
facility’ cases should be restricted to secondary market relationships and must be 
sensitive to the copyright’s interests, the benefits of vertical integration, and the 
need for defensive leveraging.704 The US Supreme Court in Trinko was exactly 
right in cautioning against excessive reliance on antitrust rules to mandate 
dominant players to assist their competitors by giving them access to essential 
inputs. Although granting access often provides greater competition at the 
downstream level, it will also likely have a negative impact on copyright 
incentives. 
 
 Second, regulation of digital copyright markets should be directed 
primarily by dynamic efficiency considerations. Concerns about preserving SMEs 
reflect pious socio-political aspirations based on inconclusive evidence, rather 
than more readily identifiable economic targets.705 Similarly, focusing on price 
and output gains of static efficiency neglects the greater benefits which 
technological progress brings. Any failure of market discipline on prices and 
output is only temporary. A long-run view of competition has brought greater 
consumer welfare gains as they enjoy products and services unlikely to be offered 
without the certainty of appropriation by IP owners and control over access to 
                                                 
702 Chapter II, Part III.A.  
703 Chapter II, Part IV.B 
704 Chapter II, Part IV.C 
705 Chapter III, Part II. 
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their content.706 Competition law should rarely find it necessary to intervene 
where consumers are ‘locked-into’ inferior digital products due to path 
dependency. Digital markets are highly dynamic and ‘locked-in’ consumers often 
end up that way deliberately because these products are functionally better,707 or 
offer positive network externalities that offset any deficiencies in function.708 
Dominant copyright owners foolish enough to exploit its installed base may 
significantly lower switching costs, resulting in an exodus of its customers to rival 
technologies. Allegations by rivals or regulators who claim that the copyright 
owner has harmed competition or consumers in the abstract without proof of 
consumer harm should be stoutly rejected.     
 
 Third, a ‘unified’ legal framework incorporating elements of the Property 
Rights Approach, Specific Subject Matter Approach and Cost Benefit Approach 
should be the starting point in analysing refusals to license. While some analogies 
may be drawn between copyright and real property rights, they are fundamentally 
different.709 Digital copyright, in particular is susceptible to free riding, and 
owners should be more justified in refusing access.710 The extent of this 
justification turns on the scope of the copyright grant. By explicitly taking into 
account the owner’s statutory rights, analysis will be more principled and 
conceptually certain.711 Further, while private parties have no locus standi to 
enforce international obligations, being cognizant of them allows courts to respect 
                                                 
706 Chapter III, Part III. 
707 Chapter III, Part IV. 
708 For example, use of the Microsoft Windows OS is a significantly higher than the Apple OS 
even though there is a general consensus that Apple’s product is technically superior because of 
the far greater number of applications written for Windows.  
709 Chapter IV, Part II.A. 
710 Chapter IV, Part II.B. 
711 Chapter IV, Part III.A.  
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national commitments and gain respect of other states in turn.712 Finally, analysis 
should include an express weighing of the socio-economic costs and benefits in 
the refusal. It may be that economic theory at the Interface does not enjoy 
universal consensus and has inherent limitations.713 Judges may also have limited 
competence attempting the complex balancing process.714 However, it would be 
nothing less than a miscarriage of justice, if courts or regulators simply aborted 
the only form of analysis which would bring them closer toward getting it exactly 
right.  
 
 Fourth and finally, copyright law should strive toward eventual 
independence from regulation by competition law. In its quest to promote national 
competitiveness and protect owners against free riding, copyright law gives 
digital content owners more expansive rights in than other copyright works.715 
While copyright may have preserved the owner’s interests to compensation, it has 
done so at the expense of the utilitarian balance protecting the public’s right to 
access. The present set of exceptions and limitations within copyright laws, 
including those in Singapore, fail to provide an effective check against 
anticompetitive abuses.716 If applied properly, competition law should exist 
complementarily with copyright law, and may provide some temporary relief.717 
However, like any other form of colonial rule, regulation under Section 47 will be 
unlikely to be able to incorporate fully the nuances in copyright policy the same 
way that copyright law can. A long-term solution may therefore lie in more 
                                                 
712 Chapter IV, Part III.B. 
713 Chapter IV, Part IV.A. 
714 Chapter IV, Part IV.B.  
715 Chapter I, Part II. 
716 Chapter I, Part III. 
717 Chapter I, Part IV. 
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generously interpreting the fair dealing provisions, developing the copyright 
misuse doctrine, or expanding compulsory licensing to include anticompetitive 
abuses similar to those found in the Patent Act.718 Any future debate on the extent 
of copyright protection in developing endogenous rules should explicitly take into 
account both the welfare of both copyright users and copyright owners.  
 
III. A FINAL WORD 
 
 As technology continues to permeate deeper into our lives, courts and 
regulators will increasingly be called upon to analyse allegations of abuse by 
undertakings in digital markets refusing access to copyright content. The essence 
of litigation in the end consist may less in legal doctrine, economic theory or the 
facts of each particular case than in presumptions about how markets and 
businesses behave and about what these presumptions are trying to prove. Courts 
are ill placed to second guess market outcomes, and rivals should be encouraged 
to independently innovate and develop new and better copyright content rather 
than relying on compulsory access as a crutch to compete. This does not mean that 
access should never be given. Caution must be exercised and proper weight given 
to the impact of mandatory access on investment decisions. Understanding of 
economic and business behaviour must be improved if competition policy is to 
avoid becoming a source of economic inefficiency itself. The creativity that 
Prometheus represents should never be bound by legal or economic dogma. C S 
Lewis sums this up by noting that: 
 
                                                 
718 Chapter I, Part III.C. 
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 “We all want progress. But progress means getting nearer to the place 
where you want to be. And if you have taken a wrong turning, then to 
go forward does not get you any nearer. If you are on the wrong road, 
progress means doing an about turn and walking back to the right 
road; and in that case the man who turns back soonest is the most 
progressive man.”719     
 
 
 How the Interface develops in Singapore will have a substantial bearing on 
her national economy. Interface litigation is high risk and high delay litigation. 
The pace of litigation is often slower than market developments. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that in these markets, the period from complaint to trial is 
often far longer than the life cycle of an average product. As Frank Easterbrook 
rightly noted, countries with legal systems able to deliver quick, sound and 
binding answers to tough questions like these will take the baton.720  
 
 Eventually, the best solution to this seemingly intractable problem may 
well be found where it all started: within copyright itself. In its haste to extend 
copyright to digital works without carefully considering counterbalances, 
copyright law has only itself to blame for its inability to maintain the utilitarian 
balance. It may be appropriate to redesign copyright law so that basic proprietary, 
economic and moral rights are secured at the core, while leaving a level of 
flexibility at the margins that reflects the aims and needs of individual 
technologies.721 Copyright law enjoys an important advantage over competition 
law in deciding when to allow or prevent open access to a platform standard 
                                                 
719 C S Lewis, Mere Christianity, (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1980), at p. 28. 
720 F H Easterbrook, ‘Ignorance and Antitrust’ in T M Jorde and D J Teece, Antitrust, Innovation 
and Competitiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) at p.119. 
721 Burton Ong noted: “Copyright Law can approach the problem of an anti-competitive refusal to 
license from a number of angles. These include tinkering with the rules on the eligibility of the 
subject-matter for copyright protection, the nature and scope of the copyright owner's exclusive 
rights, and the availability of compulsory licences to would-be competitors of the copyright 
owner.” B Ong, supra, n. 83, at pp.505-514.  
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because it operates only as a check on private conduct, not as an affirmative 
regulatory regime that imposes access obligations.  
 
 Whether or not this independence is achieved, the interface between 
competition law and digital copyright in the decades ahead will be a dynamic one: 
just as competition law shapes the boundaries of permissible copyright 
exploitation, copyright law will also refine competition law’s understanding of its 
own nuances. The process of competition between the regimes, as each strives to 
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Section 47 (1) Subject to section 48, any conduct on the part of one or more 
undertakings which amounts to the abuse of a dominant position in 
any market in Singapore is prohibited.  
(2)   For the purposes of subsection (1), conduct may, in particular, 
constitute such an abuse if it consists in —  
(a) predatory behaviour towards competitors;  
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers;  
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; or  
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by 
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their 
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of the contracts.  
(3)   In this section, “dominant position” means a dominant position within 
Singapore or elsewhere. 
Third Schedule, 
Section 3(4) 
If the Minister is satisfied that, in order to avoid a conflict between the 
provisions of Part III and an international obligation of Singapore, it would 
be appropriate for the section 47 prohibition not to apply in particular 
circumstances, he may by order provide for it not to apply in such 
circumstances as may be specified. 
Third Schedule, 
Section 4(4) 
If the Minister is satisfied that there are exceptional and compelling reasons 
of public policy why the section 47 prohibition ought not to apply in 
particular circumstances, he may by order provide for it not to apply in such 




Section 25   (1) In the case of a copyright of which (whether as a result of a partial 
assignment or otherwise) different persons are the owners in respect of its 
application to —  
(a) the doing of different acts or classes of acts; or  
(b) the doing of one or more acts or classes of acts in different countries or 
at different times,  
the owner of the copyright, for any purpose of this Act, shall be deemed to 
be the person who is the owner of the copyright in respect of its application 
to the doing of the particular act or class of acts, or to the doing of the 
particular act or class of acts in the particular country or at the particular 
time, as the case may be, that is relevant to that purpose, and a reference in 
this Act to the prospective owner of a future copyright of which different 
persons are the prospective owners shall have a corresponding meaning.  
(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1), where under any provision of this 
Act a question arises whether an article of any description has been 
imported or sold, or otherwise dealt with, without the licence of the owner 
of any copyright, the owner of the copyright, for the purpose of determining 
that question, shall be taken to be the person entitled to the copyright in 
respect of its application to the making of articles of that description in the 
country into which the article was imported, or, as the case may be, in 
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which it was sold or otherwise dealt with. 
Section 33  (1) The copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is 
infringed by a person who, in Singapore, and without the licence of the 
owner of the copyright —  
(a) sells, lets for hire, or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire, 
an article; or  
(b) by way of trade exhibits an article in public,  
where he knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the making of the article 
constituted an infringement of the copyright or, in the case of an imported 
article, the making of the article was carried out without the consent of the 
owner of the copyright. 
Section 35 (1)   Subject to this section, a fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical 
or artistic work, or with an adaptation of a literary, dramatic or musical 
work, for any purpose other than a purpose referred to in section 36 or 37 
shall not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the work.  
(1A)   The purposes for which a dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work, or with an adaptation of a literary, dramatic or musical work, 
may constitute a fair dealing under subsection (1) shall include research and 
study.  
(2) For the purposes of this Act, the matters to which regard shall be had, in 
determining whether a dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic 
work or with an adaptation of a literary, dramatic or musical work, being a 
dealing by way of copying the whole or a part of the work or adaptation, 
constitutes a fair dealing with the work or adaptation for any purpose other 
than a purpose referred to in section 36 or 37 shall include —  
(a) the purpose and character of the dealing, including whether such dealing 
is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;  
(b) the nature of the work or adaptation;  
(c) the amount and substantiality of the part copied taken in relation to the 
whole work or adaptation;  
(d) the effect of the dealing upon the potential market for, or value of, the 
work or adaptation; and  
(e) the possibility of obtaining the work or adaptation within a reasonable 
time at an ordinary commercial price.  
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), a dealing with a literary, dramatic or 
musical work, or with an adaptation of such a work, being a dealing by way 
of the copying, for the purposes of research or study —  
(a) if the work or adaptation comprises an article in a periodical publication, 
of the whole or a part of that work or adaptation; or  
(b) in any other case, of not more than a reasonable portion of the work or 
adaptation,  
shall be taken to be a fair dealing with that work or adaptation for the 
purpose of research or study.  
(4) Subsection (3) shall not apply to a dealing by way of the copying of the 
whole or a part of an article in a periodical publication if another article in 
that publication, being an article dealing with a different subject-matter, is 
also copied.  
(5) (Deleted by Act 6/98)  
Section 39A (1)   Subject to subsection (2), the copyright in a literary work, being a 
computer program expressed in a low level language, is not infringed by a 
lawful user of the computer program decompiling it if —  
(a) it is necessary to decompile the computer program to achieve 
the objective of obtaining the information necessary to create an 
independent computer program which can be operated with the 
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computer program decompiled or with another computer program 
(referred to in this section as the permitted objective); and  
(b) the information so obtained is not used for any purpose other 
than the permitted objective.  
(2)   Subsection (1) shall not apply if the lawful user —  
(a) has readily available to him the information necessary to achieve 
the permitted objective;  
(b) does not confine the decompiling to such acts as are necessary 
to achieve the permitted objective;  
(c) supplies the information obtained by the decompiling to any 
person to whom it is not necessary to supply the information in 
order to achieve the permitted objective; or  
(d) uses the information —  
(i) to create a computer program which is substantially 
similar in its expression to the computer program 
decompiled; or  
(ii) to do any act restricted by copyright.  
(3)   Where an act is permitted under this section —  
(a) it shall be irrelevant whether or not there exists any term or 
condition in an agreement which purports to prohibit or restrict the 
act; and  
(b) any such term or condition shall, in so far as it purports to 
prohibit or restrict the act, be void.  
(4)   For the avoidance of doubt, this section is without prejudice to the 
generality of section 35 and does not limit the operation of that section.  
(5)   For the purposes of this section and sections 39B and 39C, a person is a 
lawful user of a computer program if he has a right to use the computer 
program, whether under a licence to do any act restricted by the copyright in 
the computer program or otherwise.  
(6)   In this section, “decompiling”, in relation to a computer program 
expressed in a low level language, means —  
(a) converting the computer program into a version expressed in a 
higher level language; or  
(b) incidentally in the course of so converting the computer 
program, copying the computer program,  
and “decompile” shall be construed accordingly. 
Sections 39B (1)   The copyright in a literary work, being a computer program, is not 
infringed by a lawful user of the computer program observing, studying or 
testing the functioning of the computer program in order to determine the 
ideas and principles which underlie any element of the computer program, if 
he does so while performing any of the acts of loading, displaying, running, 
transmitting or storing the computer program which he is entitled to do.  
(2)   Where an act is permitted under this section —  
(a) it shall be irrelevant whether or not there exists any term or 
condition in an agreement which purports to prohibit or restrict the 
act; and  
(b) any such term or condition shall, in so far as it purports to 
prohibit or restrict the act, be void.  
(3)   For the avoidance of doubt, this section is without prejudice to the 
generality of section 35 and does not limit the operation of that section. 
Sections 39C (1)   Subject to subsection (3), the copyright in a literary work, being a 
computer program, is not infringed by a lawful user of the computer 
program copying or adapting the computer program, if such copying or 
adapting is necessary for his lawful use.  
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(2)   For the avoidance of doubt, it may be necessary for the lawful use of a 
computer program to copy or adapt the computer program for the purpose 
of correcting errors in the computer program.  
(3)   Subsection (1) shall not apply to any copying or adapting permitted 
under section 39 or 39A.   
Patents Act 1995  
Section 55 (1) At any time after the expiration of 3 years from the date of the grant of a 
patent or 4 years from the date of filing of the patent application, whichever 
is the later, any person interested may apply to the court for the grant of a 
licence under the patent upon any of the grounds specified in subsection (2). 
(2) The grounds upon which a licence may be granted under this section are 
that a market for the patented invention is not being supplied, or is not being 
supplied on reasonable terms, in Singapore. 
Patents Act 2002  
Section 55  (1)   Any interested person may apply to the court for the grant of a licence 
under a patent on the ground that the grant of the licence is necessary to 
remedy an anti-competitive practice.  
(2)   Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the court may 
determine that the grant of a licence is necessary to remedy an anti-
competitive practice if —  
(a) there is a market for the patented invention in Singapore;  
(b) that market —  
(i) is not being supplied; or  
(ii) is not being supplied on reasonable terms; and  
(c) the court is of the view that the proprietor of the patent has no 
valid reason for failing to supply that market with the patented 






Section 27  (1) A person who claims that he requires a licence to do any act referred to 
in section 8 in relation to a protected layout-design may apply to the Court 
for the grant of a licence upon the ground that the grant of the licence is 
necessary to remedy an anti-competitive practice.  
(2) If the Court is satisfied that the ground referred to in subsection (1) is 
established, the Court may make an order for the grant of a licence in 
accordance with the application upon such terms as the Court thinks fit.  
(3) The Court shall specify in the order such remuneration to be paid to the 
qualified owner for the licence as the Court considers reasonable. 
 





Section 18 (1) Subject to section 19, any conduct on the part of one or more 
undertakings which amounts to the abuse of a dominant position in a market 
is prohibited if it may affect trade within the United Kingdom.
(2) Conduct may, in particular, constitute such an abuse if it consists in-  
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices 
or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
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other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of the contracts. 
(3) In this section-  
"dominant position" means a dominant position within the United 
Kingdom; and 
"the United Kingdom" means the United Kingdom or any part of it. 
EC Treaty   
Article 82 Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices 
or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers;  
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts. 
Charter of 
Fundamental 
Rights of the 
European Union 
Article 17 
1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her 
lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her 
possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the 
conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in 
good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so 
far as is necessary for the general interest. 
2. Intellectual property shall be protected. 
 
C. United States of America  
 
Sherman Act  
Section 1 Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage 
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine 
not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, 
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
 
Section 2 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall 
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished 
by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, 
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said 






§ 102(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is 





APPENDIX B – INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
 




For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the 
provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to 
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights. 
Article 7 
 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
Article 8 
 
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and 
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, 
and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their 
socio-economic and technological development, provided that such 
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.   
 
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 




1. Computer programs, whether in source or object code, shall be 
protected as literary works under the Berne Convention (1971). 
 
2. Compilations of data or other material, whether in machine readable 
or other form, which by reason of the selection or arrangement of their 
contents constitute intellectual creations shall be protected as such.  Such 
protection, which shall not extend to the data or material itself, shall be 
without prejudice to any copyright subsisting in the data or material itself. 
Article 12 
 
Whenever the term of protection of a work, other than a photographic work 
or a work of applied art, is calculated on a basis other than the life of a 
natural person, such term shall be no less than 50 years from the end of the 
calendar year of authorized publication, or, failing such authorized 
publication within 50 years from the making of the work, 50 years from the 
end of the calendar year of making. 
Article 13 
 
Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to 
certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right 
holder.   
Article 27.1 Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available 
for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application.722  Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, 
paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be 
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place 
of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or 
locally produced. 
Article 30 Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred 
                                                 
722 For the purposes of this Article, the terms "inventive step" and "capable of industrial 
application" may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the terms "non-obvious" and 
"useful" respectively. 
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 by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with 
a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate 
interests of third parties. 
Article 31 
 
Where the law of a Member allows for other use723 of the subject matter of 
a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the 
government or third parties authorized by the government, the following 
provisions shall be respected: 
 
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual 
merits; 
 
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed 
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not 
been successful within a reasonable period of time.  This requirement may 
be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial 
use.  In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as 
reasonably practicable.  In the case of public non-commercial use, where 
the government or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or has 
demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for 
the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly; 
 
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose 
for which it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor 
technology shall only be for public non-commercial use or to 
remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative 
process to be anti-competitive; 
 
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive; 
 
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the 
enterprise or goodwill which enjoys such use; 
 
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of 
the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use; 
 
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate 
protection of the legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to 
be terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to 
exist and are unlikely to recur.  The competent authority shall have 
the authority to review, upon motivated request, the continued 
existence of these circumstances; 
 
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the 
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value 
of the authorization; 
 
(i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of 
such use shall be subject to judicial review or other independent 
                                                 
723 "Other use" refers to use other than that allowed under Article 30. 
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review by a distinct higher authority in that Member; 
 
(j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of 
such use shall be subject to judicial review or other independent 
review by a distinct higher authority in that Member; 
 
(k) Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in 
subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use is permitted to remedy a 
practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be 
anti-competitive.  The need to correct anti-competitive practices 
may be taken into account in determining the amount of 
remuneration in such cases.  Competent authorities shall have the 
authority to refuse termination of authorization if and when the 
conditions which led to such authorization are likely to recur; 
 
(l) where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent 
("the second patent") which cannot be exploited without infringing 
another patent ("the first patent"), the following additional 
conditions shall apply: 
 
(i) the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an 
important technical advance of considerable economic 
significance in relation to the invention claimed in the first 
patent; 
 
(ii) the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a cross-
licence on reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in 
the second patent;  and 
 
(iii) the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be 




1. Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions 
pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain competition may 
have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and 
dissemination of technology. 
 
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying 
in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular 
cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse 
effect on competition in the relevant market.  As provided above, a Member 
may adopt, consistently with the other provisions of this Agreement, 
appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices, which may 
include for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing 
challenges to validity and coercive package licensing, in the light of the 
relevant laws and regulations of that Member. 
 
3. Each Member shall enter, upon request, into consultations with any 
other Member which has cause to believe that an intellectual property right 
owner that is a national or domiciliary of the Member to which the request 
for consultations has been addressed is undertaking practices in violation of 
the requesting Member's laws and regulations on the subject matter of this 
Section, and which wishes to secure compliance with such legislation, 
without prejudice to any action under the law and to the full freedom of an 
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ultimate decision of either Member.  The Member addressed shall accord 
full and sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity 
for, consultations with the requesting Member, and shall cooperate through 
supply of publicly available non-confidential information of relevance to 
the matter in question and of other information available to the Member, 
subject to domestic law and to the conclusion of mutually satisfactory 
agreements concerning the safeguarding of its confidentiality by the 
requesting Member. 
 
4. A Member whose nationals or domiciliaries are subject to 
proceedings in another Member concerning alleged violation of that other 
Member's laws and regulations on the subject matter of this Section shall, 
upon request, be granted an opportunity for consultations by the other 
Member under the same conditions as those foreseen in paragraph 3.  
 
2. The Berne Convention  
 
Article 6bis   (1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship 
of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification 
of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.  
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of 
the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions 
authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed. 
However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their 
ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection 
after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding 
paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, cease 
to be maintained.  
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article 
shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is 
claimed.  
Article 9 (1) Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall 
have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in 
any manner or form.  
(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit 
the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.  
(3) Any sound or visual recording shall be considered as a reproduction for 
the purposes of this Convention.  
 
Article 10bis (1) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit 
the reproduction by the press, the broadcasting or the communication to the 
public by wire, of articles published in newspapers or periodicals on current 
economic, political or religious topics, and of broadcast works of the same 
character, in cases in which the reproduction, broadcasting or such 
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communication thereof is not expressly reserved. Nevertheless, the source 
must always be clearly indicated; the legal consequences of a breach of this 
obligation shall be determined by the legislation of the country where 
protection is claimed.  
(2) It shall also be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to 
determine the conditions under which, for the purpose of reporting current 
events by means of photography, cinematography, broadcasting or 
communication to the public by wire, literary or artistic works seen or heard 
in the course of the event may, to the extent justified by the informatory 
purpose, be reproduced and made available to the public. 
Article 10 (1) It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has 
already been lawfully made available to the public, provided that their 
making is compatible with fair practice, and their extent does not exceed 
that justified by the purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles 
and periodicals in the form of press summaries.  
(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union, and for 
special agreements existing or to be concluded between them, to permit the 
utilization, to the extent justified by the purpose, of literary or artistic works 
by way of illustration in publications, broadcasts or sound or visual 
recordings for teaching, provided such utilization is compatible with fair 
practice.  
(3) Where use is made of works in accordance with the preceding 
paragraphs of this Article, mention shall be made of the source, and of the 
name of the author, if it appears thereon. 
 
Article 13 (1) Each country of the Union may impose for itself reservations and 
conditions on the exclusive right granted to the author of a musical work 
and to the author of any words, the recording of which together with the 
musical work has already been authorized by the latter, to authorize the 
sound recording of that musical work, together with such words, if any; but 
all such reservations and conditions shall apply only in the countries which 
have imposed them and shall not, in any circumstances, be prejudicial to the 
rights of these authors to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the 
absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority.  
(2) Recordings of musical works made in a country of the Union in 
accordance with Article 13 (3) of the Convention signed at Rome on June 2, 
1928, and at Brussels on June 26, 1948, may be reproduced in that country 
without the permission of the author of the musical work until a date two 
years after that country becomes bound by this Act.  
(3) Recordings made in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2) of this 
Article and imported without permission from the parties concerned into a 








APPENDIX C – INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS *724   
 
 Standards facilitate the interaction of sellers and buyers or users and providers 
and the interfacing of one product with another. Two products are compatible if they can 
be used together. Where several identical or complementary products work together, a 
network is formed. A set of product characteristics becomes a standard when it is 
incorporated in all or a significant part of the industry where the product is used. 
Standards may be simple, like those in the electric plug, or complex like those in a 
computer interface.  
 
 Markets affected by network effects require standards to facilitate coordination. 
Compatibility provides access to an installed base of customers. Access to a network is a 
crucial to a network business’s success. An example is a computer’s operating system 
(OS). Software applications must interconnect with the computer hardware to operate. 
Operating systems incorporate common functions, which need to be invoked by many 
applications. In the absence of an OS, each software application would have to 
incorporate its own mini-OS. Combining these common functions in an OS enables 
applications to omit those functions and enables the cost of producing the functions to be 
spread over the entire personal computer base, thus vastly reducing costs. Other examples 
include the Internet, B2Bs, telecommunications systems, computer operating systems, 
transportation systems, stock exchanges, and ATM and credit card systems.  
 
 Networks users benefit from the ability to access and connect with each other. By 
adopting uniform standards for interconnection, networks assure that all participants can 
use the system on equal terms. Because networks can only operate effectively under a 
single standard, they tend to vest dominant market power in the firm that owns the 
standard, leaving little, if any, room in the relevant market for other players. For example, 
in the Windows OS market, network effects imply that the greater the number of copies 
of Windows that are in use, the greater its value to users because the number of 
applications available for Windows will be positively influenced by the number of its 
users. In addition, entry, competition and innovation will be easier if a rival need only 
produce a single better component, than if each innovator must develop an entire system. 
 
 The stronger the network effects, the more powerful will be the pressures in the 
direction of a single standard. Those standards can be the product of private agreement, as 
in the DVD industry, or de facto standards can be the result of market forces, as in the 
personal computer industry. Because the Windows OS is in widespread use, it has 
sometimes been referred to as a de facto standard.  
 
 It should be evident from the foregoing that compatibility is a key factor in the 
network economy. Standards not only determine the parameters of the game but also 
construct the playing field and decide which teams get to play. A standard can promote 
competition if it creates an open and level playing field for new market entrants. 
                                                 
724* Sources: A D Melamed, ‘Network Industries and Antitrust’, (2000) 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 
147; J Farrell, ‘Standardisation and Intellectual Property’, in P Drahos (ed), Intellectual Property 
(Altershot: Ashgate, 2000);  G Lea, ‘Raising the Standard?: The Interaction of Intellectual 
Property Rights with Competition Law in the Context of Standard Setting in the Software and 
Telecommunications Sectors’, Intellectual Property Institute Seminar (27th October 1999); I 
Rahnasto, Intellectual Property Rights, External Effects and Anti-trust Law, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003) J M Mueller, ‘Patent Misuse through Capture of Industry Standards’, 
(2002) 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 623; R T Nimmer, ‘Standards, Antitrust and Intellectual Property’ 
(1995) 414 PLI/PAT 797; R J Kaufman et al, ‘Opening the Black Box of Network Externalities in 
Network Adoption’ (2000) 11 Information Systems Research 61; D J Gifford, ‘Developing Models 
for a Coherent Treatment of Standard-Setting Issues Under the Patent, Copyright, and Antitrust 
Laws’ (2003) 43 IDEA 331 
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However, a number of separate firms may own components in a network. Generally, 
owners intending to participate in a market for standardised products are unlikely to 
refuse to license its copyright. If it were to do so, other undertakings with necessary 
copyright would probably refuse to license to it, making it impossible for anyone to 
benefit from the standard. Without standardisation, different owners would act 
opportunistically, raising transaction costs and creating uncertainty. 
 
 However, owners may sometimes use copyright to control the extent to which 
rivals benefit from network effects. For companies developing proprietary applications 
that function as information platforms, protecting their standard often through copyright 
is critical to enabling them to succeed. In the case of a game console, for example, the 
inventor may well safeguard access to its platform standard to prevent a potential rival 
from accessing its system and appropriating the value of the original invention by 
developing a clone. For such basic standards, copyright law confronts a dilemma.  
 
 On one hand, allowing one firm to control standards may prevent the technology 
from gaining adopters. In these circumstances, copyright might convert initial success 
into permanent dominance, if it helped the initially successful firm to maintain control 
over product interface technology. Standardisation reduces variety by constraints in 
architectural design. Innovation is also retarded as consumers and producers of 
complementary products may find themselves locked into a standard. This is an economic 
theory based on the idea that no user would want to bear the heavy switching costs 
inflicted on the first group that switches to the new standard. On the other hand, not 
allowing the creator to reap rewards from its work will fail to provide an incentive for 
firms to innovate in the first place. Consumers benefit from standardisation not only 
because they can reliably use their products in remote locations, but also because they can 
exchange information with others who use the same standard. Customers often not 
technologically savvy and are reluctant to choose between competing technologies, since 
they may be locked into inferior technology if they make the wrong choices. By joining 
the majority, there is a high likelihood that particularly amongst the earlier entrants, there 





APPENDIX D- REVERSE ENGINEERING*725  
 
 A software engineer may write software which becomes the industry standard, 
and acts as the architecture for communication between related applications. Copyright 
protects the interface information, a set of electronic keys requiring precise emulation in 
order to secure operation between programs. In order to develop compatible interoperable 
programs, it is often necessary to decompile it to access its source code to discover this 
information. This is a quintessential form of reverse engineering. Several methods of 
reverse engineering pose little legal risk of copyright infringement. For instance, studying 
published documentation, performing timing tests and observing the inputs, outputs, and 
conditions of operation are all methods of reverse engineering that pose no legal problems 
regarding the rights of a copyright owner. Reverse engineering by decompilation has been 
repeatedly challenged as a violation of copyright. It requires at least a partial reproduction 
of the original object code program. To the extent that the reproduced object code is 
protected by copyright, the making of this temporary copy constitutes prima facie 
copyright infringement.   
 
 Copyright law permits reverse engineering in a functional sense. One could find 
the uncopyrightable ideas hidden in a book without copying the book, and therefore 
without triggering copyright law at all. As copyrighted works are placed in digital form, 
this has changed. Virtually every use of a digital work involves the making of at least one 
copy. In response to this change, courts have created a limited right to reverse engineer a 
work in order to extract uncopyrightable information from the work.  
 
 In industries with network effects, there is a strong economic argument in favour 
of permitting reverse engineering where it promotes either vertical or horizontal 
compatibility with an industry standard. Users of products that work with an industry 
standard will benefit from its widespread adoption. If competitors produce goods that are 
broadly compatible products, consumers will be able to switch freely between products. 
At the same time, competition among providers of products incorporating that standard 
will remain. This is not necessarily a clear benefit to competition. Instead, it foregoes 
competition where competition that would otherwise have occurred to set the de facto 
standard in favour of competition among competing suppliers of standard-compatible 
products. 
                                                 
725 * Sources: G  Wei, The Law of Copyright in Singapore, (SNP Editions: Singapore, 2000), at 
pp.1251-5; W Cornish and D Llewellyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks 
and Allied Rights (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th Edition, 2003) at p.755.  
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APPENDIX E - GLOSSARY  
 
Term Definition 
Allocative efficiency Where prices equal marginal cost of production, which in turn 
maximises the output of society’s resources.  
Antitrust laws Statutes that limit the market power exercised by firms and 
control how firms compete with each other.  
Application Tools  Application tools are programs used by programmers to retrieve, 
process and manage data and databases, and to develop 
application solutions. These tools range from spreadsheets, to 
database managements systems. Most application tools 
incorporate programming languages that can be used by 
relatively unskilled programmers to develop simple applications.  
Application Program 
Interfaces (APIs) 
Points of contact between software and the operating system. 
Hence it is to these APIs that application software conforms.  
Asymmetric 
Information  
One party to a transaction knows a material fact the other party 
does not know.  
Assembly Converting a low-level assembly language into object code.  
Barrier to entry Anything that prevents an entrepreneur from instantaneously 
creating a new firm in a market.  
Bounded Rationality The inability to fully understand and predict all future 
possibilities because courts and regulators are not omniscient.   
Capture theory An industry ‘captures’ (persuades, bribes or threatens) the 
regulators, so that the regulators do what the industry wants.  
CFI Court of First Instance. Here it refers to the Courts in the 
European Union.  
Compiling  Compiling a computer program means converting a high level 
language code program into an object code that is machine 
readable.  
Competition Competition is a rivalrous relationship between undertakings 
selling similar goods or services at the same time to an 
identifiable group of customers.  
Competition law Rules to promote market competition and strengthen efficiency.  
Competition Policy Government policies that preserve and protect competition 
among independent buyers and sellers in relatively unregulated 
markets. This includes market opening policies that promote 
competition in national markets and laws that regulate 
commercial trade and conduct. Of these, two notable ones are 
competition law and intellectual property law. 
Computer Software  The International Standardisation Organisation and WIPO give 
similar definitions of computer software and services which can 
be summarised as follows. Software is the production of a 
structured set of instructions, procedures, programs, rules and 
documentation contained in any types of physical support with 
the aim of making possible the use of electronic data processing 
equipment. (OECD, 1985). 
Concentrated An industry is concentrated if a few firms make most of the 
sales.  
Consumer Surplus The amount above the price paid that a consumer would 
willingly spend, if necessary, to consume the units purchased.  
Contestable A market is contestable if there is free entry and exit.  An entrant 
has access to all production techniques available to the 
incumbents, is not prohibited from wooing the incumbent’s 
 257
customers, and entry decisions can be reversed without cost. It 
is, however, not synonymous with markets subject to real 
potential competition. 
Copyright  Copyright protects original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression. Broadly, copyright infringement 
occurs when third parties reproduce or distribute copies of the 
copyrighted work without the owner’s consent.  
Deadweight Loss The cost to society of a market that does not operate optimally.  
Decompilation  Process of obtain interface details. For example, A may wish to 
develop a new word processing program. A will need to know 
details of various computer operating systems so that it can work 
in the computer’s operating environment. A must determine how 
the operating systems use the computer’s memory so that it’s the 
word processing program can run properly. Also, to be 
successful, this program must be compatible with other existing 
programs. It must be able to import fields produced by other 
word processors and export them to non-word processors.  
Decreasing Returns to 
Scale 
Average cost rises with output (also known as diseconomies of 
scale) 
Disassembly Produces assembly language from an object code version of a 
computer program. Unlocks the ideas and techniques contained 
in the object code version of the program.  
Dominant Firm A price-setting firm that faces smaller, price taking firms.  
Downstream Firms Firms that produce the final good.  
Durable Goods Goods that last for several time periods.  
Dynamic efficiency Competition takes place for the market. Firms compete through 
innovation to dominate the market. Those that succeed are enjoy 
a ‘fragile monopoly’ because they can only retain their position 
if they continue to innovate. Scale economies in production 
together with network effects may result in a few dominant firms 
able to function at the lowest costs. Successful innovators must 
charge more than marginal cost to compensate for their fixed 
costs and risky investment. The average returns for competitors, 
adjusted for risk, are normal. But winners receive huge profits 
and control the industry standard with its IPRs. However, this 
may not mean that competition has failed.       
Easements A species of real property by which one landowner has a right 
over the land of another. As an interest in land, it is separate 
from, but ‘parasitic upon the land’.  
Economic rent  The return for the use of a factor in excess of the minimum 
required to bring the factor into use.  
ECJ The European Court of Justice. The highest administrative court 
of appeal in the European Union.   
Economies of Scale Where increases in output lead to falling average costs of 
production.  
Entry Conditions Firms enter the market when profits are positive and exit when 
profits are negative.  
Essential Facilities Scarce resources that a competitor needs to use to survive.   
Essential Facilities 
Doctrine 
The doctrine recognizes that a monopolist can gain an unfair 
competitive advantage in a related market by denying its 
competitors the right to access a resource required to engage in 
effective competition in that market. 
Exclusionary Abuse A situation in which a dominant undertaking uses its position of 
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power to drive its competitors out of the market, prevent 
potential competitors from entering, or make it difficult from 
them to compete with the dominant player.  
Exploitative Abuse A situation in which a dominant undertaking uses its position of 
power to exploit the market and make a supra-competitive profit. 
This behaviour is suggested as being rational for a monopolist 
who wishes to maximise its profits, and its avoidance is therefore 
considered to be one of the main aims of any competition law 
system. (Note: this does not apply in Singapore)  
Externality The direct effect on the well being of a consumer or the 
production capability of a firm from the actions of other 
consumers or firms.  
Fair Use/ Fair Dealing A copyright law doctrine intended to allow third parties the use 
of protected expression certain circumstances. 
Fee Simple A property right allowing heirs to succeed the interest of the 
owner on his death. At common law, the fee simple was the 
largest segment of time that an individual could hold land.   
Firm An organisation that transforms inputs (resources it purchases) 
into outputs (valued products that it sells).  
First Mover 
Advantage 
The first firm to enter incurs lower costs because it faces no 
rivals.  
First Sale Doctrine An owner who voluntarily puts its goods on the market exhausts 
its right to control its resale.  
Fixed Costs Expenses that do not vary with the level of output.  
Free Riding A situation where someone obtain a benefit from another’s 
investment without paying for it.  
Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index 




Common communications standards that allow each part of the 
network to work effectively with its other parts. 
Increasing Returns to 
Scale 
Average cost falls as output increases.  
Industrial 
Organisation 
The study of the structure of firms and markets and of their 
interaction.  
Inelasticity  A demand curve is inelastic if a 1% increase in price reduces the 
quantity demanded by less than 1%.  
Infocommunications A facility allowing the transmission of information between 
individual using fibre-optic cables.  
Instant scalability  Where a firm’s output can be increased rapidly without the usual 
additional costs associated with rapid increases in output. Where 
products are differentiated and where consumers have similar 
preferences, a product that consumers identify as ‘best’ can be 
quickly offered in sufficient quantity to satisfy the entire market.  
Internalising the 
Externality 
Forcing someone who is causing an externality to bear the full 




Rights relating to literary, artistic and scientific works, 
performances and performing artists, photographs and 
broadcasts; inventions in all fields of human endeavour- 
scientific discoveries, industrial designs;  trademarks, service 
marks, and commercial names and designations; protection 
against unfair competition and all other rights resulting from 
intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic 
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fields. 
ISO Independent service organisations  
Leveraging  A tactic by which an undertaking with monopoly power, such as 
those conferred by IPRs, in one market exploits that power into 
another market. It also refers to leveraging power from one 
product to another, as in tying cases. 
License  . A species of real property which does not pass any property 
interest, but only makes lawful an action which would otherwise 
be unlawful.   
. A permit granted by the IP owner to another firm to produce the 
product or use the process.  
Long Run A sufficiently lengthy period of time such that all factors of 
production can be costlessly varied.    
Marginal Cost The increase in total cost as a result of producing an additional 
unit of the good.  
Marginal Revenue The extra revenues that a firm receives when it produces one 
more unit of the product.  
Market Definition  The competing product and geographic area in which 
competition occurs that determines the price for a given product. 
Market Failure Distortions or inefficient production due to improper pricing.  
Market Power The ability of a firm to set price profitably above competitive 
levels. (marginal cost) 
Middleware The term "middleware" has been used to describe software such 
as Netscape's Navigator Internet browser and Sun Microsystem's 
"Java" software, which have the capability to serve as platforms 
for the operation of applications programs. As such software 
becomes capable of supporting a growing number of 
applications, it ultimately could compete with Microsoft's 
Windows program.  
Monopoly A single seller in the market.  
Negative Externality A ‘bad’ that is not priced (such as pollution) 
Network Any system that facilitates the exchange of information, money, 
goods or services among individuals or firms. 
Network effects A phenomenon where the benefits of consuming a good or 
service depends positively on the number of individuals who 
also do so. These may also be known as demand-side economies 
of scale or Metcalfe’s law.   
Operating system 
(OS) 
The software platform that allows applications to run on a 
computer.  
Patent A limited monopoly that is granted in return for the disclosure of 
technical information. The applicant is required to disclose its 
invention so that it can be sued by a ‘person skilled in the art’. In 
return, the state issues the applicant with a patent that gives it the 
right to control the way its patented invention is exploited for a 
20 year period.    
Path dependency A phenomenon where the possibility that small events at a given 
time might have major effects on the long run evolution of a 
specific technological trajectory. In particular, an industry may 
be stuck in an inferior technology because of the cost advantages 
of the existing network. 
Perfect Competition A market outcome in which all firms produce homogenous, 
perfectly divisible output and face no barriers to entry or exit; 
producers and consumers have full information, incur no 
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transaction costs , and are price takers; and there are no 
externalities.  
Per Se Violation An action that by itself, is illegal.  
Piracy  Piracy is understood broadly to include any situation where the 
copyright owner is not able to appropriate returns from an 
expected sale of its work. 
Positive Externality An uncompensated action that benefits others.  
Predatory Pricing A firm first lowers its price in order to drive rivals out of 
business and scare off potential entrants and then raises its price 
when rivals exit the market.  
Price-cost margin A measure of the markup of price over marginal cost.  
Primary Market The primary market is the market served, and in many cases 
made possible by, an electronic network. In the primary market, 
firms use a network to provide products and services to users. A 
computer operating system, for example, serves several different 
primary markets, including word processing, databases, 
spreadsheets, electronic mail, games, and Internet browsers. 
Product 
Differentiation 
A market strategy that firms use to ‘relax’ price competition. 
Products may be differentiated horizontally, by location or 
vertically, by quality.  
Property Rights Exclusive rights to use some asset.  
Public Good Something useful which, if supplied to one person, can be made 
available to others at no extra cost.  
Regulatory capture A situation identified by industrial economic theory where the 
regulator unduly favours the regulated party, because of bribes or 
similar incentives.  
Resale Price 
Maintenance 
The manufacturer sets a minimum price that may be charged by 
retailers.  
Reverse engineering See generally, ‘Decompilation’.  
Rule of reason Under this doctrine, alleged anticompetitive conduct is not 
automatically forbidden or permitted in per se. An analysis of 
the competitive effect is done within the economic context in 
which it occurs before the court decides whether to condemn the 
practice or allow it to continue. 
Secondary Market The secondary market is at a level once removed from the 
primary market. In the secondary market, networks compete 
among themselves to provide network services. 
Short run A time period so brief that some factors of production cannot be 
costlessly varied.  
SME Small and medium enterprises 
Software systems System software comprises operating systems and utilities. 
Operating systems are sets of programs that regulate the 
functionality of a computer program by linking the central 
processing unit to computer peripherals, such as storage devices 
like RAM and ROM, monitors, printers and input/output devices 
such as keyboards and optical scanners. Operating systems 
translate programs developed in binary digit sequences of coded 
instructions into program languages. They interface users and 
machines capabilities. 
Standards  Standards describe sets of product characteristics and are used to 
communicate information about products and guide or control 
the production of products.   
Standardisation  The basic aim of standardisation is to ensure interoperability 
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between related technologies. 
Static Efficiency  Competition takes place in the market, with firms competing to 
provide the lowest prices and best features. With many firms and 
few barriers to entry, competition minimises costs to consumers 
and eliminates the ability of a firm to earn supernormal profits. 
Thus, competition assures prices equal the marginal cost of 
production.  
Software Packages Software packages include programs that are developed to 
execute cross industry tasks. They included system software, 
programming languages, applications tools and application 
solutions. 
Switching Costs Costs incurred by users when they switch from their existing 
platform to another one. This could manifest in terms of the time 
taken to learn how to use the new platform, the loss in 
interoperability with applications compatible with the old 
platform, or interoperability with users of the old platform.   
Tipping  A point where the joint existence of two incompatible products 
becomes unstable and a single product standard will dominate. 
Undertakings Economic entities, usually firms or a group of firms.    
Upstream Firms Firms that supply the inputs in the production process.  
Utilities Utilities are programs managed by the operating system that are 
used for the maintenance and safety of programs, the conversion 
of programs from one language to another, and the organisation 
of information. They comprise compilers, assemblers, 
translators, sort/merge programs, screen generators and 
communication monitors. Internet software browsers such as 
Netscape’s Navigator and Microsoft’s Explorer have been 
introduced to extend the functions of traditional utilities.  
Vertical Integration A strategy where the firm performs internally an economic 
function that it could have contracted out.  
  
 
 
